Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (September 9, 1902) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Court of Kishna (March 27, 1900). The suit was brought by the appellant against the first respondent, the Zemindar of Telaprole, and a ward of the Court of Wards, and sixteen other defendants, to recover possession of the village of Hanumantunigudem, together with mesne profits. The village in question formed part of the ancient Zemindari of Nuzvid (the history of which appears in the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Venkata Narasimha v. Narayya Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 46 ( 1905- 1906) Raja Venkata Narasimha v. Raja Sobhanadri Appa Rao 153 (( 1879) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 38.)), and it was granted by one of the zemindars to the ancestors of the sixteen respondents. Subsequently (viz., in 1783) the zemindari was confiscated by Government on account of the rebellion of Narayya, the then zemindar. Having been granted in the following year to his eldest son, it was again resumed by Government for arrears of revenue in 1793, and in 1802 two zemindaris were carved out of it. One of these, which retained the name of Nuzvid (or the six Pergunnas of Nuzvid), was granted to Ramachandra, the second son of Narayya the rebel, and he received in respect of it a sanad in the ordinary form under Regulation XXV. of 1802. This document was dated December 8, 1802; and in the list attached to it the village in suit was mentioned among mokhasa villages. Ramachandra was succeeded by his son and then by his grandson, on whose death a suit was instituted, which resulted in the partition of the estate among his six sons, in accordance with the judgment of the Judicial Committee above referred to. The partition under the decree was finally carried out in January and February, 1882. The appellant, and the father of the first respondent, who were among the parties to that suit and who were brothers, were each put into possession of a one-sixth share of the estate. The village in suit is within the ambit of the appellants share. In 1894 the appellant sent a notice to the mokhasadars stating that he no longer required their services, and demanding to resume the service mokhasas; and on March 20, 1899, sued for possession and mesne profits. The village in suit is within the ambit of the appellants share. In 1894 the appellant sent a notice to the mokhasadars stating that he no longer required their services, and demanding to resume the service mokhasas; and on March 20, 1899, sued for possession and mesne profits. The plaint alleged that the ancestors of the mokhasadars became servants of the Zemindar of Nuzvid, " each nayak undertaking to be present with fourteen peons, to be on attendance and keep watch, to have the crops reaped and the heaps threshed, and to keep watch over the heaps, to watch the sources of irrigation, and to accompany the zemindar when he goes a hunting, carrying spears, muskets, and other weapons, and to render such services" ; and that, "in lieu of paying salaries to the ancestors of the mokhasadars for the rendering of the said services, the village called Hanumantunigudem, attached to the zemindari of Nuzvid .... was granted to them as a service mokhasa subject to the payment of kattubadi at the rate of Rs.144 per annum to the zemindar; and that the ancestors of defendants 2—17 (the mokhasadars), and subsequently, until some time ago, the major number of the defendants, were rendering service in the said manner." It further stated that the appellant became entitled to the village on the partition of the Nuzvid estate; that the services were rendered irregularly for some time, and ceased about four years before suit, and that the plaintiff does not desire that they should be rendered in future, but it was not stated that they were on any occasion refused. The first respondent, who held the village under leases from the mokhasadars, denied that the village was granted under the condition or for the purpose alleged, and in particular that the grant was made in lieu of wages for the services mentioned ; and also denied that it was resumable or had ever been resumed. He pleaded that the village had been in possession of the ancestors of the mokhasadars long before the permanent settlement as an inam subject to the payment of kattubadi of Rs.144, and had since been held and enjoyed by them and their descendants. The Subordinate Judge decreed in favour of the appellant. He held that the village had been granted on account or in lieu of wages for services to be rendered by the grantees. The Subordinate Judge decreed in favour of the appellant. He held that the village had been granted on account or in lieu of wages for services to be rendered by the grantees. The High Court held on the evidence that the village was granted by the zemindar in perpetuity, though subject to a burden of service, and that the grant was not made simply as payment for the services in lieu of money; and accordingly that the plaintiff was not entitled to resume it. C. W. Arathoon (W. C. Bannerjee with him), for the appellant, contended that upon the evidence the Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 46 ( 1905- 1906) Raja Venkata Narasimha v. Raja Sobhanadri Appa Rao 154 village was resumable at his option, having regard to the nature of the tenure. It was held in lieu of wages for services to be rendered, and the zemindar was entitled to dispense with the services and resume the village. He