JUDGMENT Rampini, J. - This second appeal has been returned to us by a Full Bench of this Court in order that we may dispose of it, as we think proper. The two points to be considered are (1) whether there was any irregularity in connection with the proclamation of sale, and (2) whether, because the price obtained at the sale was inadequate, it may be reasonably and legitimately inferred, as the Subordinate Judge has done, that it was due to the irregularity that the property was sold at an inadequate price. 2. With regard to the first point I consider that there was no material irregularity in the proclamation of sale, and that the share of the estate about to be sold was sufficiently specified in the proclamation. That proclamation has been printed at page 3 of the paper-book (see p. 345); and I need not describe it in detail because its contents have been fully set forth in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge before whom the case first came. The passage of that judgment in which they are described is as follows:-- In the present case a separate account was opened only under sec. 10 of the Sale Act in respect of the 5 anna 18 gunda share of the Defendant No. 1. The remaining 10 anna 2 gunda share of the Plaintiffs was meant to be sold by the word 'residue' in the sale-notification. Here the entire revenue for the 16 anna share was stated as Rs. 2-10 annas 8 gundas in column 3 of the notification, and the revenue for the residue share was given as Re. 1-10 annas 11 gundas. So, by simple calculation, the intending purchasers could know what the share was actually going to be sold Sec. 6 of the Sale Act, however, requires specification of the share to be sold. This evidently means that the extent of the share as so much is necessary to be clearly specified, so that the intending purchasers might, at a glance, know what the exact share was going to be sold without having recourse to any calculation for themselves. This evidently means that the extent of the share as so much is necessary to be clearly specified, so that the intending purchasers might, at a glance, know what the exact share was going to be sold without having recourse to any calculation for themselves. As, however, the share in the present case could be ascertained, as shown above, by the intending purchasers by a simple rule of proportion calculated on the entire revenue and the revenue of the residue share given in the sale-notification, the ruling cited above does not seem to apply on all fours to the present case, for at best the non-specification of the exact share in the sale notification (though it could be ascertained from other particulars given there) is only an irregularity and not an illegality. 3. It therefore appears to be the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge before whom the case first came that the sale' proclamation was sufficient to give notice to any intending purchaser as to what was about to be sold. He says that there was irregularity in the proclamation, but it evidently in his opinion did not amount to a material irregularity; and I am certainly of the same opinion. I think there has been in this case sufficient compliance with the provisions of sec. 6 of Act XI of 1859, as explained in the case of Ram Narain Koer v. Mahabir Pershad Singh I. L. R. 13 Cal. 203 (1886). That being so, it appears to me that there was no material irregularity, and that the suit should not have been remanded by the Subordinate Judge before whom the case first came to the lower Court to have evidence as to the inadequacy of price recorded. However, he did remand the suit to the first Court; and an appeal was preferred to the Subordinate Judge who ultimately decided the case, and who has pointed out that the price realized was inadequate, and has then gone on to say that "a Court of Justice may reasonably and legitimately infer that it was due to this irregularity that the property was sold at an inadequate price." He has, therefore, set aside the sale and decreed the suit. 4. I am of opinion, however, that the decision of the Subordinate Judge on this point was erroneous. It appears to me clear from sec. 4. I am of opinion, however, that the decision of the Subordinate Judge on this point was erroneous. It appears to me clear from sec. 311 of Act XIV of 1882 that it is only when substantial injury is proved to have been sustained "by reason of the irregularity" that the Court is justified in setting aside a sale; and there can be no doubt that the rulings of their Lordships of the Privy Council have already laid down that there must be direct evidence to connect the substantial injury resulting from the inadequacy of price with the irregularity. This has been pointed out in these cases. First in the case of Olpherts v. Mohabir Pershad Singh L. R. 10 I. A. 25 : s. c. I. L. R. 9 Cal. 656(1882), their Lordships say as follows : "The High Court, having held that the non-statement of the amount of revenue in the proclamation was an irregularity, proceeded to try the question whether the irregularity had caused substantial injury to the applicant. They say:-- But it may be reasonably supposed that the non-specification of the Government revenue in the sale-proclamation published is one of the causes which caused the diminution in price. There was no evidence at all on this subject. It appears to their Lordships that the High Court could not, without evidence and upon a mere supposition, properly find that the non-statement of the revenue in the proclamtion did cause an injury to the applicant by causing an inadequate price to be bid at the sale." 5. The next case is chat of Aruna Chellam Chetti v. Aruna Chillam Chetti L. R. 15 IndAp 171 (1888). Their Lordships there observe :-- "There is another objection to this decree of the High Court. The law provides, by sec. 311 of Act XIV of 1882, that an objection may be taken by the judgment-debtor to an irregularity in the sale, but then it says that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity, unless the applicant proves to the satisfaction of the Court that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity. The Subordinate Judge, finding, as he says, that no complaint had been made of this irregularity did not receive evidence that there was any injury occasioned by it. The Subordinate Judge, finding, as he says, that no complaint had been made of this irregularity did not receive evidence that there was any injury occasioned by it. If he was wrong, in the opinion of the High Court in doing that, they ought to have sent back the case to him to take that evidence. Instead of doing this, when the case comes before them, and they give judgment, they assume that there was a substantial injury, and that the property, in consequence of the misdescription, had sold for less value than it would otherwise have fetched. There seems to be no ground for an assumption of that kind by the High Court, and, therefore, both as to the objection to the non-description, or not mentioning the mortgage in the attachment proceedings and that there was no proof that any special injury was occasioned, their Lordships think that the judgment of the High Court was wrong, and that it must be reversed." 