JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J and Holmwood, J. - This is a suit for rent. The Defendants are permanent tenure holders in a permanently settled area. Under their kabuliyat they contracted to pay interest on arrears at the rate of twenty-four per cent, per annum. The only question on the appeal is whether they can recover interest at that rate or only at the rate of twelve per cent, per annum. Under a recent Full Bench decision of this Court [Matanyini Debi v. Mokrura Bibi 5 C.W.N 438 : s.c. ILR 29 Cal. 674 (901)] It has been held that sec. 67 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not control sec. 179, and that a contract for the larger sum is enforceable. Prima facie then the Plaintiffs can recover the larger sum for interest. It is, however, contended, that they cannot do so as the matter is res judicata. It appears that, in a previous rent suit, between the same parties, a decree was ultimately made in favour of the Plaintiffs, but with interest on the arrears at the rate of twelve per cent, per annum only. That decision was based on the case of Basunta Coomar Roy v. Promotha Nath Bhuttacharjee 3 C.W.N. 36: s.c. ILR 26 Cal. 130 1898 which was overrated by the above Full Bench case. It is said that this decision bars the Plaintiffs from now recovering the larger amount of interest, which, on the terms of the kabuliyat., is clearly payable. I am unable to take this view; to do so would mean that the Plaintiffs are for ever debarred from recovering that which the law, as it now stands, and as it stood when the present case was decided, says they are entitled to recover. I should hesitate before coming to such a conclusion. Cases must be decided upon the law as it stands when judgment is pronounced, and not upon what it was at the date of a previous suit, the law having been altered meantime. It has been conceded that, if the law had been altered meanwhile by statute, the objection could not prevail : it is difficult to see why it should prevail because the law has been since determined to be otherwise by judicial decision The cases of Partha Saradi Ayyanger v. China Krishna Ayyinger ILR 5 Mad. 304 (1882) and Chamanlal v. (sic) ILR Bom. 304 (1882) and Chamanlal v. (sic) ILR Bom. 669 (1897) and Venku v. Mahalinga I.L.R 11 Mad 395 (1888) are distinctly against the Defendants, whilst the observations of the Judges in the cases to be found in Rai Churn Ghose v. Kumud Mohan Dutt I C.W.N. 687 (1897) and Bishnu Priya v. Bhaba Sundiri I. L. Ft. 28 Cal. 318 (1901) point in the same direction. The, case of Gowri Koer v. Auth Koer I. L. It. 10 Cal. 1087 (1884) is distinguishable There, in the second suit between the same parties and relating to the same property, the Plaintiff was suing upon the same cause of action as in the previous suit, in which it had been held, upon the construction of a certain deed of sale,--purely a question of law,--that a certain property had not passed. The second suit was based upon the same deed of sale and to recover precisely the same property, and it was held that, although a Full Bench in another case had subsequently disapproved of the previous decision, the question as between the same parties, based upon the same cause of action, and relating to the same property, could net be re-opened, and the matter was res-judicata, Again in Phindo v. Jangi Nath I. L. It. 15 All. 327 (1883), the question in both suits was as to the validity of the same adoption. But in the case before us the suit is brought upon a fresh cause of action, no question as to the construction of the kabuliyat arises, the terms are clear enough, and the only question is whether Sec. 67 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is a bar to the present claim for interest. The law, as it now stands, says it is not, and I think we are bound to give effect to that law: when the previous case was decided the law was then regarded as different. To hold otherwise would be to hold that there is one law for the parties in the Full Bench case and another law for the parties in the present case. That does not seem to me to he right. If the Defendant's contention be sound, the Court must, for all time, perpetuate an injustice, by saying the section is a bar, when the law says it is not a bar. That does not seem to me to he right. If the Defendant's contention be sound, the Court must, for all time, perpetuate an injustice, by saying the section is a bar, when the law says it is not a bar. 1 do not desire to be understood as saying that a point of law can never constitute res judicata. 2. The decision of the District Judge must be reversed and that of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs.