Judgement These two appeals, brought by special leave, were heard together. The first was from orders (February 22, September 8, and September 22, 1902) of the Court of the Political Agent, Kathiawar, now called the Court of the Agent to the Governor in Kathiawar. The second was from an order (January 14, 1904) of the Governor in Council of Bombay rejecting the appellants appeal against an order of the Agent to the Governor in Kathiawar, and refusing the appellants application for the execution of a judgment and decree of the Governor in Council of Bombay dated September 26, 1899, on the ground that both the judgment and decree had been reversed by His Majestys Secretary of State for India in Council. The main questions raised in these appeals were whether an appeal lies to His Majesty in Council from the Agency Courts in Kathiawar, or from a decision of the Governor in Council of Bombay on appeal from those Courts, and whether in a suit of which the subject-matter is one of municipal or civil law, and which has been duly heard and decided by those Courts in Kathiawar and by the Governor in Council of Bombay acting as a Court of Appeal therefrom, His Majestys Secretary of State for India in Council has jurisdiction to reverse, alter or otherwise modify such decision. The appellant in the first appeal sued under the circumstances stated in the judgment of their Lordships to enforce a mortgage of village Sardharpur in Jetpur, in Kathiawar, in the Court of the Assistant Political Agent, Sorath Prant. On November 24, 1901, that Court refused to entertain it without a certificate of the Political Agent consenting to the hearing. This order was on February 22, 1902, confirmed by the Court of the Political Agent. On September 22 of that year the same Court refused leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, on the grounds that the appellant was not a British subject, but the subject of the independent State of Jetpur, and had, therefore, no birth-right of appeal to His Majesty in Council, but only to the sovereign of Jetpur; that the inhabitants of Jetpur and of the Kathiawar States were foreigners; that the jurisdiction exercised by the Agency Courts was native State jurisdiction; and that the said Courts were not British Courts from which an appeal lay to the King in Council. On May 16, 1902, pending the petitions for leave to appeal, the appellant was ejected from the village in suit by order of the Assistant Political Agent, which was confirmed by the Court of the Political Agent on September 8 following. On March 12, 1903, the appellant obtained special leave to appeal from the orders of the Political Agent; including a third one refusing leave to appeal. In the second case the appellant instituted a suit (Political Case No. 15 of 1881— 1882) in the Court of the Assistant Political Agent, Halar Prant, in Kathiawar, for redemption of a mortgage of the village Karmal Kodta. An application by the respondent to transfer it from the political to the civil side was refused in August, 1886, the refusal being affirmed on appeal by the Political Agent, and eventually by the Governor in Council of Bombay on June 15, 1887. The suit was said to have been tried in all respects in accordance with the ordinary procedure of the Court as regulated by Act XIV, of 1882. Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 126 The Assistants Court on April 19, 1897, dismissed the suit. The Political Agent affirmed this dismissal on appeal. The Governor in Council in September, 1899, reversed these dismissals on second appeal and decreed redemption; but on appeal to the Secretary of State the decision of the Governor in Council was reversed, and the decrees of the political officers in Kathiawar re-established. The appellant then applied to the Courts in Kathiawar for execution of the Governors decree of redemption in 1899 on the ground that the Secretary of State had no jurisdiction to reverse it, the subject of the suit being matter of municipal law and the Secretary of State in Council not being a Court of law or a Court of- appeal from the final decision of a Court of law in India. These applications were refused, the Agency Courts, and eventually the Governor in Council, on January 14, 1904, holding that they were bound by the decision of the Secretary of State. On August 10, 1904, the appellant obtained special leave to appeal to the King in Council from the final order of the Governor. These applications were refused, the Agency Courts, and eventually the Governor in Council, on January 14, 1904, holding that they were bound by the decision of the Secretary of State. On August 10, 1904, the appellant obtained special leave to appeal to the King in Council from the final order of the Governor. Haldane, K.C., and J. W. McCarthy, for the appellants in both cases, contended that an appeal lay to the King in Council from the Courts of Kathiawar—first, because Kathiawar was British territory inhabited by British subjects, and not foreign territory inhabited by the subjects of native sovereign princes; secondly, because the Courts in question were British Courts exercising jurisdiction in Kathiawar. With regard to the first point it was contended that Kathiawar formed part of British India as defined in s. 18 of the Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Viet. c. 63), it being a territory or place within His Majestys dominions, which is for the time being governed by His Majesty through the Governor-General of India or through a governor or other officer subordinate to the Governor-General of India. The province of Kathiawar con sisted of a number of small States under tributary chiefs or talukdars, who appear to have been about 400 in number. Prior to 1802 the whole province was divided between the Peshwa and the Gaikwar, who claimed over it sovereign rights, chiefly consisting of the exaction of tribute, and the sovereignty over the country was in the power to which tribute was paid. As regards the rights of this Peshwa, many taluks and villages and a considerable portion of Kathiawar were ceded to the British Government in 1802 by the Treaty of Bassein, and the rest of the rights of the Peshwa in those parts of Kathiawar which had not been transferred in 1802 were ceded to Great Britain in 1817. As regards the Gaikwar in 1807 a settlement was made for the payment to the British Government of the tribute payable [@ page LRA 5] by Kathiawar chiefs to the Gaikwar, and since that date this tribute has been collected by the British authorities, who have then paid to the Gaikwar the share to which he is entitled under existing agreements, and in 1820 by a further agreement the Gaikwar engaged not to interfere in the province except through the British Government. Further, in 1807 and 1808 the chiefs entered into agreements giving a security bond for the general peace of the country and agreeing (inter alia) " to do nothing thenceforward without the sanction of the Government previously obtained." Since 1820 the supreme authority in Kathiawar, as far as it had been previously vested in the Peshwa or the Gaikwar, has been exercised solely by the British Government. Since that date Political Agents and other officers have been appointed to govern the province and the authority of the British Government has been generally exercised over the whole province. As regards the judicial administration, down to 1831, this was left in the hands of the chiefs without regular control. In 1831 the British Government established a Criminal Court of Justice under the presidency of the Political Commissioner for the trial (inter alia) of crimes committed by petty chiefs upon one another or otherwise than in the exercise of their recognized authority over their own dependents, and until 1853 every sentence of this Court was submitted to the Bombay Government for their approval. In 1862 the whole administration was re-organized, and the province was divided into four districts under political assistants with other British magistrates under them, all under the control of the Political Agent. At the same time the number of Kathiawar States under separate chiefs being 188, these chiefs were divided into different classes, on whom was conferred certain criminal and civil jurisdiction varying according to each class. All other jurisdiction both civil and criminal throughout the Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal C hhotamlal province beyond that allowed to the chiefs was reserved to the British officers an Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 128 or when the case is one affecting the interests of the tributary chiefs, of whatever class, in regard to sovereign rights, jurisdiction, tribute, territory, boundaries, political status, or prerogative and certain other matters. