JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - The question is whether a second appeal lies in this case. I do not think it does. It is quite clear that, in Act I (B. C.) of 1879, there is nothing to indicate that a second appeal lies from an order passed in execution. In fact, I have heard no argument which suggests that it does lie under that Act. But then it is said that sec. 41 of Act V (B. C.) of 1903 which amends the previous Act to which I have referred, coupled with sec. 44 of the same Act gives a right of second appeal to this Court. Sec. 41 says :-- "Orders passed after decree and relating to the execution thereof shall be appealable to the Court to which an appeal from the decree itself would lie." I think the meaning of that section is that inasmuch as under sec. 144 of Act I (B. C.) of 1879 an appeal from a decree lies to the Judicial Commissioner and not to the Commissioner it was intended to place appeals from orders in the same position, that is, make them appealable to the Judicial Commissioner and not to the Commissioner. Then, we come to sec. 44 which is the only other section in the Act--at any rate, our attention has not been drawn to any other section--which deals with the question of second appeal. This section, it must be remembered, is an addition to sec. 144 of Act I and runs as follows :-- "A second appeal shall lie to the High Court under Ch. XLII of the Code Civil of Procedure from any appellate decree passed by the Judicial Commissioner under this Act." Now sec. 144 deals with decrees and it is very noticeable that although in other parts of both Acts a distinction is drawn between decrees and orders, 'decree' only is mentioned in sec. 44 and the legislature may have had very good reasons for determining that whilst a second appeal might properly lie from decrees there should be no such appeal from orders of this class. We think, therefore, that a second appeal does not lie in this case and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs, two gold mohurs.