JUDGMENT : BURKITT, J.:— In the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, the plaintiff-respondents here, sued under section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act to recover from the defendant-appellant the ‘amount of Rs. 98, which had been advanced by the respondent to the defendant on the security of a usufructuary mortgage of certain land executed on the 4th April, 1900, for a term of five years. 2. The land in question was, it appears, subject to two prior unregistered mortgages securing a sum of Rs. 70, executed in the year 1896, in favour of one Musammat Natho Kunwar, Natho Kunwar brought a suit for sale on her mortgages on the 22nd March, 1899, and obtained a decree for sale thereon on the 4th April, 1899. It thus follows that when the mortgage in favour of the plaintiff mortgagee was executed in April, 1900, there was outstanding against that property a decree for sale just a year old. That decree of the 4th April, 1899, was subsequently put into execution, and the property was sold on the 20th March, 1902, and was purchased by the plaintiff-respondent here. Shortly afterwards, i.e., on the 7th April, 1902, the present suit was instituted by the present plaintiff-respondent, Salar Bakhsh. 3. He claimed to recover from the appellant Ahmad-ul-lah Khan Rs. 98, the mortgage money, plus a certain amount for damages. He based his claim on the wording of the deed of April the 4th, 1900, by which the mortgagor undertook that, if any “khalal” occurred, he would be responsible and would repay the mortgage money. But, strange to say, in his plaint he omits all mention of the fact that he was the person who purchased at the sale of the 20th March, 1902. In consequence of objections raised by the defendant, I remitted an issue to the lower court to ascertain whether in pursuance of the terms of the mortgage the mortgagee had been put in possession, and whether mutation of names had been effected in his favour by the mortgagor. The lower appellate court has now reported in the affirmative on both these matters. It appears that Salar Bakhsh, the respondent, was put into possession immediately on the execution of the mortgage of April the 4th, 1900, and also that his name was recorded in the village papers. 4. The lower appellate court has now reported in the affirmative on both these matters. It appears that Salar Bakhsh, the respondent, was put into possession immediately on the execution of the mortgage of April the 4th, 1900, and also that his name was recorded in the village papers. 4. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that the plaintiff has not shown any grounds coming under section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act which could justify a court in granting him a decree for repayment of the mortgage money. That was the view taken by the court of first instance, it held, referring to the use of the word “khalal” in the mortgage-deed that that word meant an unforeseen event or accident, and therefore, as no such event or accident, had happened, it refused the plaintiffs a decree. 5. I am unable to concur in the very restricted meaning which that court placed on the word “khalal” It seems to me that the view of the facts taken by the lower appellate court is more correct as explaining what was meant by the word “khalal” in the mortgage-deed, For here the facts are that at the time when in April, 1900, the usufructuary mortgage in favour of the plaintiff was created, the property which the mortgage purported to hypothecate was, and had been for a year, subject to a decree for, sale at the suit of Musammat Natho Kunwar. Further, it is found by both the courts that the mortgagor, Ahmadulla Khan, had concealed from the plaintiff the existence both of the prior mortgages and the decree for sale on them, and, as found by the lower appellate court, had concealed that fact fraudulently. The result is that the property might have been put up for sale at any time after the plaintiff's mortgage and might have been sold over his head. 6. The result is that the property might have been put up for sale at any time after the plaintiff's mortgage and might have been sold over his head. 6. The fact that the plaintiff, to save the property of which he was in possession, purchased it at auction does not in my opinion affect the matter, it seems to me that the plaintiff's case comes within clause (c) of section 68, because the mortgagor failed to secure the possession of the property to the plaintiff without disturbance, The security the mortgagor gave to the plaintiff was absolutely illusory, and one of which he might have been deprived at any moment unless he chose to advance more money. 7. I am of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to his decree for the payment of the mortgage money, but I do not think he is entitled to recover the interest at 2 per cent, by way of damages during the period from April, 1900, to 20th March, 1902, during which the plaintiff was actually in possession of the mortgaged, property and was enjoying the usufruct. 8. To that extent the decree of the lower appellate court must be modified. The plaintiff certainly would be entitled to damages from the 20th March 1902, to the 7th April, 1902, the date of the institution of the suit, but this is a matter of a few days, and Mr. Ryves, for the respondent, does not press for that small amount. I therefore modify the decree of the lower appellate court, and in lieu of the decree passed by that court I give the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 98, with interest thereon, at the rate of six per cent, per annum up to date of payment.