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 128 or when the case is one affecting the interests of the tributary chiefs, of whatever class, in regard to sovereign rights, jurisdiction, tribute, territory, boundaries, political status, or prerogative and certain other matters. The judges of the Agency Courts of Kathiawar exercise both executive and judicial authority, and if a "political" suit is instituted in which the subject-matter relates to civil rights of the parties arising out of contract or otherwise, and in which the matter is one of ordinary civil or municipal law, it falls within the judicial authority, and proceeds as an ordinary civil suit, with the exception that the parties are relieved from the payment of certain fees on instituting the suit. If a " political " suit raises questions outside the ordinary legal rights of the parties and outside matters of ordinary civil or municipal law, whether such questions affect the political status or rights of the parties, or are matters of general policy to be dealt with by the Government or its executive tribunals or officers, such suit falls within the executive authority of the Political Agent or Agent to the Governor, and does not proceed as an ordinary civil suit. The first of these suits was a civil suit. The second was originally entered in the Agency Court of Halar Prant as a "political " case, solely because the parties thereto were members of the specified class of chiefs, and were therefore entitled to privileges such as the exemption from payment of institution fees in the Court, but as far as regards its subject-matter the suit was an ordinary civil suit for the redemption of a mortgage, and raised only questions of civil or municipal law and of the rights of the parties under contract. Cohen, K.C., and Phillips, for the respondents in the first appeal, contended that no appeal lay to the King in Council. They contended that Kathiawar was not a part of British India, but was native territory under the1 suzerainty of His Majesty. On the further question raised by the appellant, they contended that the Courts were not British Courts exercising British jurisdiction, but were tribunals exercising a jurisdiction conferred on them by the executive authorities, and limited by rules prescribed by them from time to time. On the further question raised by the appellant, they contended that the Courts were not British Courts exercising British jurisdiction, but were tribunals exercising a jurisdiction conferred on them by the executive authorities, and limited by rules prescribed by them from time to time. The 780 native States of India are not subject to the Crown, though to a certain extent in a state of dependence thereon. In Damodhar Gordhans Case (1 App. Cas. 332.) it was held that the Government could not remove any part of British India from the ordinary jurisdiction of the British Courts. If, therefore, Kathiawar is in British India, the Courts of the Political Agents had no jurisdiction to deal with the case, being illegally established; and all notifications and rules issued in regard to them were invalid. Only Courts established by the Legislature would have jurisdiction. In Queen v. Burah (( 1878) 3 App. Cas. 889 ; S. C. Ind. App. 178. L. R. 5) it was held that, by enactments of Parliament or of the Indian Legislature, any part of British India might be removed from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts. No Act has been passed relating to the Courts of Kathiawar. The Executive can only establish Courts therein if it be outside British India. The province of Kathiawar was, and is, governed by a large number of native Rajpoot chiefs, independent of one another, who formerly paid tribute to the Peshwa and the Gaikwar of Baroda, two Mahratta chiefs, subordinate in theory to the Great Mogul at Delhi. In 1802, by the Treaty of Bassein, the Peshwa ceded part of his claims to tribute to the British Government, then represented by the East India Company (Aitchisons Treaties, 3rd ed. Vol. VI. p. 53), The East India Company thereafter, in concert with the Gaikwar, collected the Kathiawar tribute. The Peshwa in 1803 or 1804 farmed his rights to the Gaikwar for ten years. In 1817 he ceded whatever rights remained to him to the East India Company, and in 1820 the Gaikwar made a similar cession. Vol. VI. p. 53), The East India Company thereafter, in concert with the Gaikwar, collected the Kathiawar tribute. The Peshwa in 1803 or 1804 farmed his rights to the Gaikwar for ten years. In 1817 he ceded whatever rights remained to him to the East India Company, and in 1820 the Gaikwar made a similar cession. Thereafter engagements were entered into between the chiefs, who mutually guaranteed the performance of each others obligations, and the Indian Government, by which the chiefs agreed to pay a tribute fixed in perpetuity, with security for its due payment, and the British Government undertook to protect them from oppression, and engaged that the Mulkgiri (Periodical progress or incursion of a military force for the collection of tribute or revenue by violence or intimidation " Wilsons Glossary, s.v. This meaning seems purely local. In old Anglo-Indian cacography, " mooluck gerry." Wilson by a strange slip misspells the common word mulk with a final qaf.— F. P.) army should not be employed as Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 129 theretofore. The chiefs were left perfectly independent in their internal administration ; the paramount power (which was the East India Company from 1820) not then claiming and never having eercised any right to interfere in their internal administration except for the better security of the tribute. The question of fact, whether Kathiawar is or is not a part of British India (see 52 & 53 Viet. c. 63, s. 18, and the Indian General Clauses Act X. of 1897, s. 3, sub-ss. 7 and 23), can only be determined in one of two ways, either by studying the past relations between the Crown or Indian Government and the States of Kathiawar, or by obtaining information from the Secretary of State, as was done in Taylor v. Barclay (( 1828) 2 Sim. 213, 220.), and The Charkieh. (( 1873) L. R. 4 A. & E. 59, 74.) Such a proceeding is permitted by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Viet. c. 37), s. 4. Various opinions of leading officers of the British and Baroda Governments, and dispatches given in the record, were referred to as shewing that Kathiawar was regarded as a foreign country, subject to occasional interference if peace and order required it. c. 37), s. 4. Various opinions of leading officers of the British and Baroda Governments, and dispatches given in the record, were referred to as shewing that Kathiawar was regarded as a foreign country, subject to occasional interference if peace and order required it. The Bhaunagar Act of 1876 is the only instance of Indian legislation with regard to Kathiawar, and by that Act the Government disclaimed the territory. It is not a scheduled district under Act XIV. of 1874. Not being part of British India, the Governor-General in Council had power in his executive capacity (see Ilberts Government of India, pp. 452, 455,458, 459, and 574), as regulated by Act XXI. of 1879, to issue the notification in dispute in this case (June 22, 1900) and to entrust power to his executive officers to administer justice subject to his directions. If it were part of British India, the Legislature alone could establish judicial Courts and authority. The notifications in the Kathiawar Directory shew how the Political Agents Courts were established, what appeals were allowed, and what law was administered. A Political Agent (see s. 3 of Act XXI. of 1879) is an officer appointed by virtue of the executive