JUDGMENT Rampini, J. - This is an appeal against an order of the lower Court in an execution case allowing execution. The decree-holder obtained in 1889 a decree for a perpetual injunction prohibiting the erection of a pucca building on a certain plot of land. The judgment-debtor disobeyed the injunction in February 1904. The lower Court has allowed the decree-holder to execute his decree by attaching the property of the judgment-debtor. It is contended before us-(1) that execution should not have been allowed to proceed at the instance of one decree-holder without notice to the judgment-debtor-(2) similarly, that an order under sec. 260, C.P.C., should not have been passed without notice--(3) that the decree-holder should not have been granted a relief which he did not ask for-(4) that the judgment-debtor has no objection to the demolition of the house but should not be called on to demolish it, as he is no longer in possession of the land. I am of opinion that these pleas are all frivolous and without any substance. Neither sec. 231 nor sec. 260, C.P.C., requires the issue of any notice to the judgment-debtor before an order under either is made. Nor do the rulings under these sections make it imperative on a Court to issue (sic) This seems to be left, as it should be, to the discretion of the Court in consideration of the circumstances of each case. The judgment-debtor had ample opportunity of obeying the decree and obeyed it for about 15 years-when he without warning proceeded to act in defiance of it. One case Protap Chandra Das v. Peary Chowdhrain ILR 8 Cal. 174 (1881) has been much relied on. In this case the Judges who decided it held that a notice should be issued before executing the decree and remanded the case. I do not understand the Judges to have laid down any general rule. They could not add to the provisions of sec. 260, C.P.C. I regard their observations as to the propriety of issuing a notice as applying only to the particular case before them. 2. It would be in my opinion a very narrow view of the law if it were held that because the decree-holder applied for the demolition of the house he is not entitled to the relief which the law allows him. 2. It would be in my opinion a very narrow view of the law if it were held that because the decree-holder applied for the demolition of the house he is not entitled to the relief which the law allows him. The lower Court was, therefore, I consider right in allowing the decree-holder to execute his decree by attachment. 3. The judgment-debtor's fourth plea is a most disingenuous one. The lower Court has found that the judgment-debtor has collusively transferred his property to his relatives, but he still retains his share in the land and is in joint occupation of it. 4. I would dismiss the appeal with costs, 5 gold mohurs. Mookerjee, J. 5. On the 30th March 1889, two persons Deoraj Agarwalla and Normal Agarwalla obtained in a contested suit against Durgadas Nandi and Jadu Nath Roy a decree which granted a perpetual injunction restraining the latter from erecting pucca buildings on a parcel of land, the subject-matter of that litigation. On the 16th March 1904, Deoraj, one of the decree-holders, applied for execution of the decree against Durgadas, one of the judgment-debtors; it was alleged that Durgadas had in contravention of the terms of the decree erected a pucca building on the 17th and 18th February 1904 and the only relief asked for was the demolition of the building by an officer of the Court. The Courts below have concurrently found that the building has been erected by the judgment-debtor as alleged by the decree-holder, but they have held that as the decree did not expressly direct the demolition of any buildings, the only relief that could be granted was under sec. 260, C.P.C., and they have accordingly ordered an attachment of the judgment-debtor's properties for the period of one year. The judgment-debtor has appealed to this Court and on his behalf the decision of the lower Court has been assailed on four grounds, namely, first, that as the decree was in favour of two persons jointly, it could not be executed at the instance of one of the decree-holders without notice to the other; secondly, that inasmuch as the decree-holder had only asked for the demolition of the buildings, it was not competent to the Court to make an order of attachment under sec.260, C.P.C.; thirdly, that it was not competent to the Court to make any order under sec. 260, C.P.C., without previous service of notice upon the judgment-debtor calling upon him to comply within a time to be fixed by such notice with the order contained in the decree; and, fourthly, that no order could be made against the judgment-debtor inasmuch as at the time of the erection of the buildings he had ceased to be the owner of the property. In my opinion, none of these grounds can be successfully maintained and the order of the Court below must be affirmed. 6. In support of his first contention it has been argued by the learned vakil for the Appellant that ordinarily all the decree-holders in a joint decree must join in an application to execute it, that one of several decree-holders has no right to claim execution and that an application by him ought not to be entertained till notice thereof has been given to the other decree holders. In order to sustain this proposition, reliance is placed upon the cases of Umrith Nauth v. Chandra Kishore 21 W.R. 31 (1873), and Ahmed Chowdry v. Shahzada Khatoon 7 C.L.R. 537 (1880). The cases referred to, however, do not support the broad contention advanced on behalf of the Appellant and are clearly distinguishable. It may be conceded that before an order for execution is made on an application presented by one of several joint decree-holders, the Court is bound under sec. 231, C.P.C., to satisfy itself that he has sufficient cause for asking for execution alone, and the Court must also take steps