JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for a decree upon an award under the provisions of section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The parties to the suit are the” owners of considerable property situate in the districts of Basti, Fyzabad and Lucknow. Differences and disputes arose amongst them as to the ownership and distribution of this property, which they agreed to refer to arbitration. The award was passed upon the submission on the nth of December, 1901. Soon after an application was made, under section 525, to have the award filed and a decree passed thereon. This was resisted by the appellants on a number of grounds, amongst others, that the arbitrator had determined matters which were not referred to him. It is contended, that if this objection is well founded, the Court has no power to file the award or to pass a decree thereon. We have, therefore, to consider in this appeal the operation and effect of sections 525 and 526 of the Code. Section 525 enables the Court to file an award in a matter which has been referred to arbitration without the intervention of the Court, that is, what is sometimes described as a “private arbitration.” Section 526 provides that “if no ground such as is mentioned or referred to in section 520 or 521 be shown against the award, the Court shall order it to be filed, and such award shall then take effect as an award made under the provisions of this Chapter.” Section 520 enables the Court to remit the award on any matter referred to arbitration for the re-consideration of the arbitrator on the ground, amongst others, that the award determines any matter not referred to arbitration, It is contended that if a ground of objection, such as is mentioned in section 520, is shown against the award the Court cannot remit the award on any matter referred to arbitration, for the re-consideration of the arbitrator; that the only course open to the Court in such a case is to reject the application and to refuse to file the award. This matter was considered in the case of Allarakhia Shivji v. Jehangir Hormasjee, [1873] 10 Bom., H.C.R., 391 where it was held upon the construction of section 327 of Act VIII of 1859, corresponding with section 526 of the present Code, after hearing learned arguments upon the question, that the Court had no power to amend a private award or remit it for re-consideration, but only possessed the power to file and enforce it or reject it. This ruling was followed in Juala Singh v. Narain Das, [1881] I.L.R., 3 All., 541, Mana Vikrama v. Mallichery Kristnan Nambudri, [1880] I.L.R., 3 Mad, 68 and Dandekar v. Dandekars, [1882] I.L.R., 6 Bom. We see no reason whatever for dissenting from this ruling. It appears to us upon careful consi deration of section” 526, that no other course is open to the Court than that which is pointed out in these decisions. 2. We now come to consider whether or not any objection to the award in this case within the meaning of section 520 has been established, The submission to arbitration clearly expresses the powers which were conferred upon the arbitrator, They were (1) to determine the amount and nature of the share of each of the parties; (2) to determine what property jointly belonged to them and under whose management and in whose possession such property was; (3) in partitioning the property to determine how much of any particular property should be given to any of the parties, or to deprive any party of any particular property; and (4) to award that goods or can be transferred or paid by any party to any other party. These provisions appear to us clear and definite. Now let us see what the arbitrator purported to do. He bestowed a great deal of labour in ascertaining the complex and varying interests in the property of the parties, and in determining the questions which were left to him to determine, and no doubt made an honest and fair award as far as we can judge; but the award appears to us to be faulty in several respects. In the first place the arbitrator has placed restrictions upon the full enjoyments of some portions of the property which he allotted to two of the parties, which he was not justified in placing. In the first place the arbitrator has placed restrictions upon the full enjoyments of some portions of the property which he allotted to two of the parties, which he was not justified in placing. For, example, in the case of Musammat Phuljha Bibi he found that she was entiitled to a certain share, but, not content with so finding, he, proceeds to place restrictions upon her power to deal with the share so awarded to her. 3. He directs that, with the exception of the male descendants of Ghulam Rasul Khan, she should not transfer her share in whole or in part to the daughters of the family, or to the relations of her father-in-law, or to strangers, adding a proviso that if the male descendants of Ghulam Rasul Khan cause her inconvenience and neglect to maintain her, she should be at liberty to sell her property even to a stranger. It was not within the power of the arbitrator to place any restrictions upon any party in regard to the enjoyment of it, and in this respect it appears to us that the arbitrator has determined matters which were outside submission. It has been contended by the learned advocate, for the respondents, that as the arbitrator was empowered to determine the nature of the share which each party should obtain, the restriction imposed upon the enjoyment of the property awarded to this lady was within the powers of the arbitrator. We are unable to place this meaning upon the words “nature of the share.” What was intended by the use of this” expression we are unable to say, but the meaning of it certainly seems to us not be so wide, as to authorise the arbitrator to place the restriction which he has done in the case of Musammat Phuljha Bibi. Again, certain parts of the property were awarded to Rustam Khan, and in his case also the arbitrator places a restriction upon his enjoyment. He states in the award that Rustam Khan “must always abide by his own statement and that he should not transfer the whole or part of his share to any one, nor should he create any charge upon it.” This clearly appears to, be outside the powers conferred by the submission. He states in the award that Rustam Khan “must always abide by his own statement and that he should not transfer the whole or part of his share to any one, nor should he create any charge upon it.” This clearly appears to, be outside the powers conferred by the submission. Again, we find that there was a number of debts outstanding in connection with a timber trade carried on in Lucknow, These debts, the arbitrator was in the ordinary course bound to partition or divide among the parties. He did not, however, do so, but by the award he directed that Bandhu Khan, one of the appellants, and he only, should collect these debts and account to the other parties in respect of them. Now Bandhu Khan objects to this provision in the award, and not unnaturally. He says that he was not conversant with the trade which was carried on in Lucknow and is not in a position to give his time and labour to the collection of the debts. He also says that in all probability he will be involved in serious litigation if he accepts the responsibility cast upon him by the award. In this also it appears that the arbitrator has gone outside the provisions of the submission and has given cause to the appellants to object to the award. This being so and having regard to the decisions referred to above, there is no course open to us but to allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below, and reject the application, It only remains then to consider the question of costs. We have carefully considered the judgment of the Court below, and we find in it no reference whatever to the grounds of appeal upon which the appellants have succeeded in this Court. The parties gave evidence in the Court below upon a number of issues which were settled. These issues have largely to do with alleged misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, and none of them is directed to the question which has been now determined by the Court in favour of the appellants upon the effect of section 256, coupled with section 520 of the Code. Upon the other questions the appellants have not satisfied us that the court below was wrong. Upon the other questions the appellants have not satisfied us that the court below was wrong. We therefore, think that the parties ought respectively to abide their own costs, in both Courts, and we so direct. We wish it to be understood that we decide this appeal entirely upon the question of the true meaning of section 526, and that we do not determine amy other question raised before the Court below.