authority to watch over peace and good order in a native State, and is invested with a certain kind of jurisdiction. By Macphersons List of British Enactments in Force in Native States, published by authority of the Government of India, the Kathiawar Agency is included amongst the native States. The appellants only remedy is to apply to His Majesty, who could, under s. 4 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41, refer the matter to this Board see the case of the Nawab of Surat(( 1855) 9 Moore, P. C. 88.), and Safford and Wheelers Privy Council, pp. 769, 770. Sir E. Clarke, K.C., and Birdwood, for the respondent in the second appeal, contended that the decision of the Governor of Bombay in Council in September, 1899, in favour of the appellant had been validly (see 21 & 22 Viet. c. 106, s. 3) reversed by the Secretary of State, and that after that reversal there remained no decision in his favour capable of being executed against the respondent. Consequently the subsequent order of the Governor in Council refusing execution was a valid order and it was moreover a political act. c. 106, s. 3) reversed by the Secretary of State, and that after that reversal there remained no decision in his favour capable of being executed against the respondent. Consequently the subsequent order of the Governor in Council refusing execution was a valid order and it was moreover a political act. They contended that the Agency Courts in Kathiawar which dealt with this case, are not Courts of justice within a British possession within the meaning of 7 & 8 Viet. c. 69 nor British Courts in a foreign country within the meaning of 53 & 54 Viet. c. 37. The preamble of the Bhaunagar Act of 1876 recognizes that Kathiawar is not British territory and see Ladkuvarbai v. Ghoel Shri Sarsanrgji (7 Bomb. H. C. R. O. C. J. 150.); Triccam Panachand v. Bombay, &c, Ry. Co. (( 1885) I. L. R 9 Bomb. 244.) ; Queen-Empress v. Abdul Latif. (( 1885) I. L. R. 10 Bomb. 186.) It has never been vested in the British Crown under 21 & 22 Viet. c. 106, and is not governed by His Majesty within the definition of British India in s. 18 of the Interpretation Act, 1889, and s. 3, sub-s. 7, of Act X. of 1897; certain powers of government are exercised, but not in such a way as to displace the native sovereignty. There are very important powers which are not exercised. As regards legislation the Indian Legislatures have never made and cannot make laws for Kathiawar. Under the Indian Councils Act, 1861, s. 22, the Governor-General for India in Council can legislate for certain persons within the province, but not in respect of Courts of justice or places or things. The Agency Courts were set up by compact with the chiefs, that is, in pursuance of Colonel Walkers famous settlement of 1807, not by legislation; and are Courts of the native States if Courts, at all. Where Indian Acts or adaptations of them have been introduced into Kathiawar they have been applied by executive order, not by legislation, and are merely rules of procedure for the guidance of Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 130 political officers. The revenue system was examined to shew that it was conducted by the chiefs as their own freed from British jurisdiction or control. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 130 political officers. The revenue system was examined to shew that it was conducted by the chiefs as their own freed from British jurisdiction or control. So also the police administration was left in the hands of the native States. Interference has been confined to the judicial administration ; but only a tenth part of the litigation of Kathiawar is dealt with by Political officers exercising jurisdiction on behalf of the chiefs. The inherent jurisdiction of the chief s extends to all litigation in their territories, but while they are under disqualification it is exercised by the British Government see the Directory, Part L, 1886,p.276,PartII., 1886,p.453, and Macphersons Enactments in Force in Native States, p. 42. Kathiawar has never been subject to the system of jurisprudence applicable to British India. Its chiefs have their own Courts and codes of law. The Courts of the political officers are not governed by British laws, but by special rules of procedure prescribed for their guidance see Kathiawar Directory, Part II., 1886, pp. 822— 824,1182. They are in fact not Courts of justice, though described as such; certainly not British Courts established by law. Their decisions are guided by political considerations. The cases dealt with by them are classed as civil and political; but the same officers deal with both classes. The nature of political suits is described inKathiawarDirectory,PartI., 1886,p.276; PartII., 1886, p. 453; and Part III. 1896, pp. 38 and 40. In hearing them the Agent as representing the paramount power arbitrates diplomatically between the parties. The present case is undoubtedly political, and the decision of the Governor in Council is not a judgment of a Court acting on principles and rules which the Judicial Committee can investigate and apply. This Board cannot be guided by the same considerations which control the Political Agents. The suzerainty of the Crown has been delegated to them through the Government of India. The laws which have been introduced are so many rules of procedure within the meaning of s. 5 of Act XXI. of 1879. This second appeal is an interstatal case involving sovereign rights over a particular village. The suzerainty of the Crown has been delegated to them through the Government of India. The laws which have been introduced are so many rules of procedure within the meaning of s. 5 of Act XXI. of 1879. This second appeal is an interstatal case involving sovereign rights over a particular village. The political jurisdiction exercised in such a case is one of the methods by which the suzerainty of the Crown is exercised and is entirely distinct from the jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in British India and by His Majesty in Council in appeal therefrom see Maharajah Madhava Singh v. Secretary of State for India in Council. (( 1904) L. R. .31 Ind. Ap. 239.) Formerly the appeal lay from the Governor in Council in such cases to the Court of Directors. Under s. 3 of 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106 it is to the Secretary of State. It cannot be contended that this long-established procedure was wrong; but if Kathiawar was part of British India no such appeal would lie, and the decisions would have been coram non judice in every case from the Assistant Political Agent up to the Governor in Council. Haldane, K.C., replied in both appeals. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. The first of these appeals arises out of a suit instituted in a Court of the Assistant Political Agent of Sorath Prant, in Kathiawar (the term Prant meaning an administrative district). The grounds of the plaintiffs claim, so far as it has now to be noticed, were that in February, 1893, he had advanced money to the late Darbar Shri Vala Naja Mamaiya, a shareholder in the chiefship or talukdari of Jetpur Chital in Kathiawar, for the purpose of paying off debts due by the latter, who was a talukdar of the sixth class, and that the plaintiff had acquired possession ; that Vala Naja died in May, 1901; and that the plaintiffs rights as mortgagee had been interfered with or threatened by the nominal defendant as manager for the substantial defendants, the successors of the deceased chief. The plaintiff prayed for a declaration of his rights and an injunction. In effect, therefore, the suit was one to enforce a mortgage made by a deceased chief against his successors. The plaintiff prayed for a declaration of his rights and an injunction. In effect, therefore, the suit was one to enforce a mortgage made by a deceased chief against his successors. The Assistant Political Agent dismissed the suit, basing his decision upon a notification of the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, of June 22, 1900, which Laid down, for the guidance of the Agency Courts in Kathiawar, the rule that " No suit shall lie against a tributary chief or talukdar Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 131 .... in respect of