JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J.:— This appeal has arisen under the following circumstances:— On the 30th of June, 1890, the appellant obtained a decree for sale under the provisions of section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, An appeal was preferred to this Court from that decree and was dismissed on the 10th of April, 1893. Subsequently an order absolute for sale was made. The mortgaged property was sold by auction, and the amount of the decree as it then stood, was realised by the decree-holder. On the 27th of February, 1901, the judgment-debtors applied to this Court under section 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of the decree and to bring it into accord with the judgment. The judgment of the Court of first instance, it, appears, had directed interest on the decretal amount to be charged at the rate of six per cent, per annum, but in the decree as drawn up interest was allowed at the rate of twenty-four per cent, per annum which was the contractual rate of interest. On the 19th of April, 1909, this Court allowed the application for amendment of the decree, and the decree was accordingly amended, the rate of interest payable under it being reduced to six per cent, per annum. Thereupon, on the 18th of August, 1903, the judgment-debtors applied to the Court below for a refund of the amount which has been realised from them in excess of the sum payable under the decree as amended. The Court below has allowed that application, and from the order of that Court this appeal has been preferred. 2. In our judgment the application made by the judgment-debtor was not an application for execution of the decree, but an application under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution of an amount which had in execution of the decree been realized in excess. It is conceded by the learned vakil for the appellant that the application is not one to which article 179, schedule ii of the Limitation Act applies. There being no other article applicable, the article which would govern the application is article 178 which gives a period of three years from the time when the right to apply accrued. It is conceded by the learned vakil for the appellant that the application is not one to which article 179, schedule ii of the Limitation Act applies. There being no other article applicable, the article which would govern the application is article 178 which gives a period of three years from the time when the right to apply accrued. The question is, when did the right of the judgment-debtors to make their application arise?, There cannot be any doubt that it was only when the decree was amended by this Court under its order of the 19th of April, 1901, that the judgment-debtor's right to make the present : application came into existence. Before that date they could not possibly make any application for refund of the amount which they now claim, as such application would have been consistent with the decree as it then stood. The learned vakil for the appellant contends the judgment-debtor's right to apply accrued on the date on which the decree-holder realised a larger sum than what he was entitled to. 3. But, as we have already said, under the decree as it stood at the time, the decree-holder was entitled to the amount which he recovered from the judgment-debtor by the sale of the property, and any application by the judgment-debtors for restitution would have been inconsistent with the terms of the decree as it then stood. It is only in consequence of the amendment of the decree on a subsequent date that the judgment-debtors became entitled to get back from the decree-holder the amount which they now claim. As the amendment was not made until the 19th of April, 1901, the judgment-debtor's right to make the present application could not have arisen at an earlier date. The learned vakil, for the appellant referred to the ruling of this Court in Daya Kishun v. Nanhi Begam, [1898] I.L.R., 20 All, 304.. That was a case in which the decree-holder obtained an amendment of the decree and applied for execution of the amended decree. The limitation applicable to his application was that prescribed by article 179, and his application was admittedly beyond time unless he could invoke in aid the application which he had made for amendment of the decree. That application was held not to be an application to the proper Court to take a step in aid of execution. The limitation applicable to his application was that prescribed by article 179, and his application was admittedly beyond time unless he could invoke in aid the application which he had made for amendment of the decree. That application was held not to be an application to the proper Court to take a step in aid of execution. That case, therefore, is distinguishable from the present. In our judgment the application made by the judgment-debtors was not beyond time, and this appeal must fail. We accordingly dismiss it with costs.