for protecting the interests of the persons who have not joined in the application. Ordinarily no doubt this cannot be properly done without hearing the other decree-holders and for this purpose, the application may have to be disposed of after service of notice to them. This procedure would obviously be desirable in cases of decrees for money, as is shown by the two decisions just mentioned. But where, as in the present instance, there is no possibility of the absent decree-holder being prejudiced by reason of an order for execution made on the application of the other decree-holder, I am not aware of any rule of law which makes it obligatory upon the Court to issue a notice upon him. This view is supported by the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Hurrish Chunder v. Kalisundari L.R. 10 I.A. 4 (1882). This view is supported by the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Hurrish Chunder v. Kalisundari L.R. 10 I.A. 4 (1882). The first ground urged on behalf of the Appellant therefore fails and must be overruled. 7. In support of the second contention advanced on behalf of the Appellant, it is argued that the decree-holder must be limited to the sole relief asked for in his application for execution and as that relief cannot be granted as is laid down in the cases of Bhooban Mohun v. Nabin Chunder 18 W.R. 282 (1872), and Protap Chandra v. Peary Chowdhrain ILR 8 Cal. 174 (1881), the application ought to be dismissed. Reliance is placed in support of this proposition on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sha Karam Chand v. Ghela Bhai ILR 19 Bom. 34 (1893). That case, however, is clearly distinguishable, inasmuch as the learned Judges confined their decision to the ground that an application for execution in which the only relief asked for was that steps be taken according to the law, did not comply with the requirements of sec. 235, cl (j) and see. 260 of the CPC and ought not to be entertained. On the other hand, the observations of Jenkins, C. J., in Sakar Lal v. Bai Parbati Bai ILR 26 Bom. 283, 287 (1901), show that in a case of this description notwithstanding the form of the applicant's prayer, the Court ought to make such order as the law permits, allowing any amendment that may be necessary for that purpose. Strictly speaking the judgment-debtor might perhaps have insisted that before any relief could be granted to the decree-holder, he ought to have asked for leave to make an amendment of the prayer clause in his application; but the omission to do so has not in any way placed the judgment-debtor at a disadvantage, nor is there any suggestion that he was taken by surprise. The second ground therefore is purely technical and ought not to prevail. 8. The third ground on which the validity of the order of the Court below is questioned turns upon the construction of sec. The second ground therefore is purely technical and ought not to prevail. 8. The third ground on which the validity of the order of the Court below is questioned turns upon the construction of sec. 260 of the CPC which so far as it is applicable to the present case provides as follows : "When the party against whom a decree for the obstruction from any particular act has been made, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree or injunction and has wilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced by his imprisonment or by the attachment of his property or by both." It is argued on behalf of the Appellant upon the authority of the decision of this Court in Protap Chandra v. Peary Chowdhrain ILR 8 Cal. 174 (1881), that it is obligatory upon the Court under this section, to serve a notice upon the judgment-debtor, calling upon him to comply within a time to be fixed by such notice, with the order contained in the decree; and if the judgment-debtor within such time fails to comply with such order, the Court can then at the instance of the decree-holder make an order either for the imprisonment of the judgment-debtor or for the attachment of his property, due regard being had to the provisions of the section in the latter case. After a careful examination of the decision referred to and of the grounds upon which it is founded, I must hold that it is distinguishable and does not lay down any general rule applicable to the case now before me. Sec. 260 merely provides that before a decree for an injunction may be enforced by imprisonment or attachment, it must be established that the judgment-debtor has had an opportunity of obeying the injunction and has wilfully failed to obey it. But this does not show that in every case in which a decree-holder asks for relief under sec. Sec. 260 merely provides that before a decree for an injunction may be enforced by imprisonment or attachment, it must be established that the judgment-debtor has had an opportunity of obeying the injunction and has wilfully failed to obey it. But this does not show that in every case in which a decree-holder asks for relief under sec. 260, he must serve a notice upon the judgment-debtor calling upon him to obey the decree; no doubt if he takes this precaution and the judgment-debtor fails to obey the decree the case against the latter is completely proved, but it is quite possible for the decree-holder even without service of notice to show conclusively that the judgment-debtor had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has wilfully failed to obey it; see, for instance, Hawkins v. State 126 Ind. 294; 26 N.E. 43 (1890) in which it was held that where an order of injunction forms part of a decree rendered in regular course upon issue joined by answer, the parties to the suit are bound to take notice thereof without being served with a certified copy of the decree. To take the present case, again, as an illustration, it is proved that the decree was made in a contested suit, the judgment-debtor was aware of the injunction granted against him, he obeyed