any debt contracted by the predecessor of such chief or talukdar or sub-sharer unless (a) the claim has been admitted by the tributary chief or talukdar or sub-sharer; or (b) the debt has received the written approval of the Political Agent." Against that decision the plaintiff appealed to the Political Agent, who, on February 22, 1902, dismissed the appeal. On September 8, 1902, the Political Agent dismissed another appeal by the plaintiff against an order of the Assistant Political Agent awarding the defendants possession of the property in dispute. By a third order of September 22, 1902, the Political Agent dismissed two applications of the plaintiff, one for a certificate that the case fulfilled the conditions necessary to support an appeal to His Majesty in Council, the other for leave to bring such an appeal. Against these three orders of the Political Agent the present appeal has been brought. The plaintiff being dissatisfied with these orders of the Political Agent, his ordinary and regular course would have been to appeal to the Governor of Bombay in Council. But he made an application to His Majesty in Council for special leave to appeal without going first to the Governor in Council, and in accordance with their Lordships advice, His Majesty in Council granted special leave so to appeal, but with leave to the Secretary of State for India to intervene, and put in a case and appear; in the result the India Office acted for the respondent. The appellant having been thus allowed to come before this Board without first going to Bombay, their Lordships think that the leave so given cannot have the effect of placing the appellant in any better position than he would have been in if he had followed the usual course and had a decision against him by the Governor in Council. So that in this respect, the case stands on the same footing as the second of the present appeals. The second appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the Thakor of Kotda-Sangani (a Kathiawar State) in the Court of the Assistant Political Agent, Halar Prant, against the State of Gondal, a State of the first class, to redeem and recover possession of a village said to have been transferred by way of mortgage to the latter State by the former. The suit was dismissed by the first Court, and that dismissal was upheld by the Political Agent, Kathiawar. Upon appeal the Governor of Bombay in Council reversed that decision, andgave a decree for redemption. A further appeal was brought to the Secretary of State in Council, who reversed the decision of the Governor in Council. After various proceedings before the tribunals in Kathiawar, in which the plaintiff sought unsuccessfully to execute the decree of the Governor in Council, notwithstanding its having been reversed by the Secretary of State, he appealed to the Governor in Council, and asked him to order the execution of his own decree. By an order of January 14, 1904, the Governor in Council refused the application. And against that order the plaintiff has brought the second of the present appeals, having obtained special leave to do so, granted upon the same terms as the leave granted in the first case. These two appeals were heard together. The question common to both cases, and the only question which has been argued, is whether an appeal lies to His Majesty in Council. And the answer to that question depends mainly upon the true relation of the Kathiawar States and their people to the British Crown, and upon the nature and character of the control exercised by the British Indian authorities over the administration of justice in those States. And the answer to that question depends mainly upon the true relation of the Kathiawar States and their people to the British Crown, and upon the nature and character of the control exercised by the British Indian authorities over the administration of justice in those States. Prior to the year 1802 Kathiawar consisted of a large number of States, independent of one another, each governed by its own chief, but paying tribute in part to the Peshwa and in part to the Gaikwar of Baroda. It is necessary to review certain events that have occurred since that date, but they can be dealt with very briefly ; the more so because Kathiawar in its relations with the British Indian Government has commonly been dealt with as a whole; and it may be so dealt with on the present Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal occasion, for the cases presented by the present appellants do not depend upon any circumstances peculiar to the particular States which, or whose rulers or people, are affected, or upon any consideration not applicable to the whole province. The time under consideration divides itself naturally into two periods, that of the government of British India by the East India Company down to 1858, and that of the direct government by the Crown after that date. The legal and constitutional position of the Company during the former of these periods was established in a series of judicial decisions, and was finally and fully defined in The Secretary of State in Council v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba. (( 1859) 7 Moo. Ind. App. 476.) The Company exercised a delegated sovereignty over the territories under its government, with all the powers in connection with the external relations of those territories incidental to the exercise of that sovereignty, subject, of course, to such restrictions as were imposed by charter or by statute. It is obvious that the sovereign power thus delegated to the Company could be exercised by it in India only through its agents and officers in the country. Before the Regulating Act of 1773 (13 Geo. It is obvious that the sovereign power thus delegated to the Company could be exercised by it in India only through its agents and officers in the country. Before the Regulating Act of 1773 (13 Geo. 3, c. 63) the three Presidencies in India were wholly independent of one another ; in the government of each, and in the dealings of each with the native States in its neighbourhood, the Company acted through its officers charged with the administration of that Presidency. By the Regulating Act the Governments of Madras and Bombay were placed under the superintendence and control of the Governor-General of Bengal (since become Governor-General of India) and his Council, and close restrictions were placed upon their power of making war or peace or concluding treaties without the approval of the Central Government. Subsequent statutes expressed with greater clearness the subordination of the lesser Governments, and repeated the restrictions upon the exercise by them of various sovereign powers. But subject to that subordination and to those restrictions, those statutes never took away those powers, but, on the contrary, repeatedly recognized their existence. And accordingly in The East India Company v. Syed Ally (( 1827) 7 Moo. Ind. App. 555) this Board held that a treaty entered into by the Government of Madras, after compliance with the statutory conditions, was a valid exercise of sovereignty. It is well to notice this point, because much that has now to be considered has to do with the action of the Government of Bombay. And as no question has been raised as to the Bombay Government having at all times obtained all necessary sanction, the distinction between the two Governments need not be further noticed. By the Government of India Act, 1858, the delegation of sovereign power to the Company was determined, and it has since been exercised directly on behalf of the Crown, in India (speaking generally) through the same authorities as before, in England through the Secretary of State. Under the sovereign power thus delegated for so long to the Company, and since 1858 exercised directly on behalf of the Crown, the British Empire in India has been built up. Under it new territories have been added to the actual dominions of the Crown; and under it many and various powers, rights, and jurisdictions have been acquired and exercised over territories which yet remain outside the Kings dominions. Under it new territories have been added to the actual dominions of the Crown; and under it many and various powers, rights, and jurisdictions have been acquired