cited Koolodeep Narain Singh v. Mahaheo Singh (( 1866) 6 S. W. R. 199.); Forbes v. Meer Mahomed (( 1870) 13 Moo. Ind. A p. 438, 464, 466) ; Radha Per shad Singh v. Budhu Dashad (( 1895) Ind. L. E. 22 Calc. 940.); Mahadevi v. Vikrama (( 1891) Ind. L.R. 14Madri 365..); Sanniyasi Razu v. Zemindar of Sahu (( 1883) Ind. L. R. 7 Madr. 268.); Kooldeep Narain Singh v. Government of India. (( 1871) 14 Moo. Ind. Ap. 247, 255, 257) This was a grant for personal services to the zemindar, who can dispense with them and resume see Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdvan (( 1864) 10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 16, 45; and see ( 1858) 7 Moo. Ind. Ap. 128, 132), and the definition of mokhasa grants in Wilsons Glossary; Narasayya v. Venkatagiri (( 1899) Ind. L. R. 23 Madr. 262.) ; Neelanund Singh v. Surwan Singh. (( 1866) 5 S. W. R. 292.) Cohen, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the first respondent, contended that the High Court rightly held that the village was not resumable at pleasure. The evidence shewed that the village had been uninterruptedly in the family of the original grantee, passing by succession from father to son without objection by the zemindar. (( 1866) 5 S. W. R. 292.) Cohen, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the first respondent, contended that the High Court rightly held that the village was not resumable at pleasure. The evidence shewed that the village had been uninterruptedly in the family of the original grantee, passing by succession from father to son without objection by the zemindar. Also that there had been no resumption or attempt at resumption of the grant until 1894; that quit rent, or kattubadi, had been paid at the favourable rate of Rs.144 without variation. The mokhasadars had always performed the services incident to their tenure, and were still able and willing to render them. It was not held by right of any office conferred upon the original grantee in such way as to be annexed to the office; the grant was of the tenure reserving the services which had never been refused. Under these circumstances, the appellant had shewn no right to resume it. They referred to Forbes v. Meer Mahomed (13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 438.); Kooldeep Narain Singh v. Government of India (2); Rajah Leelanund Singh v. Thakoor Munoorunjun Singh (L. R. Ind. Ap. Supp. Vol. 181.); and Fifth Report of Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company, Madr. ed. vol. 2, p. 4. Adverse possession for fourteen years ( 1882— 1896) was a bar to the suit see Secretary of State for India v. Krishnamoni Gupta. (( 1902) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 104.) Arathoon replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. The Zemindari of Nuzvid, in the Madras Presidency, after protracted litigation, into the history of which it is unnecessary to enter, was partitioned in the year 1882. At the partition a sixth share of the estate was allotted to the plaintiff and appellant, including the village of Hanumantunigudem, which is the subject of the present proceedings. Prior to the partition, the father of the first respondent had obtained from the other sixteen respondents or their predecessors in title, whom it will be convenient to designate as the mokhasadars, leases for thirty years of the lands held by them in the village under mokhasa tenure, and the term of these leases is still unexpired. The appellant claims that the leases are invalid, and that he is entitled to resume the village. The appellant claims that the leases are invalid, and that he is entitled to resume the village. The Subordinate Judge decided in his favour, but the High Court, on appeal, reversed the decision. The sole question which their Lordships now have to determine is whether, having regard to the nature of the tenure, the village is resumable at the option of the appellant, the zemindar. There is no doubt that Hanumantunigudem is what is known as a mokhasa village. The learned judges of the High Court say that "Mokhasa is a well-known tenure in the Northern Circars; and the term itself implies that it is a tenure subject to service." In Wilsons Glossary, mokhasa or mokhasa is said to be irregularly derived from an Arabic word signifying " to have as ones own," and is defined as " a village or land assigned to an individual, either rent free or at a low quit rent, on con dition of service." There is no deed or sanad containing the particulars of the grant in this case, but the evidence shews Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 46 ( 1905- 1906) Raja Venkata Narasimha v. Raja Sobhanadri Appa Rao 155 that the village has been held by the mokhasadars and their ancestors on a quit rent of Rs.144 per annum from a period antecedent to the introduction of the British Government, and that the service to be rendered was that of one naik and fourteen peons, whose duty it was to guard the zemindars fort and treasury, to watch over the reaping and threshing of the crops, and to attend the zemindar on his hunting or military expeditions. These services, it is clear from a report of the Inam Commission, were rendered down to 1860, when a mokhasadar represented that, "in consequence of the proximity of his village to Nuzvid, the call for their service was incessant" ; and the obligation is recognized in the leases granted to the first respondents father by the mokhasadars in 1881 in which there is a stipulation that they shall " render service to the zemindar according to