Judgement Appeal from a Court of the Judicial Commissioners (June 15, 1903) modifying a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur (June 27, 1901). The question decided was as to the construction of a mortgage deed dated October 27, 1888, the clauses of which are sufficiently set out in their Lordships judgment. The appellant sued for redemption, contending that by the true construction of the deed the profits were to be taken by the mortgagee in possession in lieu of interest. The mortgagees contended that they were entitled to principal and compound interest as stipulated, subject to a liability to account for the profits realized by them while in possession. Both the Courts below decided this question of construction in favour of the respondents. W. C. Bonnerjee, for the appellant, contended that on the true construction of clause 6 of the mortgage deed no interest was due, for the receipt of rents was to be taken in lieu of interest. It was contended that clause 11 should not be read therewith, but should be rejected as being repugnant to and inconsistent with it. In any event compound interest should not be decreed, for the mortgagees Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 42 ( 1905- 1906) Jawahir Singh V. Someshar Datt 150 never rendered any account from which it could be ascertained what was the amount of interest left unpaid. De Gruyther, for the respondents, was not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DAVEY. In this case there has been a good deal of litigation in the Courts below, but Mr. Bonnerjee, in opening the appeal, has very fairly narrowed the points which he thought he could properly bring to the attention of the Board. The appellant is the representative of a mortgagor who executed a mortgage so far back as October 27, 1888, and the suit was brought to redeem a portion of the mortgaged property in which the appellant is interested. The provisions of the mortgage deed are somewhat peculiar. It is a compound of an ordinary mortgage and a usufructuary mortgage. The appellant is the representative of a mortgagor who executed a mortgage so far back as October 27, 1888, and the suit was brought to redeem a portion of the mortgaged property in which the appellant is interested. The provisions of the mortgage deed are somewhat peculiar. It is a compound of an ordinary mortgage and a usufructuary mortgage. The mortgage is for three years (clause 2) ; the interest is to be at the rate of 1 rupee 3 annas per cent, per mensem (clause 3), and clause 4 is as follows — " In the event of non-payment of interest yearly, the mortgagee will have power either to realize the principal with interest through a Court or get a new deed charging the property executed in lieu of interest. If, as a mark of favour, the mortgagor lets the interest remain unrealized, then in such case the interest shall be added to the principal from the date of its becoming due and interest at the said rate will run on it, as if its original formed part of the principal and within the term or after it till the date of realization, this rate of interest and compound interest shall continue." That provision very clearly makes the principal money payable with compound interest. Clause 6 then provides as follows — " After taking possession the mortgagee will be entitled to receive the net profits after paying the Government revenue and village expenses, &c, in lieu of interest and during the time of her possession the interest and profits shall be deemed equal." If that clause stood alone it might possibly be construed as an ordinary usufructuary mortgage in which a mortgagee entering into possession accepts the profits in satisfaction of the interest. But that clause does not stand alone. There is a further clause (clause 11) which appears to their Lordships to qualify the prima facie meaning which might be attached to it. Clause 11 (so far as material for the present purpose) is to this effect— " If during the period of possession of the mortgagee, after depositing the Government revenue and defraying the village expenses, &c, the profits do not cover the amount of interest, we, the mortgagors, will make good the deficiency from our pockets in accordance with the accounts prepared by the agents of the mortgagee. If we cannot make good the deficiency we will pay it with interest at the rate mentioned above at the time of redemption." The first point taken is that that clause is inconsistent with clause 6. Their Lordships agree with the Court below in their inability to find anything inconsistent between the two clauses. Clause 11 no doubt qualifies what would be the prima facie meaning of clause 6; but they are perfectly capable of being read together. The second point is that the deficiency of the interest which the mortgagor undertook to pay by clause Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 42 ( 1905- 1906) Jawahir Singh V. Someshar Datt 151 11 does not carry compound interest. There again their Lordships agree with the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. Beading the whole deed together there can be no doubt that compound interest should be paid. In the first place this deficiency of interest is precisely such interest as is mentioned in clause 4, where it says " If as a mark of favour, the mortgagor lets the interest remain unrealized." There is nothing in clause 11 to take away the express provision contained in clause 4 with regard to interest which remains unrealized, and the words " We will pay it with interest at the rate mentioned above at the time of redemption," must, in their Lordships opinion, be taken to be only a concise way of bringing in the application of clause 6 to the interest which the profits are insufficient to pay. This is made clearer by clause 7, which provides that the villages are to be redeemed when " the whole of the principal, interest, compound interest, and all dues against the tenants are paid in a lump sum." Their Lordships see no reason, therefore, for differing from the conclusions at which the learned judges in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner have arrived, or from the reasons which are expressed in their judgment. They will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of those respondents who appeared in the appeal.