and exercised over territories which yet remain outside the Kings dominions. Of the divers ways in which new lands have been brought under the Kings allegiance it is unnecessary here to speak. As to the rights and powers of control possessed and exercised over the native States in India with the corresponding restrictions upon the independent action of those States, some, no doubt, are the necessary consequence of the suzerainty vested in the predominant power. Thus, as is recited in 39 & 40 Vict. c. 46, the Indian States in alliance with the Crown, have " no connexions, engagements, or communications with foreign powers." But apart from and beyond the consequences, whatever they may be, flowing from this general source, rights of very varying kinds have been established in connection with the several States. They have different Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 133 historical origins. The Indian Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act XXI. of 1879 (following the language of the Imperial Act) recites that " by treaty, capitulation, agreement, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means the Governor-General of India in Council has power and jurisdiction within divers places beyond the limits of British India." And that Act proceeded to regulate the exercise of that jurisdiction so far as it was competent for the Indian Legislature to do so, that is to say, so far as it affected persons for whom that Legislature could make laws. The present cases are outside the scope of that legislation. Such rights over foreign territory differ not only in origin but in kind and in degree in the cases of different States ; so that in each instance in which the nature or extent of such rights becomes the subject of consideration, inquiry has to be made into the circumstances of the particular case. In accordance with this, in Muhammad Yusuf-ud-din v. Queen-Empress (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. App. 137.), in which the question was as to the nature and extent of the railway jurisdiction vested in the British Indian authorities within the dominions of the Nizam, the case was decided upon the construction of the correspondence in which the cession of the jurisdiction was embodied. App. 137.), in which the question was as to the nature and extent of the railway jurisdiction vested in the British Indian authorities within the dominions of the Nizam, the case was decided upon the construction of the correspondence in which the cession of the jurisdiction was embodied. In the present cases the inquiry is as to the relation of the Kathiawar States and their people to , British India, and the character of the control exercised by the British Indian Governments over those States, and particularly with relation to the administration of justice. It has already been said that, prior to 1802, the numerous States of Kathiawar were independent of one another, but paid tribute in part to the Peshwa and in part to the Gaikwar. By treaties of 1802 and 1817 the Peshwas rights were ceded to the East India Company. In 1820 the Gaikwars rights were ceded. What the nature of the power of the Peshwa and of the Gaikwar was, regarded as a matter of right, and what therefore they ceded to the East India Company, was the subject of frequent and anxious inquiry on the part of the Board of Directors and the Government of Bombay, but no satisfactory result was ever arrived at; and it would be almost hopeless at the present time to attempt to answer that question upon the basis of contemporary evidence. Perhaps the whole truth is told in a sentence of a dispatch of the Court of Directors of November 8, 1831 "It can scarcely be doubted, however, that the rights of the Maratta Governments were whatever they found it convenient to claim and had power to enforce." Their Lordships are happily not called upon to enter into any inquiry so difficult as this. The control of the British Indian Government over Kathiawar has been in operation without controversy for a very long series of years. And the nature and character of that control must be ascertained from the manner in which, and the principles upon which, it has, in fact, been exercised. The history of this is therefore of primary importance. The control of the British Indian Government over Kathiawar has been in operation without controversy for a very long series of years. And the nature and character of that control must be ascertained from the manner in which, and the principles upon which, it has, in fact, been exercised. The history of this is therefore of primary importance. In 1807, at a time when the rights of the Peshwa had been partially, but not completely ceded, and when those of the Gaikwar were still in full force, Colonel Walker was sent to Kathiawar for the purpose of putting an end, as far as might be possible, to the disorders prevailing in the province. In a later dispatch of the Court of Directors, of September 15, 1824, it is said "The objects of the Companys interference in Kathiawar in 1807 were to induce the chiefs to enter into a permanent engagement for the payment of the claims of the Guicowar Government " (the Peshwas tribute was at that time farmed to the Gaikwar) " without the periodical Mooluckgerry Circuit, which devastated the country in its progress and absorbed the tribute in its expense, and at the same time to obtain security for the discontinuance of mutual aggression and predatory excursions." Colonel Walker brought about a settlement to which the Gaikwars Government and the chiefs were parties, of which it is enough to say that it provided for a fixed tribute from each State, secured by a system of mutual guarantees, that tribute to be received by the Company, which should account to the Gaikwar for what was due to him, for the cessation of the Mooluckgerry (See note at p. 9, ante.) invasions, and for the maintenance of peace and order between the States themselves. Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 134 The next period which it is necessary to consider is 1819 and the few following years. The arrangements made by Colonel Walker for securing the tribute had not been completely successful. Two different officers were instructed to investigate the conditions of the problem. Amongst the subjects of inquiry prescribed one was " In whom do the chiefs of Kattywar conceive the sovereignty of their country to reside; in the chiefs themselves, the King of Delly [sic], or the Governments to whom they pay tribute? Two different officers were instructed to investigate the conditions of the problem. Amongst the subjects of inquiry prescribed one was " In whom do the chiefs of Kattywar conceive the sovereignty of their country to reside; in the chiefs themselves, the King of Delly [sic], or the Governments to whom they pay tribute? " with a number of other inquiries bearing on the same question. Reports were received, the Government of Bombay expressed its views, and the subject came before the Court of Directors in 1824, who, in the dispatch to Bombay already referred to of September 15, 1824, dealt thus with the subject "In your 49th paragraph, Colonel Walkers opinion that the chiefs were otherwise independent, though paying a forced tribute, is questioned, and an inquiry is intimated into the general rights of the British and Gaicowar Governments over the chiefs of Kathiawar.....The right of preserving the peace of the country, which you assumed in paragraph 48, appears here to be questionable, and is made to rest on questionable precedents. If Colonel Walker acted on a supposed right he did not therey make it a real one. But it is at least doubtful if the Maratha Governments in point of fact ever claimed more than tribute. There is no evidence that they ever interfered to maintain the peace of the country, or that they ever sequestrated talooks for means of tribute. The proposed inquiry must therefore resolve itself into this, whether we have derived from them the right of doing the same precise things which they did and nothing more, or the right of directing the same general power to different specific objects according to the difference of our policy." In 1825 further difficulties had arisen, which the Government of Bombay dealt with as