custom." There has, therefore, been no breach of this condition on the part of the respondents. Both Courts in India agree in holding that " the mokhasadars hold their lands conditional upon the performance of the services," which have been already specified. Both Courts in India agree in holding that " the mokhasadars hold their lands conditional upon the performance of the services," which have been already specified. The question remains whether the zemindar can dispense with the services and resume the land ; and upon this point the Courts below differed. The Subordinate Judge held that "in the absence of any evidence .... as to an absolute grant, or as to a gift burdened only with a condition of service, the only conclusion that can be come to upon the evidence in the case is that the village was granted by the zemindar before 1780 to an ancestor of the (mokhasadar defendants), for the purpose of rendering the services above mentioned"; and he found upon a specific issue that the grant was in lieu of wages. The learned judges of the High Court came to an opposite conclusion upon the facts. "In the first place," they say, "no office by any particular designation was conferred upon the original grantee, but an obligation of a feudal character was imposed upon him. He was simply to provide a specified number of men as custodians, so to speak, of the zemindars property, and their services appear to have been rendered intermittently and not continuously. Besides, they were paid in money when they actually performed such services .... that is to say, batta was given to them when actually on duty. It is also certain that in later years their services were not in frequent requisition, because, as Mr. Taylor points out in his report, the zemindar would have had to pay in the shape of batta more than the services were worth. In the second place, the following circumstances indicated as plainly as possible a fixity of tenure. The mokhasadars have paid a uniform rent of Rs.144 a year for the last 120 years without alteration at any time, and the land has descended from father to son hereditarily. There has been no instance of resumption or even an attempt at resumption during all this time. The mokhasadars have paid a uniform rent of Rs.144 a year for the last 120 years without alteration at any time, and the land has descended from father to son hereditarily. There has been no instance of resumption or even an attempt at resumption during all this time. There has also been no attempt to enhance or to alter the rent, or to interfere with the devolution of the property from heir to heir." Without altogether adopting the further reasons adduced by the learned judges in support of their view, their Lordships are of opinion that the considerations above stated are sufficient to establish that the grant in this case was a grant subject to a burden of service, and was not a mere grant in lieu of wages. This disposes of the case, for it is well settled that where lands are held upon such a grant, " as long as the holders of those grants are willing and able to perform the services, the zemindar has no right to put an end to the tenure whether the services are required or not" Rajah Leelanund Singh v. Thakoor Munoorunjun Singh. (L.R, Ind. Ap. Supp. Vol. 181, at p. 185.) Great stress was laid in the Courts below upon a statement contained in a note to an " Abstract of the Revenue Collections in the Noozeed Zemindari," prepared by the Circuit Committee in 1786, in which it is stated that " the mockawsaw villages and grants being immediately under the zemindar, and given or resumed when he pleases, are included in Government collections." The Circuit Committee was appointed by the Government " to inquire into the state of the Northern Circars," with a view, inter alia, to the settlement of the revenue, and their Lordships would have been disposed to attach importance to this piece of contemporary evidence as to the relations between the mokhasadars and the zemindar, Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 46 ( 1905- 1906) Raja Venkata Narasimha v. Raja Sobhanadri Appa Rao 156 were it not that it appears from the Fifth Report of the Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company (vol. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 46 ( 1905- 1906) Raja Venkata Narasimha v. Raja Sobhanadri Appa Rao 156 were it not that it appears from the Fifth Report of the Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company (vol. 2, p. 4 of the Madras edition) that " few of the members of (the Circuit Committee) appear to have been acquainted with the native languages, and, as it is stated by themselves, they depended wholly for what intelligence they obtained on those subjects, on the zemindars and the native officers in the villages, the very persons most interested to conceal the truth, and to impose upon them false information." Their Lordships agree with the learned judges of the High Court that although the records of the Circuit Committee may be good evidence with reference to the system upon which the Government claimed to deal with the zemindars property, they cannot affect the rights of the mokhasadars as against the zemindar, with regard to which no independent inquiry appears to have been made. Upon these considerations, their Lordships will humbly advise . His Majesty that the decree of the High Court of Madras ought to be confirmed, and this appeal dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the first respondent who alone defended the appeal.