6. The third case is the well-known case of Tasaduk Rasul Khan v. Ahmad Husain L. R. 20 I. A. 176 : s. c. I. L. R. 21 Cal. 66 (1893). In this case their Lordships say :-- "The proceeding in this case was brought under sec. 311, which deals with material irregularity. The non-compliance with the provisions for posting was a material irregularity. But in the case of Olpherts v. Mahabir Pershad Singh L. R. 10 I. A. 25 : s. c. I. L. R. 9 Cal. 656 (1882) and Aruna Chellam Chetti v. Aruna Chellam Chetti L. R. 15 I. A. 171 (1888), it was held that in all cases of irregularity under sec. 311 evidence must be given of substantial injury having resulted. In the present case the decree-holder failed to comply with the full requirements of sec. 290, but both on principle and authority their Lordships are of opinion that the case must be treated, as the Respondents themselves treated it, as one of material irregularity to be re dressed pursuant to the provisions of sec. 311, and in the application of that section, it was incumbent on the Respondents to have proved that they sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity. They gave no such evidence and it would be extremely improbable that injury could have happened from the non-compliance with the strict letter of the section. 311, and in the application of that section, it was incumbent on the Respondents to have proved that they sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity. They gave no such evidence and it would be extremely improbable that injury could have happened from the non-compliance with the strict letter of the section. Their Lordships cannot accept the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, that loss is to be inferred from the mere fact that a sale was had without full compliance with the provisions of sec. 290. The section clearly contemplates direct evidence on the subject." 7. In the present case it appears to me that there is absolutely no direct evidence to connect the alleged irregularity with the inadequacy of price. There is no evidence on the point. There is only evidence as to inadequacy of price. There is no evidence, direct or otherwise, on which we could hold the relation of cause and effect to be established between these two facts. That being so, it appears to me that under the provisions of the section, and in accordance with the ridings of the Privy Council, the Subordinate Judge was not justified in inferring that the inadequacy of price was due to the irregularity, which he considers to have occurred in the proclamation of the sale of this property. Furthermore, T would observe that it stands to reason that before it can be logically concluded that one event is the result of another, all the other causes which may have produced the latter event must be excluded. No Court is justified in finding that one event is the result of another, simply because it follows the other. To do so is to commit the well-known fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. The Subordinate Judge, from whose decision this appeal has been preferred, would seem to me to have fallen into this error. 8. For these reasons I do not think that the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge can be upheld, and I would set it aside and decree this appeal with costs. Mitra, J. 9. I am of opinion that the suit should be dismissed and the appeal decreed on the ground that there was no such irregularity in the proclamation of sale as would entitle the Plaintiffs to say that the sale had been effected contrary to the provisions of Act XI of 1859. 10. Mitra, J. 9. I am of opinion that the suit should be dismissed and the appeal decreed on the ground that there was no such irregularity in the proclamation of sale as would entitle the Plaintiffs to say that the sale had been effected contrary to the provisions of Act XI of 1859. 10. My learned brother has pointed out the nature of the irregularity complained of and the finding of the Subordinate Judge on the point. The Subordinate Judge holds that non-specification of the exact share in the sale-notification is an irregularity. His judgment, however, shows that in his opinion it is not a material irregularity; and unless the irregularity was such as would be considered material and would necessarily induce inadequacy of price, I do not think that the sale should be set aside. The mere fact that the share was not specifically given in the proclamation is not sufficient to show that the sale did not take place in accordance with the provisions of sec. 6 of Act XI of 1859. This, in my opinion, is quite sufficient for disposal of the case; and it is not necessary for us to go into the other question, namely, whether substantial loss resulted on account of the irregularity. 11. If I were to decide the question under what circumstances there may be a necessary inference of substantial loss on account of any irregularity, the mere inadequacy of price cannot certainly be the sole ground upon which we can conclude that the one is the cause of the other. If I had not agreed with my learned brother in dismissing the suit on the first ground, I would have remanded the case for a re-trial of the question as to whether, upon the whole case, having regard, not only to the irregularity in the sale-proclamation, if any, and to the inadequacy of price, but to other circumstances, there could be a necessary inference of substantial loss resulting from the irregularity. 12. Since I agree with my learned brother on the first point, it is not necessary for me to say anything further on the second point. The appeal is decreed with costs.