best it could ; and on November 23, 1825, the Government addressed to the Court of Directors a letter in which the constitutional position of Kathiawar was very cautiously dealt with. The reply to this and other letters was contained in a dispatch of the Court of Directors of July 20, 1830, in which they said " All the rights which we possess in Kattywar were acquired from the Peshwa and the Guicawar, from the former by conquest, from the latter by mutual arrangements. The reply to this and other letters was contained in a dispatch of the Court of Directors of July 20, 1830, in which they said " All the rights which we possess in Kattywar were acquired from the Peshwa and the Guicawar, from the former by conquest, from the latter by mutual arrangements. These rights we considered as limited to the exaction of a tribute with the power of taking such measures as might be essential to the security of that tribute. Beyond this we did not propose to interfere, and we determined to treat the Kattywar tributaries as independent chieftains entitled to the uncontrolled exercise of the power of Government within their own territories, and subject only to the obligation of not molesting our subjects, our allies, or one another, and of paying the stipulated tribute to the Guicawar and to ourselves." By the year 1830 it was found that disorders still prevailed in Kathiawar, due apparently to the weakness of some of the chiefs. And the Bombay Government instructed the Political Commissioner to visit Kathiawar twice annually, and try persons guilty of capital crimes in the territories of those petty States whose chiefs might be too weak to punish them. The Court of Directors in 1834 approved this plan, adding " We are glad to find that it has the complete concurrence of the chiefs themselves." In 1847 it appears that questions arose as to whether offences committed in Kathiawar by sepoys in the Companys service, and by camp followers, were to be tried by court-martial as offences committed in foreign territory, and the decision of the Bombay Government was in the affirmative. In a dispatch of March 31, 1858, the Court of Directors, referring to an opinion expressed by the then Resident of Baroda, said " We cannot dismiss the correspondence which has arisen out of these questions of jurisdiction without expressing our surprise that an officer in the high political position occupied " (by the officer in question) " should have declared his opinion that the whole province of Katteewar, with the exception of the districts of the Gaekwar, is British territory, and its inhabitants British subjects." Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 135 In and before the year 1863 a further reorganization was found to be necessary, and, as might be expected, the question as to the status of Kathiawar again arose. In 1863 the members of the Bombay Government, in carefully reasoned minutes, maintained the proposition that Kathiawar was British territory. The Government of India did not indorse this view, but in a dispatch of April 14, 1864, to the Secretary of State, while discussing the proposed new arrangements, they said " The next question refers to the law and the system which should be applied to Katteewar. For the due solution of this question it is necessary first to decide whether Katteewar is foreign or British territory; and until we receive an expression of the views of Her Majestys Government on the question discussed in our separate dispatch, the law as at present in force must remain." On the point thus submitted the reply of the Secretary of State, in a dispatch of August 31, 1864, was this " I have read with interest and attention all the arguments which have been adduced on either side by the several members of the Government of India and of Bombay. It is not necessary that I should examine in detail these conflicting arguments, or record an opinion with respect to their relative weight. It is sufficient to say that the chiefs of Katteewar have received formal assurances from the British Government that their rights will be respected, and that the Home Government of India, so lately as 1858, repudiated the opinion that the province of Katteewar was British territory, or its inhabitants British subjects." The arrangements then made will be considered later. During the period which has hitherto been under consideration, and in subsequent years, the political control exercised over Kathiawar has been very complete, but it has been exercised in different degrees in different classes of Kathiawar States. The question of judicial administration will be more fully considered hereafter ; at present it may be convenient first to notice a few other points. It has never been claimed that British Indian law, as such, is operative in Kathiawar; nor, on the other hand, have the Kathiawar States been included in the Scheduled Districts Act (XIV. The question of judicial administration will be more fully considered hereafter ; at present it may be convenient first to notice a few other points. It has never been claimed that British Indian law, as such, is operative in Kathiawar; nor, on the other hand, have the Kathiawar States been included in the Scheduled Districts Act (XIV. of 1874), which enumerates certain of the districts forming part of British India, but to which the general law is not necessarily to apply. The British Indian Legislature has never purported to legislate directly for Kathiawar or its inhabitants; but, on the contrary, in the Indian Act, XX. of 1876, it is expressly recited, with regard to an important territory in Kathiawar, that " the British Government have exercised certain powers of government over the said territory, but such territory has never been treated as being British territory, nor as having been vested in the East India Company nor in Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and Empress of India, and the said Kathiawar villages have consequently never been subject to the laws in force in the Presidency of Bombay." The chiefs, at least in the larger States, have exercised the power of making laws for their own subjects. The police administration has been in their hands. The general revenues have been received and applied by the chiefs, and it appears from a work of high authority (6 Aitchison, 3rd ed. ( 1892), pp. 187 et seq., and Appendix 9, p. 48.) that in many cases the revenue is a sum many times as great as the tribute. As to the course pursued with regard to judicial administration it has already been stated that under the arrangement sanctioned by the Court of Directors in 1834, authority was given to the Political Commissioner to try persons guilty of capital crimes committed in States whose chiefs were too weak to punish them. It may be added that under that scheme sentences passed by the Political Commissioner were subject to the approval of the Bombay Government. In all subsequent arrangements, the first thing to be noticed is, that they were all carried out, not by any legislative action, but by orders or resolutions of the Executive Government, a course of proceeding which was appropriate if Kathiawar was foreign territory, but quite irregular if it formed part of the dominions of the Crown. Law. In all subsequent arrangements, the first thing to be noticed is, that they were all carried out, not by any legislative action, but by orders or resolutions of the Executive Government, a course of proceeding which was appropriate if Kathiawar was foreign territory, but quite irregular if it formed part of the dominions of the Crown. Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 136 A fairly complete organization of the province was carried out in 1863. The general nature of that settlement is very concisely described in 6 Aitchison, p. 183 " The administration was re-organized by arranging in seven classes all the chiefs of Kathiawar, and defining their powers and the extent of their jurisdiction. The country was divided into four districts, or prants, corresponding with the ancient divisions of Kathiawar, and European officers were appointed to these districts to superintend the administration generally, and more particularly to try inter-jurisdictional cases and offenders who had no known chief, or who were under such petty landholders as might be unable to bring them to trial," Under the arrangement then made, modified as it has been in some respects by subsequent orders, the chiefs of the first class, who are not many in number but who rule over wide areas, can try any person except a British subject, even for a capital offence, without any permission from the Political Agent, and their civil jurisdiction is unlimited. The jurisdiction of the chiefs in the second class, who also rule wide areas, is very nearly the same as that of those in the first. The chiefs in the third and the fourth classes have still very wide powers. These are much less in the following classes, down to the seventh, in which the chiefs have very trifling criminal and no civil jurisdiction. In the cases which fall within the power of the chiefs their decision is final, and no judicial appeal lies to any British authority. British officers have been appointed to deal with the classes of cases withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the chiefs themselves. Those officers and their tribunals are of three classes (1.) Subordinate Courts—which need not be further noticed in dealing with these appeals; (2.) Assistant Political Agents Courts; (3.) the Court of the Political Agent. British officers have been appointed to deal with the classes of cases withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the chiefs themselves. Those officers and their tribunals are of three classes (1.) Subordinate Courts—which need not be further noticed in dealing with these appeals; (2.) Assistant Political Agents Courts; (3.) the Court of the Political Agent. To the latter officer is attached a judicial assistant, whose Court forms part of that of his chief. The titles of the Political Agent and of the Assistant Political Agents have now been altered; but the change appears to have been only one of name, and need not be further noticed. The Assistant Political Agents have jurisdiction in all classes of cases ; but an appeal lies to the Political Agent, who, according to circumstances, hears it himself or refers it to his judicial assistant. The cases that come before the Assistant Political Agents, and on appeal from them before the Political Agent, are divided into two classes, political and civil. This division has long been maintained. It is clearly recognized in rules Laid down by the Governor in Council in 1874 and in 1883. A fresh set of rules was issued in 1902, in which express instructions are Laid down as to what cases should be regarded as political. In this the rules seem, on the face of them, to go beyond their predecessors. But in the dispatch of August 8, 1902, which communicated the new rules to the Secretary of State, the Government of Bombay said " The Rules are simply an issue in authoritative form of existing orders, and contain no new matter " except certain points not now material. What is Laid down in the Rules of 1902 is as follows— "2. The following suits should ordinarily be considered political— "(i) Suits to which a chief of any of the first four classes is a party. "(ii.) Cases affecting the interest of the tributary chiefs, of whatever class, in regard to sovereign rights, jurisdiction, tribute or allied payments, maintenance to members of the chiefs family, compensation for injury done by outlaws or highway robbers, territory, boundaries, political status or prerogative. "(ii.) Cases affecting the interest of the tributary chiefs, of whatever class, in regard to sovereign rights, jurisdiction, tribute or allied payments, maintenance to members of the chiefs family, compensation for injury done by outlaws or highway robbers, territory, boundaries, political status or prerogative. "Explanation.—Claims for inheritance or partition of estates in the families of chiefs below the fourth class should ordinarily be heard as civil suits, but this does not include cases which raise the issue ofa right of succession to a chief ship to which jurisdictionary powers are attached, or an issue of an inheritance to, or partition of, any estates in which a jurisdictional chief or tribute-paying talukdar has an interest direct or indirect." Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 137 In political cases the Political Agent hears the appeals himself. He is to regard his function as " diplomatic or controlling," and to dispose of the cases " as he thinks proper." Civil appeals he is ordinarily to refer to the judicial assistant. Of the two appeals now before their Lordships, the first arises out of a case classed as civil, the second out of one classed as political. From the Court of the Political Agent appeals lie, subject to certain rules, to the Governor of Bombay in Council. And since as far back as their Lordships have been able to trace the matter, a further appeal has been entertained by the Secretary of State in Council. The first ground upon which it was sought to maintain the competence of the present appeals was that the province of Kathiawar is British Indian territory, and its people within the Kings allegiance, and that an appeal lies from the Courts of that province, and from those within the Kings dominions, who hear appeals from that province, as from other Courts within British territory. In support of this contention reliance was placed, first, upon the case of Damodhar Gordhan v. Deoram Kanji(L. R. 1 App. Cas. 332.), the judgment in which was said to suggest an opinion that Kathiawar was British territory. It is true that there are passages in that judgment which may fairly be cited as favourable to the contention of the appellants. But in that case the question did not arise for decision, and their Lordships neither decided it nor expressed any opinion upon it. It is true that there are passages in that judgment which may fairly be cited as favourable to the contention of the appellants. But in that case the question did not arise for decision, and their Lordships neither decided it nor expressed any opinion upon it. Nor were the materials for a decision which are now before their Lordships then before this Board. That case, too, was one between private persons, in which the Secretary of State was not represented. Reliance was further placed upon opinions expressed by persons of high authority to the effect that Kathiawar was British territory. But the opinions so expressed were overruled by higher authority. Stress was Laid, lastly, upon the great extent of the control exercised by the British Indian Governments over the administration of the Kathiawar territories, which it was argued amounted to an actual assumption of sovereignty. On the other hand, there are the repeated declarations by the Court of Directors and of the Secretary of State that Kathiawar is not within the Dominions of the Crown. Those declarations were no mere expressions of opinion. They were rulings by those who were, for the time being, entitled to speak on behalf of the sovereign power, and rulings intended to govern the action of the authorities in India, by determining the principle upon which they were to act in dealing with Kathiawar. Those rulings have, in fact, been acted on. Many and various as have been the forms of intervention by the British Indian powers in the affairs of Kathiawar, and large as has been the political control exercised over the province, any assertion of territorial sovereignty has been avoided. No legislative power over it has ever been claimed. The intervention has never been carried further than was judged necessary, in the emergency, for the maintenance of peace, good order, and security. The position of the chiefs has always been respected; and, at least in the case of the more important among them, many of the functions commonly regarded as attributes of sovereignty have been preserved to them. The form adopted in establishing and regulating tribunals in the province has been that which was regular and appropriate if it was not British territory, but quite irregular and inapplicable if it was. The form adopted in establishing and regulating tribunals in the province has been that which was regular and appropriate if it was not British territory, but quite irregular and inapplicable if it was. And in the first of the appeals now before their Lordships counsel