it for a period of fifteen years and subsequently he has acted in total disregard of the injunction. Under these circumstances I find it difficult to realise what useful purpose would have been served by the issue of a notice upon the judgment-debtor calling upon him to comply with the order contained in the decree within a specified time. If such a notice had been issued and the judgment-debtor had pulled down the buildings he had erected it could not properly be said that he was complying with the order made in the decree, he had disobeyed the order as soon as the erections were made and their subsequent removal would have been not a compliance with the order of the Court but rather a purging of the contempt of which he was guilty. In the case of Protap Chandra v. Peary Chowdhrain ILR 8 Cal. In the case of Protap Chandra v. Peary Chowdhrain ILR 8 Cal. 174 (1881) the decree directed that the Defendants do forthwith pull down and remove a wall; in other words, the decree called upon the judgment-debtor to perform a particular act and in such a case it might have been desirable to issue a notice upon the judgment-debtor calling upon him to comply with the order of the Court, so that no question might arise as to whether he had an opportunity of obeying the decree, and had wilfully failed to obey it. (See the observations of the Judicial Committee in Kishore Bun Mohunt v. Dwarkanath L.R. 21 IndAp 89 (1894), see also Gilbert v. Endean 9 Ch. Div. 259 (266) (1878), where Sir George Jessel, M. R., pointed out that when a judgment directs an act to be done forthwith, it cannot be said that it fixes any date of the act to be done, though Lord Romilly, M. R., took the contrary view in Thomas v. Nokes L.R., 6 Eq. 521 (1868). But I cannot regard this as an inflexible rule of universal application, and if the learned Judges who decided the case of Protap Chandra v. Peary ILR 8 Cal. 174 (1881), intended to lay down any such general rule I must hold that they engrafted upon sec. 260 a provision for which there is no foundation in the Code. It appears to me that when a judgment-debtor who has had an opportunity of obeying an injunction issued by the Court, has wilfully failed to obey it, he is in substance guilty of a contempt of Court, and our Code provides that the judgment may, in such an event, be enforced by imprisonment or attachment, which is also the procedure followed in the English and the American Courts; see Domile on Chancery Practice, 7th Ed., Vol. II, pp. 1375, 1376. But so far as I can make out, it is not the practice anywhere to give an opportunity to the person guilty of contempt, to clear or purge his contempt. As is pointed out in Kerr on Injunctions, 4th Ed., Ch. II, pp. 1375, 1376. But so far as I can make out, it is not the practice anywhere to give an opportunity to the person guilty of contempt, to clear or purge his contempt. As is pointed out in Kerr on Injunctions, 4th Ed., Ch. XXIII, sec.6, to sustain an order for committal or attachment it must be shown that there has been an actual and wilful breach of the injunction, but if this is established, all that is necessary is that the notice of the application for committal or attachment should be served upon the party who is alleged to be guilty of the breach of injunction. The procedure is similarly described in spelling on Injunctions, Vol. II, sec. 1121: "The main features of the proceeding are (1) the filing of an affidavit by complainant setting forth the facts constituting a violation of the injunction, (2) notice to the party charged to show cause, (3) a hearing upon further affidavits by complainant, if any be produced, and whatever counter affidavits the accused may see fit to file or evidence in other form, and (4) the order assessing the punishment." In the case before us, notice of the application for execution was served upon the judgment-debtor and he had ample opportunity, of which the record shows he fully availed himself, to contest the allegations of the decree-holder. The grounds set up in defence have completely failed on the merits, and in my opinion, it would be lamentable if we were constrained by any rule of law to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that the judgment-debtor was entitled as a matter of right to be allowed an opportunity to undo what he had done deliberately and in defiance of law, before an order of imprisonment or attachment could be made against him under sec. 260, C.P.C. I have arrived at this conclusion without any hesitation inasmuch as, up to the present stage of the proceedings, the judgment-debtor has not shown any indication of repentance for the contempt of which he is guilty, but has rather strenuously resisted the application upon every technical and unsubstantial ground which ingenuity could suggest. The third ground consequently fails and must be overruled. 9. The fourth ground taken on behalf of the Appellant relates to the merits of the case and has no force in it. The third ground consequently fails and must be overruled. 9. The fourth ground taken on behalf of the Appellant relates to the merits of the case and has no force in it. The Courts below have found on the evidence that although the property has been nominally transferred, the judgment-debtor still continues to be the owner in possession and the buildings have been erected at his instance and under his supervision. The various transactions for the alienation of the property appear to constitute an elaborate contrivance for the evasion of the injunction and cannot be allowed to succeed. See St. John's College v. Carter 4 my & Cr.497 (1839), where Lord Cottenham, L.C., laid down that if a person enjoined from doing an act, is afterwards present, aiding and abetting it when done, he must; be considered as himself actually guilty of a breach of injunction. The fourth ground therefore must be negatived. The appeal consequently fails and must be dismissed with costs.