JUDGMENT Ghose, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit for contribution. The facts may be shortly stated thus : A certain putni taluk which belonged to Chatterput Singh, was mortgaged by him to Raja Promoda Nath Roy. Upon this mortgage, the mortgagee obtained a decree on the 26th June 1895, and, in execution thereof, the putni was brought to sale, and was purchased by the Plaintiff on the 20th September 1899, The sale was confirmed on the 20th November 1899, and the purchaser, the Plaintiff, took possession on the 26th February 1900. In the meantime, the rent due to the zemindar fell into arrears; and it, would appear that, for the rent due for the year 1306 and 1307 up to Assar, the zemindar obtained a decree on the 29th August 1900, and, in execution of this decree, he advertised the putni for sale. The Plaintiff thereupon paid in the amount of the decree, and saved the putni from being sold; and he subsequently brought the present suit to recover from the mortgagor, or rather from his assignee, the amount which he had to pay for the purpose of saving the putni from sale, in respect of the rent due for the period antecedent to the confirmation of the sale, at which he purchased the property. The Court below has dismissed the suit relying upon two cases decided by this Court. [Maharani Dasya v. Harendra Lal Rai 1 C.W.N. 458 (1896) and Peary Mohan Mukhopadhya v. Sreeram Chandra, Bose 6 C.W.N. 794 (1902)]. The point raised in appeal before us by the learned vakil for the Appellant is not, we must confess, altogether free from difficulty or doubt. The matter however stands thus: Under sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the zemindar was entitled to bring to sale the putni tenure, notwithstanding the sale in execution of the mortgage decree, the rent due upon the said tenure being the first charge thereupon. And it may be taken that when the Plaint ill purchased the property in execution of the mortgage decree, he purchased it subject to the liability of discharging the rent that was then due upon the property. And it may be taken that when the Plaint ill purchased the property in execution of the mortgage decree, he purchased it subject to the liability of discharging the rent that was then due upon the property. If that be his true position, it seems to be obvious that he was hound to pay the vent for which the zemindar had taken out execution, and as such, he could not rightly call upon the Defendant to make good the payment he made, But then our attention has been called to see. 69 of the Indian Contract Act. That section runs as follows :--"A person who is interested to the payment of money which another is bound by law to pay and who therefore pays it is entitled to be reimbursed by the other." And it has been contended by the learned vakil for the Appellant that inasmuch as the Defendant, the mortgagor, was in possession of the putni during the period in respect of which the contribution has been claimed, and, as such, enjoyed the rents and profits thereof, he was bound in law to pay the rent due and that the Plaintiff being interested in the payment of that money is entitled, in equity, as enunciated in sec. 69 of the Contract Act, to call upon the Defendant, the mortgagor, to make good the amount which he had to pay. At first sight it might, no doubt, appear that the contention set up by the Defendant is supported by sec. 69 of the Contract Act, But, looking into the matter more closely, it would seem that the section contemplates a case where, the person who makes the payment is under no legal liability to make it, and he pays the money for another person who is bound in law to pay. In that case, the former is entitled to call upon the latter to make good the amount that he has paid. If that be the true view of the section, it is obvious that the Plaintiff, being under the legal liability to pay the rent that was due upon the property, when he made the purchase, could not be regarded as a person who under sec. 69 of the Contract Act was entitled to call upon the Defendant to make good the amount that he paid. 69 of the Contract Act was entitled to call upon the Defendant to make good the amount that he paid. It may well be said that the Defendant having been in the enjoyment of the rent and profits of the property during the period in question is bound in equity to make good what the Plaintiff paid for him; but we do not know whether the Plaintiff, when he made the purchase subject to the liability of paying the rent then due, did not succeed in making the purchase at a lower price than he would have had to pay, or anybody else would have paid, if the property were sold free from such liability. If he, by reason of the liability existing upon the property, purchased it at a less price, it is not equitable that he should be entitled to call upon the Defendant to make good what he had to pay in order to free the property from such liability. 2. As we have already stated, the question is not altogether free from difficulty or doubt; but then we find that in the two cases to which the Subordinate Judge has referred, and in which the facts were very similar to those that exist in the present, case, this Court has held that: "Rent is by operation of law the first charge on a tenure, and a person who purchases the same at an execution sale must, in the absence of anything to denote the contrary, be taken to purchase if, charged with the rent which is due in respect of it at the time of its purchase and there being no privity between him and the judgment-debtor, he cannot recover from the latter the money which he is obliged to pay for the rent so due at the time of the purchase." Upon consideration, I am not prepared to dissent from the view that has been thus expressed. The result is that we agree with the Court below in the decision that it has arrived at and that the appeal is dismissed with costs. Pargiter, J. I agree generally in the judgment which has been delivered by my learned brother. The question involved in the facts of this case does not come before us for decision as a new one. Pargiter, J. I agree generally in the judgment which has been delivered by my learned brother. The question involved in the facts of this case does not come before us for decision as a new one. It has already been dealt with in the two rulings cited by the lower Court, and following those rulings I think the appeal must he dismissed with costs.