JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J.:— The facts which have given rise to this appeal are these:— On the 14th of June, 1890, one Sheo Din obtained a decree against the appellant for possession of a house and for an injunction restraining him from occupying the house. The respondent who is the mother of the appellant, has stepped into the shoes of Sheo Din, who is now dead. She made the present application for execution and prayed under section 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the appellant should be ordered to comply with the injunction mentioned in the decree, and to remove his possession, and that an order should he issued for his arrest, and for the attachment of his property. The allegation was that in the violation of the perpetual injunction made in the suit he had taken possession of the house and placed tenants in it. He opposed the application on two grounds—(1) that the application was time-barred, and (2) that Sheo Din had allowed him to occupy a part of the house. The allegation contained in the second objection has been found by both the Courts below to be unfounded, and they have also found that the appellant has, in disregard of the terms of the decree, placed a tenant in the house. The Court of first instance disallowed both the objections and ordered execution to issue. This order has been affirmed by the lower appellate Court. The first contention raised in this appeal is that the application is time-barred. This contention is in my judgment without force. The decree was one ordering the appellant to abstain from a particular act, namely, the occupation of the house. He disobeyed that order and put a tenant in the house. He thus committed a contempt of the authority of the Court, for which proceedings can be taken under section 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 179, schedule II, of the Limitation Act, upon which the appellant relies, is inapplicable and does not preclude the Court from taking proceedings to enforce its authority. This was held in Ram Saran v. Chatar Singh, [1901] I.L.R., 23 All, 465.. Article 179, schedule II, of the Limitation Act, upon which the appellant relies, is inapplicable and does not preclude the Court from taking proceedings to enforce its authority. This was held in Ram Saran v. Chatar Singh, [1901] I.L.R., 23 All, 465.. Under section 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure the decree-holder was entitled to ask the Court to enforce the decree which was passed against the appellant for abstention from a particular act, and all that the Court had to see was whether the appellant had an opportunity of obeying the decree or injunction and had wilfully failed to obey it. The decree was made so far back as 1899. The present application was made so long ago as the 26th of July, 1904. The appellant had thus ample opportunity for obeying the decree and had failed to obey it. The Court below was therefore justified in ordering enforcement of the decree. This appeal is untenable, and I dismiss it with costs.