JUDGMENT 1. In this case the Petitioner Kasi Nath Bania has been found guilty under sec. 9, cl. (c) of Act 1 of 1878 (the Opium Act) with having been in possession of a quantity of opium without a pass or license. It has been found by the Magistrate that on the 15th September on a search being made in the house of the Petitioner a Railway receipt for a parcel which proved to contain 21/2 seers of opium consigned by one Sreekissen from Benares to Sealdah to the Petitioner himself in the name of Kasi Monib (a name by which he is also known) was found in a box belonging to the Petitioner. The key of the box was produced by his wife at his request. The accused denied the finding of the receipt in his box alleging that the case was false and that he was the victim of a conspiracy but this allegation has been found to be false. The receipt is dated the 9th September and the parcel was taken delivery of by the Excise Super intendent from the offices of the E.I. Railway in Fairlie Place to which it had gone apparently by mistake. It must be taken on the finding of the Magistrate that the receipt was in fact found with the accused and the only question now to be determined is whether the possession of the Railway receipt by the production of which the Petitioner might have obtained delivery and physical possession of the opium is possession of the opium within the meaning of the section. By the possession of the Railway receipt the Petitioner had dominion or control over the parcel in the sense that he could have passed the right to take delivery of it to any other person. It is true that it was not in his actual or physical possession, but it was certainly in his potential possession. Such possession carrying with it, as it does, the control of the goods would apparently be sufficient in a case of dishonestly receiving possession of stolen goods, provided, of course, there was proof of knowledge of their nature. [See Queen v. Hill 1 Den C.C.R. 453 (1849) and Queen v. Wiley 2 Den C.C.R. 37 (1850)]. Such possession carrying with it, as it does, the control of the goods would apparently be sufficient in a case of dishonestly receiving possession of stolen goods, provided, of course, there was proof of knowledge of their nature. [See Queen v. Hill 1 Den C.C.R. 453 (1849) and Queen v. Wiley 2 Den C.C.R. 37 (1850)]. We are not prepared to say that the mere possession of the Railway receipt for a parcel containing opium would in all cases amount to possession of the opium. The possession of the receipt might be accounted for in various ways. It might be shown that the person in whose possession it was found had no knowledge of the contents of the parcel, or that tie receipt had been "planted" by some one with a view to get him into trouble or that he was a mere tool in the bauds of others. Here, however, the receipt was in the name of the accused, it was carefully locked up and secreted in his box, and the suggestion that he knew nothing about it has been found to be untrue. It was hardly likely that the consignor would have sent as much as 21/2 seers of opium which is worth at least Rs. 100 if his object was merely to get the accused into trouble. The possession of the receipt in the circumstances men turned being conceded, the Petitioner's denial shows that he had a reason for denying the possession of the receipt. 2. The receipt it should be stated did not mention the contents of the consignment. It was for a parcel merely. If the accused was innocent of its contents his natural course was to have said so and the explanation would have been at least a plausible one. His conduct, ill our opinion, showed that he was aware of the contents of the parcel and that it was sent to him with his full knowledge. Under these circumstances the possession of the Railway receipt must, in our opinion, be taken as possession of the opium within the section under which he was charged. We therefore discharge the rule.