JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought by the plaintiff for a declaration that certain sir and khudkasht lands which are mentioned in the schedule to the plaint, are the exclusive property of the plaintiffs, and, if necessary, also for a decree for possession of this property. The Court of first instance held for the reasons which we shall presently state that the suit was not cognizable by a Civil Court and therefore dismissed it. An appeal was preferred, which the lower appellate Court, taking the same view as did the Court of first instance, dismissed. It appears that some years before the institution of the suit the defendant filed in the Revenue Court a petition for partition of the lands now in dispute and other property alleging that the property was joint property. The plaintiffs filed an objection in regard to the property which forms the subject-matter of the present suit, setting up in that objection an exclusive title to it by adverse possession. The objection was decided in favour of the plaintiffs by the judgment of the Assistant Collector passed on the 30th of October, 1898. We shall here set forth the objection which was preferred to the partition proceedings by the objectors and the judgment thereon of the Assistant Collector. There was another objection with which we have here no concern. The judgment states the objection as follows:— “The objections of Muhammad Khan, objector, are as follows:— The same objections are in respect of the mahal of Himmat Sahai and Najaf Khan—(1) The khudkasht and sir lands have always been in separate and exclusive possession of the applicants who are in possession without the participation of any one.” This appeal, as we have said, has no concern with the second objection, and therefore it is unnecessary to state it. The decision of the Assistant Collector on the first objection raised is as follows:— “It is proved from the evidence of the patwari that the objector is in fact in separate possession of the sir land and has never paid any profits in respect thereof. The entry in the village administration paper also is to the same effect, i.e., it is mentioned in it that no sharer pays profits to any one. Besides the sir land he (the objector) collects rent from every tenant in proportion to his share. The entry in the village administration paper also is to the same effect, i.e., it is mentioned in it that no sharer pays profits to any one. Besides the sir land he (the objector) collects rent from every tenant in proportion to his share. The karinda (agent) of the applicant has also admitted this right of the objectors. This objection is therefore allowed. The settled sir and khudkasht lands which have been in his occupation for 12 or more than’12 years shall be included in his mahal without compensation being allowed.” Now it is clear that the objectors, the plaintiffs here, in their objection raised the question of title or of proprietary right within the meaning of section 113 of the Land Revenue Act No. XIX of 1873, and it also appears to us to be clear that the Assistant Collector took the proceedings which are laid down by that section and after judicial inquiry came to the conclusion that the objection of the plaintiffs was well founded and accordingly so decided, that is, he found that the plaintiffs had an absolute and exclusive title to the land the subject-matter of the dispute. An appeal was preferred, by the applicants for partition, to the Collector alleging that the property was not exclusively the plaintiffs' property but was joint property of the applicants for partition and the plaintiffs This appeal was misconceived. When a question of title had been raised and decided under section 113, the Court to which an appeal lies under section 114, is the District Judge or High Court. The Collector had no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the appeal. However, he did so and, overruling the objection of the plaintiffs, decided for the defendants. On appeal to the Commissioner and Board of Revenue the decision of the Collector was affirmed. It is obvious that the orders so passed by the Collector, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue were without jurisdiction, and therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to treat them as waste paper. On appeal to the Commissioner and Board of Revenue the decision of the Collector was affirmed. It is obvious that the orders so passed by the Collector, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue were without jurisdiction, and therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to treat them as waste paper. The plaintiffs then instituted the present suit on the 21st of October, 1900, and applied for an injunction to restrain the defendants in the suit who were the applicants for partition, from proceeding with the partition matter pending the determination of the suit., An objection to the injunction was filed on the 17th of December, 1900, and the objection was allowed on the 19th of December, 1900, the order for an injunction being refused. The partition proceedings were continued, and on the 12th of June, 1901, the partition was completed and the order for partition was confirmed on the 20th of June, 1901, that is, 8 months after the institution of the present suit and considerably more than two years from the time when the objection to the partition was filed before the Assistant Collector. