JUDGMENT : AIKMAN, J.:— The applicant's suit was based on a document, dated the 23rd November, 1902. It was thrown out by the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Dehra Dun, on the ground that the document, the basis of the suit, was inadmissible in evidence owing to want of registration. An application has been made to this Court to deal with the case under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, 1887. It is contended on behalf of the applicants that the document was not one which was compulsorily registrable under the provisions of section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877. The decision of this point turns on the question, whether the document can be considered to be one conveying an interest in immovable property. In my opinion it is nothing but an agreement by the opposite party whereby he sold the trees standing in a certain area of land. These trees were sold, not that the produce thereof might be enjoyed but simply with a view to their being cut down and removed. The document provides that the cutting was to begin from the day of execution. The fact that the applicants were to be allowed to cut down and remove the timber for a space of two years, could not, in my opinion, render the transaction a transfer of interest in immovable property. The terms of the lease in the case relied on by the learned Judge, namely, Seeni Chettiar v. Santhanathan Chettiar, [1896] I.L.R., 20 Mad., 58. differ materially from the terms of the document in this case. In the Madras case the lease gave a right to the enjoyment of the forest produce, grass, & c, for a term of four years as well as a right to cut the timber. The definition in section 3 of the Indian Registration Act shows that the Legislature intended to exclude standing timber from the category of immovable property. In my opinion the document in question was nothing but the sale of standing timber, giving the petitioners somewhat extended period for its removal. I therefore held that it was not inadmissible for the want of registration. In my opinion the document in question was nothing but the sale of standing timber, giving the petitioners somewhat extended period for its removal. I therefore held that it was not inadmissible for the want of registration. I set aside the decree of the lower Court, dismissing the plaintiffs suit with costs, and remand the case to that Court with directions to re-admit the case under its original number in the register and dispose of it on the merits. As the opposite party raised the plea as to the document being inadmissible for want of registration, which plea has now been overruled, the applicants are entitled to their costs in this Court which will include fees on the higher scale. Other costs will abide the result.