JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This is an appeal on behalf of the second and third Defendants in an action commenced by the Plaintiff-Respondent against them as also against the Secretary of State for India in Council and the Maharaja of Burdwan, for declaration of title to and recovery of possession of mouzah Asanchunga, alleged to appertain to a hereditary ghatwali tenure to which the Plaintiff became entitled upon the death of his father in May 1889. The Plaintiff alleges that mouzah Asanchunga as also various other properties were granted in lease in 1525, for purposes of reclamation, by the Rajah of Bishenpur to Narahari Roy, an ancestor of his, from whom he claims to be the tenth in descent; that in 1640 the Rajah of Bishenpur confirmed the grant, fixed the rent at Es. 33-13 annas and imposed upon the then tenant Balaram Roy (fifth in descent from Narahari), the performances of certain services, namely, the duty of keeping the peace in the mountain passes at Asauchunga; that since then the tenure has been enjoyed by successive generations upon payment of the quit-rent fixed and performance of the services imposed; that at the time when the Permanent Settlement was made after Bengal had come under British rule, the tenure was recognised and the lauds were included within the mal lands of the zamindari of the Maharajah of Burdwan; that since then his ancestors have been regularly paying the quit-rent to the Maharajah and guarding the ghat under the title of sirdar ghatwal under the Government; that his father was sirdar ghatwal from 1827 to 1889; that as the tenure is a permanent and heritable one, he was entitled to obtain possession upon the death of his father; that the father of Defendant No. 2 had been illegally appointed ghatwal and placed in possession of a portion of the tenure, and that subsequently the services had been dispensed with and settlement made of the lands comprised in the tenure with the second Defendant, upon the assumption that as son of the late ghatwal, he was entitled to such settlement. The Plaintiff accordingly prays for a declaration of his title to the lands and of his right to obtain settlement thereof. The Secretary of State, the Defendants Nos. The Plaintiff accordingly prays for a declaration of his title to the lands and of his right to obtain settlement thereof. The Secretary of State, the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3, as also the Maharajah of Burdwan, resisted the claim upon the allegations that the tenure was neither permanent nor hereditary, that it was an ordinary service tenure the holder whereof was liable to removal upon misconduct, that the father of the Plaintiff was dismissed for good cause, that the appointment of a successor rested entirely upon the discretion of the District Magistrate who gave the office and the lands appurtenant thereto to the father of the second Defendant and consequently the latter became entitled to settlement when the resumption took place. The Defendant's father pleaded limitation as a bar to the suit. The Court of first instance held that the suit was barred by limitation, that the ancestors of the Plaintiff never held the disputed tenure by payment of panchaki or quit-rent, apart from and independently of the performance of ghatwali services, that they held it as ghatwal rendering Police service to the Government and paying panchaki rent to the zemindar, that the dismissal of the father of the Plaintiff from the pout of ghatwal operated as a Forfeiture of the tenure and that, consequently, the Plaintiff was entitled neither to recover possession nor to obtain the declaration sought for. In this view of the matter, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. Upon appeal preferred by the Plaintiff the learned District Judge has reversed the decision of the Court of first instance on the grounds that, the tenure was permanent, heritable, and not resumable, that there had been no forfeiture and that the claim was not barred by limitation. The second and third Defendants have appealed to this Court, and on their behalf the decision of the District Judge has been challenged on three grounds, namely, first, that the tenure was neither hereditary nor permanent, secondly, that it had been forfeited by the dismissal of the father of the Plaintiff and, thirdly, that the claim was barred by limitation. 2. 2. As regards the first contention advanced on behalf of the Appellants the learned District Judge has found that the sanad produced by the Plaintiff to establish the confirmatory grant, of 1640 has not been duly proved; he has also found that it has not been shown whether the tenure was held on panchaki rent first and ghatwali services were added to it subsequently, or vice versa. But he has found the following facts established beyond dispute by the evidence on the record : (1) That the tenure, be it ghatwali or panchaki or panchaki ghatwali, was in the occupation of the ancestor of the Plaintiff long anterior to the grant of the dewani to the East India Company and that it descended from father to son. (2) That a panchaki rent of Rs. 33-13-0 is paid to the zemindar for this tenure, along with the ghatwali services to the Government, (3) That the lands comprised in the tenure were assessed at the time of the Permanent Settlement and were included in the mal lands of the zamindari of the Maharajah of Burdwan, (4) That the discharge of the ghatwali services has not been required from the holder of the tenure personally, that whenever the ghatwal became incapable of rendering active services by reason of illness or infirmity due to age, the tenure was not resumed and settled with a capable stranger, but a competent deputy was appointed discharge the duties of the ghatwal, Similarly, upon the death of a when it turned out that his son was an infant unable to render active service the tenure was not resumed, but the infant was