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not cognizable by a Civil Court, ignoring, as it appears to us, the fact that a question of title and proprietary right was raised at the earliest moment, and overlooking the fact that where a question of title is raised, the appeal from the decision of the Assistant Collector lies to the District Judge or to the High Court. In the course of his judgment the learned Subordinate Judge observes:— “In fact, this suit has been instituted to upset all the partition proceedings which, having become complete, have resulted in the delivery of possession.” This statement is inaccurate, in as much as the suit was commenced long before the partition proceedings had been completed and an objection was taken at the outset of the proceedings. Then he observes that the Full Bench Ruling of the High Court in the case of Muhammaoi Siddiq v. Laute Ram, [1901] I.L.R., 23 All is fully applicable to the suit. He therefore dismissed the plaintiff's claim. The decision in the case referred to appears to us to have no bearing upon the present case. Then he observes that the Full Bench Ruling of the High Court in the case of Muhammaoi Siddiq v. Laute Ram, [1901] I.L.R., 23 All is fully applicable to the suit. He therefore dismissed the plaintiff's claim. The decision in the case referred to appears to us to have no bearing upon the present case. In that case no question of title, affecting the partition, which was capable of being raised under sections 112 and 113 of the Land Revenue Act, was raised during the partition proceedings and the partition was completed before any suit was instituted. In this case, as we have pointed out, a question of title was raised at the earliest possible moment, and that question of title was decided by the Assistant Collector in favour of the plaintiffs. Therefore, as it seems to us, it is idle to say that the present suit was brought to upset the partition proceedings which had already been completed. On appeal, the learned District Judge appears to have fallen into several inaccuracies. He says in supporting the view of the Court below that the suit was not cognizable by a Civil Court, that “the suit is an attempt to get a pronouncement from a Civil Court to interfere with partition proceedings which have been completed.” If he means thereby to imply that the suit was instituted after the partition proceedings had been completed, that statement is based upon an entire error in regard to the true facts. Then, after dealing with the judgment of the Assistant Collector to which we have already referred he observes:— “In my opinion the Collector's order of the 12th of December, 1898, did not deal with and dispose of any question of title such as would be referred under section 113 or appealed under section 114 to the Civil Court, but with one of the procedure under section 118, Act XIX of 1873, with which the Civil Courts are not concerned; the particular matter in dispute is indeed one relating to the ‘distribution of the land by partition’ which is expressly barred from the cognizance of the Civil Courts by section 241(f) of Act XIX of 1873.” 2. We fail to understand how the learned District Judge came to advance this argument in support of his decision. We fail to understand how the learned District Judge came to advance this argument in support of his decision. It is clear, as we have pointed out, that a question of title was raised by the objection which was filed in 1898, and the Collector's order did deal with that question of title. In view of that order which was passed on the 3rd of October, 1898, it appears to us idle to say that a question of title was not raised and was not determined by the Assistant Collector. The objection was not an objection under section 118 so far as regards, at all events, the khudkasht and sir lands, which the objectors claimed to be their exclusive property and with which only this suit is concerned. We wholly fail to understand how the learned District Judge, dealt with the matter as a question of procedure. Then again the learned District Judge says, “what is fatal to these suits is that they have been brought after the completion of the partition proceeding, and the Lower Court was right in relying on the Allahabad High Court Full Bench ruling,” to which we have referred. Then he says, “The present case is beyond all doubt, because the alleged cause of action does not arise from any question of title pending the determination of which the partition proceedings might have been suspended.” Now the suits as we have pointed out were not brought after the completion of partition proceedings but some 8 months before the completion of those proceedings. Therefore the learned District Judge was in entire error in regard to this. Moreover, the plaintiff's cause of action was in respect of a claim of title to the land, and therefore the partition proceedings might have been properly suspended pending the determination of the question raised in the suit. The plaintiffs not merely raised a question of title, but they got a determination of that question in their favour by a Court competent to give that decision, and this decision of the Assistant Collector, though amounting to a final decision, as there was no appeal from it to a competent Court, has been entirely ignored by both the Lower Courts. We may further point out that the learned District Judge is mistaken in saying that “the particular matter in dispute is indeed one relating to the distribution of the land by partition.” The matter in dispute was in no way connected with the distribution of the land by partition. The plaintiffs set up an exclusive title to a portion of the property sought to be partitioned. The decrees of the Lower Courts therefore cannot be supported. They are based upon data which are erroneous, and they are not sound in point of law. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of the two Lower Courts, and as the case has been decided upon a preliminary point and we have overruled the decision upon that point, we remand the case under the provisions of section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Court of first instance, through the District Judge, with directions that it be restored to its original place in the file of pending suits and be disposed of on the merits. The plaintiff will have the costs of this appeal in any event. All other costs will abide the event. 3. [N.B.—An application for review of judgment was presented by W. Wallach, M.L. Agarwala and Gulzari Lal, who produced a certified copy of the plaintiff's petition of objections with the object of showing that it was actually made under section 118, Land Revenue Act, but this application was rejected by STANLEY, C.J., and BURKITT, J.—ED.]