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1905 DIGILAW 203 (ALL)

Brij Kishore v. Madho Singh

1905-12-04

BURKITT, STANLEY

body1905
JUDGMENT : Stanley, J. We think that the view expressed by our brother AIKMAN in his judgment is correct. Little can be usefully added to that judgment. Mr. Sundar Lal forcibly argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to ignore the foreclosure decree which was made absolute on the 28th of January, 1899, for one purpose and treat it as binding for another. His argument is no doubt logical. If a party seeks to have a judgment set aside, he must have it set aside in toto, he cannot take advantage of it for one purpose whilst repudiating it in other respects. In this case, however, the defendants-appellants could not have the foreclosure decree set aside as against the mortgagors who were parties to the suit. That decree is binding as between them and the mortgagees. This being so, the defendants-appellants under that decree are and must be treated as the absolute owners of the shares in the villages in dispute with the exception of the portion of sir land which was sold to the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs were bound, as Mr. Sundar Lal contends, to redeem the whole mortgage, the result would he that immediately on redemption they would be entitled in view of section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act to claim and recover from the defendants-appellants rateable contribution to the mortgage-debt and so obtain by two suits substantially the same relief as that which they ask for in the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. The question then is, are two suits necessary? Clearly not, we think, in view of the provisions of section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendants-appellants have by their foreclosure decree acquired from their mortgagors a share of the mortgaged property. The plaintiffs-respondents are interested also in a share of that property, and therefore, as it appears to us, are in the terms of the section entitled to redeem their own share only on payment of a proportionate part of the amount remaining due on the mortgage. We therefore dismiss the appeal, but without costs, as the plaintiffs-respondents are not represented before us.