appointed to the vacancy and a provisional guardian appointed to act for him. From these circumstances the learned District Judge has drawn the inference that the tenure is hereditary, permanent and not resumable. I am of opinion that this conclusion is perfectly legitimate and must be affirmed Idol accede to the suggestion made by the learned vakil for the Respondent the inference drawn by the learned District Judge is one of fact, the validity of which is not open to this Court to examine in second appeal; I think that the case falls within the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee in Ramgopal v. Shamskhaton ILR 20 Cal. 93 (1892), and that although it is not open to the Appellants to question the facts found by the District Judge, it is open to them to invite this Court to examine the soundness of the conclusions drawn from them, because this is a matter of law. I must therefore consider the grounds upon which the inference drawn by the District Judge may be held to be legitimate. 3. The learned vakil for the Appellants has contended upon the authority of a passage in Hunter's Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. IV, page 254, that ghatwali tenure of Bankura--and the tenure now in question is situated in that part of the Province--are neither transferable nor hereditary, differing in this respect from the lauds held by the ghatiwals of Bhagalpore and Birbhum who appear-to have a hereditary title to their lands. The learned vakil for the Respondent on the other hand has relied upon a passage from Harington's Analysis of the Bengal Reg., Vol. III., p. 510, which is a work of high authority and in which the learned author states as follows :--"The sirdar and inferior ghatwal in the contiguous zamindari of Bishenpur have small and specific portions of laud in different villages assigned for the maintenance of themselves, and of the pikes and chowkidars acting under them, of a nature analogous to the chakran assignments of land to village watchmen in other districts. That ghatwali tenure however differs essentially from the common chakran in two respects, first, that being expressly granted for purposes of Police at a low assessment which has been allowed for in adjusting the revenue payable by the landholders to Government at the formation of the Permanent Settlement, the land is not liable to resumption, nor the assessment to be raised beyond the established rate, at the discretion of the landholders; secondly, that although the grant is not expressly hereditary, and the ghatwal is removable from his office and the lands attached to it for misconduct, it is the general usage on the death of a ghatwal who has faithfully executed the trust committed to him, to appoint his son if competent, or some other fit person in his family to succeed to the office." I am of opinion that general observations like these, however weighty and useful they may be, are not decisive as to the character of the tenure in any individual case, and as the incidents of a ghatwali tenure vary in different districts and in different families they must be determined from the circumstances disclosed in the cases before the Court subject however to certain general principles which appear to be well settled upon authorities to which I shall now refer. 4. The general principles applicable to cases of this description were elaborately examined by Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J., in the case of Koolodeep Narain Singh v. Mahadeo Singh B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 559: 6 W.R. 199 (1866), which was heard by a Full Bench of this Court and ultimately taken before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council [Kooldeep Narain v. Government 14 Moo. I.A. 247 (1871)] where their Lordships affirmed the decision of the High Court. One of the principles laid down by Sir Barnes Peacock in his judgment is that although a ghatwali grant may not contain any words of inheritance if it is proved by long uninterrupted usage that the lands have passed from ancestors to heir, that is from father to son, for two or three generations without objection, the inference would be that the grant was a grant of inheritance. With reference to these observations, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that the tenure had been properly found to be a hereditary tenure, because the omission of words of inheritance do not show conclusively that the tenure was not hereditary, whereas the fact that It had descended from father to son, was the strongest possible evidence of its hereditary character. Their Lordships further pointed out that this was in accordance with their previous decisions, that is, the cases of Rajah Suttosurrun Ghosal v. Mohesh Chunder Mitter 12 M.I.A. 263 (1868) and Gopal Loll v. Teluck Chunder 10 M.I.A. 183 (1805). 5. Another principle laid down by Sir Barnes Peacock is that where lands are held subject to the payment of quit-rent and the performance of ghatwali services and where it is shown that at the Permanent Settlement the lands comprised in the tenure were included in the mal lands of the zamindari and were assessed upon the footing that the amount of revenue to be paid therefore by the zemindar was equal to the amount of rent payable to him by the holders of the tenure, the inference to be drawn is that the tenure was a permanent one descendible to heirs, the holders whereof would continue bound to perform the services. The learned Chief Justice pointed out that if at the time of the Permanent Settlement it had been considered that the ghatwali services might be dispensed with and the lands resumed by the zemindar at his choice, it is not likely that in fixing the assessment of the zamindari, the value of the lands in question should have been taken as the amount of the quit-rent then payable and that the principle upon which the assessment was made was consistent only with the assumption that the tenure was permanent and heritable, subject to the condition that the holder thereof was bound to perform the services. 