JUDGMENT 1. This was a suit in ejectment after notice to quit; and the question that arieses in this appeal is whether the lease that was granted to the Defendant, was intended to be a lease in perpetuity, so long as the lessee paid rent for the land leased out to him, The lease was granted in Jaista 1296 B.S. corresponding to May 1889. The land demised is situate within the municipal town of Pubna, and the lessee, or rather his agent, had actually built upon the land, though it was a cutcha building, and was at the time residing there. The period for which the lease was to subsist was not specified. The material terms of the lease are as follows : " You having applied for a settlement and pottah on assessment of rent on the said land, I agree to it and grant this pottah assessing the said land with a rent of Rs 3-6 per annum. You have of your own accord executed and submitted n kabuliyat admitting the said quantity of land and amount of rent, you will pay the rent, etc., at the above rate kist by kist year after year;" and later on: "You will on up account be at liberty to take any objection regarding remission of rent or in payment of the rent. You have built on the said land a bashabati (lodging) for the accommodation of your mukhtear, you will never be at liberty to do anything that may render the land in question unfit to be dwell on. If the said land be wholly or partially acquired by Government, I shall the full price thereof, You will retain possession of the boundaries of the said land. Should any excess land be found on a fresh measurement to be in your possession you will be bound to pay an additional rent for the same without objection." And the document concludes as follows: --" And should masonry house etc, be built on the land in question, rent will be assessed at the rate prevailing in the said mehal" and so on. Now having regard to the wording of the lease it seems to be plain enough that the parties contemplated the possibility of a pucea structure being erected on the land demised lf the erection of such a structure, including the extent thereof being left entirely with the lessee, and being not dependent upon the permission of the lessor; it being simply provided that in the event of a pucca structure being erected, the rent payable for the land was to be at the prevailing rate. Having regard to these circumstances, we may well hold that the lease was a lease fur building purposes; and, if it was a lease for bullding purposes the question arises whether the parties intended, when they entered into this transaction, that the lessor should be at liberty to eject the lessee at any time, he pleased provided only he gave him a reasonable notice to quit. The parties to this transaction were, on one hand, a zemindar, Rao Jogendra Narain Rai and, on the other, the Raja of Dighapatia, then a minor under the Court of Wards, acting through his manager. Is it probable that the parties intended that", even if the Raja built upon the laud a pucca structure, he could only do so at the risk of losing the land aud the pucca structure as well, excepting perhaps the materials, if the lessor pleased at any time afterwards that the land should be vacated by the lessee, and that it should come back to his khas possession We think not. 2. Several cases have been referred to by the learned vakils on both sides in the course of argument but we hardly think it necessary to discuss them with a view to determine what may have been the true intention of the parties when they entered into the transaction in this case. The cases, however, establish that where a lease is given for building purposes, the Court may well presume that it was intended to be a perpetual grant. We may refer to one or two of them. The cases, however, establish that where a lease is given for building purposes, the Court may well presume that it was intended to be a perpetual grant. We may refer to one or two of them. In the case of Juhnoreelal Sahoo v. H. Dear 23 W R 399 1875, the learned Judges (Glover and Mitter, JJ., upon this matter, expressed themselves as follows:-"We are inclined to think that as no evidence has been given to show what was the nature or duration of the grant made to the pensioner Sergeant Webb, it may fairly, under the circumstances, be presumed to have been a lease of the land for building purposes " and, later on, they observed: "It is not denied that the land was given to Sergeant Webb for the purposes of building a house to live in and there is no evidence that, when it was given and the house built, any term was fixed for the tenancy;" and later on: " We think that it was for the Plaintiff to prove that the grant to Sergeant Webb was of a temporary nature and that this not having been proved, the tenure must be held as having been one granted for the usual building purposes and cannot be taken away from the vendee of the original owner's heir so long as he continues to pay the rent assessed on it." Then in the case of Ismail Khan Mahomed v. Jaigoon Beebee 4 C.W.N. 210: S.c. J.L.R. 27 cal 570 (1900), it would appear that the learned Judges, who had to deal with it, upon a consideration of all the leading cases upon the subject, were of opinion that if a lease is given for building purposes, a permanent tenancy may be inferred from the length of possession by the tenant and his predecessors, though there may not be the words that are usually used in documents conveying a permanent grant, such as mourasi, mokurari and such other terms. As already noticed, the lease in this case does not specify any period during which it is to subsist. The land was to be held by the lessee from year to year at a certain yearly rent, and in the event of a masonry building being erected on it the lessee would be liable to pay the prevailing rate of rent. The land was to be held by the lessee from year to year at a certain yearly rent, and in the event of a masonry building being erected on it the lessee would be liable to pay the prevailing rate of rent. Aud it seems to us, looking at the document as a whole, that the absence of the words, mourasi, mokurari, and so forth which are usually found in grants in perpetuity, does not indicate that it was not the intention of the lessor to grant a permanent lease. Our attention has, however, been called to one of the conditions in the lease, that condition being that if the land he wholly or partially acquired by Government, the lessor, and not the lessee, should obtain the full compensation that might be allowed for it. No doubt that is a cirumstance which deserves cosideration, and it may be that the parties contemplated that, in the event of a pucca structure being built upon the land, the lessee having paid no bonus for the grant would be fully compensated by the value of the building that might be awarded by Government. We have considered this condition as bearing upon the question of the intention of the parties; and we say that, notwithstanding this condition, we are not prepared to hold that it was not a lease for building purposes and that it was in the contemplation of the parties that even in the event of the lessee building a pucca structure upon the land (for the argument of the other side must come to that) the lessor would be at liberty to turn him out at any time he pleased. The learned vakil for the Respondent has, however, called our attention to the case of Lala Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal 3 C.W.N. 502: S.C. L.R. 26 I.A. 58 (1399). That CASE, in our opinion, hardly bears upon the question we have to determine in this case. There, the lessee had no power to build, but he chose to build upon it and the lessor stood by, and the question was raised whether the lessor was estopped in equity from bringing ejectment by reason of the tenant having erected a pucca structure upon the land; and the Judicial Committee observed that the lessor was not so estoppel. There, the lessee had no power to build, but he chose to build upon it and the lessor stood by, and the question was raised whether the lessor was estopped in equity from bringing ejectment by reason of the tenant having erected a pucca structure upon the land; and the Judicial Committee observed that the lessor was not so estoppel. And they observed: "If there be one point settled in the equity law of England, it is that, in circumstances similar to those of the present case, the mere erection by the tenant of permanent structures upon the land let to him, in the knowledge of and without interference by his lessor, will not suffice to raise the equitable right against the latter which has been affirmed by the Courts below." There, as we have already indicated, the lessee had no right whatsoever to build, but he chose to build at his own risk; and clearly there was no equity on his side. For all these reasons we are of opinion that it was the intention of the ptrties to grant a permanent lease of the land demised and that the Plaintiff is not entitled to obtain ejectment in this case. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the Court of Appeal below is set aside and that of the Court of first instance restored with costs.