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1905 DIGILAW 209 (ALL)

Babu Lal v. Ram Kali

1905-12-07

BANERJI, RICHARDS

body1905
JUDGMENT : Banerji, J. This is an appeal from an order of remand made by the Court below under section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the order of remand has already been carried out, the learned Vakil for the respondent raises a preliminary objection to the effect that this appeal should not be heard, and relies upon certain cases reported in the Weekly Notes for 1882 and 1884. Those cases were considered by the Full Bench in Rameshur Singh v. Sheodin Singh, [1890] I.L.R., 12 All., 510, and it was held that the view taken in the earlier cases was erroneous. The preliminary objection must therefore fail. 2. The suit was one by the usufructuary mortgagee of an occupancy holding to recover possession of the holding. The mortgage was made on the 16th of April, 1898, that is, prior to the passing of the Agra Tenancy Act No. II of 1901. Having regard to the rulings of this Court in Khiali Ram v. Nathu Lal, [1893] I.L.R., 15 All., 219 and in Brijmohan Das v. Algu, [1904] I.L.R., 26 All., 78, it is clear that the plaintiff could have succeeded in recovering possession of the mortgaged property from his mortgagor at any time before the passing of Act No. II of 1901. It is argued, however, that section 21 of that Act prohibits a transfer of any kind including a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding; that consequently the mortgage cannot be given effect to after the passing of that Act, and that the claim ought to have been dismissed. We do not deem it necessary to decide for the purpose of this appeal whether section 21 prohibits an occupancy tenant from parting with the possession of his occupancy holding by making a usufructuary mortgage. However, the Act cannot have retrospective effect, and if what the tenant did was valid under the law which was in force at the time when the mortgage was made, and if the mortgagee was entitled to enforce his mortgage before the passing of the new Act, he would be equally entitled to do so after the passing of that Act. Section 2, clause 4, upon which the learned Vakil for the appellant has relied, has no bearing upon the question before us. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.