6. A third principle laid down by Sir Barnes Peacock is that a hereditary ghatwali tenure held upon payment of rent and performance of services cannot be determined or resumed either by the zemindar or by the Government on the ground that the services are no longer required. 6. A third principle laid down by Sir Barnes Peacock is that a hereditary ghatwali tenure held upon payment of rent and performance of services cannot be determined or resumed either by the zemindar or by the Government on the ground that the services are no longer required. In overriding the somewhat startling contention that a landlord can at his option dispense with the services upon which lands are held and take back the estate, the learned Chief Justice pointed out that if a grantor chooses to release the services, the tenant would hold the land free of the services and that he could no more resume the lauds than contend that where lands had been granted by him at a small quit-rent, he might at his option dispense with the payment of the rent and take them back. This view was affirmed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee who pointed out that it was in accordance with their decision in the case of Forbes v. Meer Mahomed 13 Moo I.A. 138 (1870) where it was held that the right of resumption does not accrue on the mere suggestion, that the services have ceased, or that they are no longer necessary. I may add that in this last-mentioned case, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee expressed their concurrence in many of the general principles laid down by Sir Barnes Peacock in his judgmeut in Koolodeep v. Mahadeo Singh B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 559 : 6 W.R. 199 (1866). This view is also supported by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Leelanund Singh v. Munoorunjun Singh L.R.IndAp Sup. Vol. 181 (1873) where it was held that ghatwali tenures which had been created before the Permanent Settlement at a fixed rent cannot be determined by a zemindar dispensing with the ghatwali services (which as between him and the Government are no longer required) so long as the ghatwals are willing and able to perform those services. 7. The learned vakil for the Appellant placed considerable reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Secretary of State v. Poran Singh ILR 5 Cal. 740(1878), as an authority for the proposition that a ghattoali tenure in the district of Bankura is neither permanent nor heritable. 7. The learned vakil for the Appellant placed considerable reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Secretary of State v. Poran Singh ILR 5 Cal. 740(1878), as an authority for the proposition that a ghattoali tenure in the district of Bankura is neither permanent nor heritable. I am of opinion that the case relied upon does not support any such general proposition and if it did, I could not treat it as binding authority in face of the decisions to which I have previously referred. I am not called upon to consider whether under the circumstances disclosed in that case, the inference ought not to have been drawn that the particular tenure was heritable and permanent. It is sufficient to observe that the actual decision in that case may be supported on the ground that the ghatwal had been rightly dismissed by reason of misconduct and that such dismissal carried with it as a necessary consequence the forfeiture of his tenure. 8. If now the principles set forth above be applied to the facts of the case before me, there can be no question that the inference drawn by the District Judge is well founded. The ghattoali tenure now in suit has existed from before the grant of the dewani to the East India Company and has for many generations descended from father to son; it is, there-fore, hereditary. It has been held upon payment of a quit-rent and the performance of ghatwali services; such quit-rent has been paid at a fixed amount from a time long antecedent to the Permanent Settlement, and was recognised at the time of the settlement when the lands were included within the mal lands of the zamindari and the revenue was assessed upon the footing that the quit-rent WAS fixed in perpetuity. The tenure therefore is not merely heritable, but also permanent, and the holder is bound to perform the services; a tenure of this description cannot be determined or resumed by the zemindar or by the Government on the ground that the services are no longer necessary or have been dispensed with. The first contention advanced on behalf of the Appellants is therefore not well founded and must be overruled. 9. The first contention advanced on behalf of the Appellants is therefore not well founded and must be overruled. 9. The second ground advanced on behalf of the Appellant is that the tenure has been forfeited by the dismissal of the father of the Plaintiff and that be has no subsisting right to the lands on the basis of which he can claim to recover possession in this action. The facts so fur as they arc necessary for the disposal of this point are somewhat peculiar and are briefly as follows :--Ramdhan Rai, the father of the Plaintiff, was appointed sirdar ghatwal in 1827 and as at that time he was an infant, the services were performed till 1840 by a deputy who was appointed to act as the guardian. From 1840, Ramdhan discharged his duties as sirdar ghatwal till 1885, when he became incapable and his infant son, under the guardianship of a relation, was appointed his deputy. Later on, Ramdhan appears to have resumed his office and continued to discharge the services till 1875, when he was reported to be too old and his son Kali Charan, the present Plaintiff, was appointed to act as his deputy. Kali Charan continued to act on behalf of his father till 18th December 1884, when he was dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that he was either wanting in courage or had laid a false charge against certain persons alleged to be thieves. The Magistrate appointed Baidya Nath Singh, father of Defendant No. 2, as ghatwal. A question was raised in the Courts below as to whether the dismissal of Kali Charan was in fact intended to be a dismissal of his father from the office of ghatwal and whether the appointment of Baidya Nath was intended in fact to be that of deputy to Ramdhan or in supersession of him. A question was raised in the Courts below as to whether the dismissal of Kali Charan was in fact intended to be a dismissal of his father from the office of ghatwal and whether the appointment of Baidya Nath was intended in fact to be that of deputy to Ramdhan or in supersession of him. It is quite clear from the proceedings before the Magistrate and the Commissioner which are discussed at great length by the learned District Judge, that at one stage, it was intended that Kali Charan acting as the deputy of his father should be removed and that the newly appointed man should be regarded merely as a fresh deputy for the old ghatwal; and it was not until the 20th August 1889, that is to say, more than three months after the death of Ramdhan which fact does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Revenue authorities, that the Commissioner decided that the dismissal of Kali Charan should be treated as equivalent to the dismissal of his father. Apart however from the question of what the dismissal of Kali Charan was intended in fact to be, I am clearly of opinion that it cannot in law operate as a dismissal of his father. If it he one of the incidents of a ghatwali tenure, either under the original grant or engrafted on it by usage that when the ghatwal becomes incapable of personally performing the services, a deputy, preferably the next successor, may be appointed to act on his behalf by the Magistrate, it does not follow that an incapacity on the part of the deputy to discharge adequately the duties incidental to the office, operates as forfeiture of the appointment of the principal. No authority has been shown in support of the position taken up by the Appellants and it is clearly not well founded on principle. I must hold therefore that the order of the Magistrate dismissing Kali Charan, made on the 18th December 1884, even if it was intended to operate as a dismissal of his father could not in law have that effect and did not destroy the ghatwali tenure. I must hold therefore that the order of the Magistrate dismissing Kali Charan, made on the 18th December 1884, even if it was intended to operate as a dismissal of his father could not in law have that effect and did not destroy the ghatwali tenure. It has further been argued by the learned vakil for the Appellant that assuming that the tenure was not destroyed by the order of the 18th December 1884, as Kali Charan was dismissed by reason of incompetence, he was precluded upon the death of his father in May 1889, from seeking to hold the office of ghatwal and to recover possession of the tenure. I am of opinion that this contention is unsound and must be overruled. It is manifest that when Kali Charan was dismissed, he ceased to hold office only in his character as deputy; and when some years later he became entitled to succeed his father to the tenure his previous dismissal could not disqualifiy him from taking upon himself the rendering of ghatwali services. The tenure was heriditary and he was consequently entitled to succeed and to continue in possession till dismissed by reason of misconduct. The result therefore is that upon the death of the father of the Plaintiff, the tenure passed to him unaffected by the order of the Magistrate under which the father of the second Defendant obtained possession. The second contention of the Appellants cannot be sustained and must be overruled. 10. The third point taken on behalf of the Appellants is that the claim is barred by limitation. The learned District Judge has found that although the father of Defendant No. 2 was placed in possession by the order of the Magistrate, shortly after the dismissal of Kali Charan on the 18th December 1884, yet such possession in its inception was on behalf of Ramdhan and continued to be permissive till the 20th August 1889, when the Commissioner decided that his appointment must be taken to be in supersession of the permanent incumbent. This view is clearly right. It appears further that Ramdhan so long as he was alive was in possession of at least a portion of the ghatwali lands, in spite of the appointment of the father of Defendant No. 2. This view is clearly right. It appears further that Ramdhan so long as he was alive was in possession of at least a portion of the ghatwali lands, in spite of the appointment of the father of Defendant No. 2. It may also be observed that the present Plaintiff would have no claim to the office of ghatwal till his father had died, and would have no cause of action as against the father of Defendant No. 2. Whether therefore time is taken to run from the date of death of Plaintiff's father (May 1889) or from the date when the possession of the predecessor of the Defendant became adverse (August 1889), in either view this suit, instituted on the 11th May 1899, is amply in time. It appears that recently by consent of the zemindar and the Government ghatwali services have been dispensed with. This as I have already pointed out does not destroy the tenure, and the Plaintiff is entitled to settlement from the zemindars. The decree therefore which has been made by the District Judge declaring the Plaintiff's mourasi panchaki ghatwali right to the property in dispute, declaring further that he is entitled to have a settlement from the zemindar and entitling him to recover possession, is clearly right and must be affirmed. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.