for the Secre tary of State disclaimed the view that Kathiawar is within the Kings dominions, and maintained that it is not so. Their Lordships are of opinion that Kathiawar is not, as a whole, within the Kings dominions, and it Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 138 has not been shewn, or indeed contended, that the particular territories out of which these appeals arise are in a different position in this respect from the province generally. The first ground, therefore, upon which it has been sought to sustain these appeals fails. The second ground upon which it was sought to base the competency of these appeals was that, assuming Kathiawar not to be a part of the Kings dominions, still the Courts of the Assistant Political Agents, that of the Political Agent, and that of the Governor in Council, are all the Kings Courts, and that the decisions of those tribunals in the present cases were judicial decisions by those Courts, and therefore subject to review by His Majesty in Council. In the Court of the Political Agent this contention was disposed of in the first of the present cases upon the short ground that the appellant is not a British subject, and that the right of appeal to the King in Council "is a birthright and appertains only to British subjects, unless specially conferred by legislative enactment." Their Lordships are unable to concur in the view thus expressed. They think that if a Court, administering justice on the Kings behalf, makes an order, judicial in its nature, by which some one is unjustly and injuriously affected, the person aggrieved is not precluded from applying to the King in Council to redress his wrong merely by the fact that he is not the Kings subject. The real question is whether in cases like those now before their Lordships the action of the tribunals in Kathiawar, and of the Governor in Council on appeal from those tribunals, is pro perly to be regarded as judicial or as political. The real question is whether in cases like those now before their Lordships the action of the tribunals in Kathiawar, and of the Governor in Council on appeal from those tribunals, is pro perly to be regarded as judicial or as political. And at this point a distinction arises between the two cases under appeal, because the first of them has been disposed of as a civil, the second as a political, case. As to the cases classed as political, their Lordships think there is no room for doubt. The rules issued from time to time for the guidance of the Political Agent treat the disposal of such cases as falling within his "diplomatic or controlling function," and direct him to dispose of them " as he thinks proper." And all the other provisions relating to such cases indicate purely political and not judicial action. The question relating to cases classed as civil gives rise to more difficulty, but, upon the whole, their Lordships are of opinion that no substantial distinction can be drawn for the present purpose between the two kinds of cases. There is not necessarily any inherent distinction between the nature of political cases and of those treated as civil. It depends in some cases solely upon who are parties to the suit. The two cases now before their Lordships illustrate this. The first of them was a suit brought to enforce a mortgage, the second was a suit to redeem a mortgage, yet one of the cases is civil and the other political, because in the latter a talukdar above the fourth class is a party. The Political Agent is empowered to transfer political cases to the civil class, and dispose of them as such, and this power he is encouraged, and indeed directed to exercise freely. The instructions from time to time issued by Government as to the disposal of cases suggests strongly that the exercise of jurisdiction, both by the Political Agent and by the Courts below him, is to be guided by policy rather than by strict law. This is illustrated by the notification of Government of Jane 22, 1900, already referred to, on the strength of which the first of the present cases (a civil case) was decided. That notification appears to follow upon a series of earlier instructions substantially to the same effect. This is illustrated by the notification of Government of Jane 22, 1900, already referred to, on the strength of which the first of the present cases (a civil case) was decided. That notification appears to follow upon a series of earlier instructions substantially to the same effect. It lays down that " no suit shall lie against a tributary chief or talukdar, or against any sub-sharer of a tributary chief or talukdar, in respect of any debt contracted by the predecessor of such chief, or talukdar, or sub-sharer unless" one or other of two conditions is complied with, one of Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 1 ( 1905- 1906) Hemchand Devchand V. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal 139 which conditions is the approval of the Political Agent. In the grounds of appeal before their Lordships questions are raised as to the construction and effect of the notification just cited. But quite irrespective of those questions, there is no doubt as to its validity as a direction by the Executive Government to its own political officers in a foreign State, and it may be used as an example of the kind of rules by which the exercise of jurisdiction is to be governed. The appeal from the Kathiawar Courts to the Governor of Bombay in Council might perhaps be regarded as a neutral circumstance. But the mode in which such appeals have been disposed of has been political rather than judicial. That disposal is described in a minute (dated October 11, 1877) of the then Governor of Bombay, as being done in the Political Department of the Government itself; that is, by the Secretary to Government in that Department under the responsible supervision of the member of Council to whom .... the political business is assigned." The further appeal to the Secretary of State in Council is a fact of clearer import. In Lord Salisburys dispatch of March 23, 1876, the practice of such appeals is dealt with as a thing at that date already fully established, and it continues to the present day in civil as well as in political cases. This system of appeal to the Secretary of State affords strong evidence that the intention of Government is and always has been that the jurisdiction exercised in connection with Kathiawar should be political and not judicial in its character. What occurred in and after 1876 points to the same conclusion. This system of appeal to the Secretary of State affords strong evidence that the intention of Government is and always has been that the jurisdiction exercised in connection with Kathiawar should be political and not judicial in its character. What occurred in and after 1876 points to the same conclusion. In the dispatch of March 23 in that year, already referred to, the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, suggested that an Act should be passed, general in character but intended specially for the case of Kathiawar, enabling the Governor in Council, when dealing with appeals, to refer any state of facts or law to the High Court for its opinion. The Bombay Government opposed the suggestion, and in an official letter of August 22, 1878, stated their grounds of objection. After distinguishing between "a system of government according to the will of the ruler," and " a system of government according to law," it was said " The cases which come before this Government for adjudication are cases which have arisen in States still administered on the former principle." " Such cases can only be justly disposed of on principles of equity in the fullest sense of the term, and not in the circumscribed sense which is familiar to the practice of the High Courts ; and sometimes consideration must be given to the political expediency which underlies the relation in which the Government stands to the protected States." The objections so stated prevailed. In 1879 Lord Cranbrook renewed the suggestion of his predecessor, but effect has never been given to it. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that each of these appeals should be dismissed. There will be no order as to the costs of these appeals.