JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— This case comes before the Court under the revisional powers conferred by section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, The suit was brought by Jagmohan, Das against the defendant, now Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding the IVth Bengal Cavalry, but then Major in that corps, to recover damages for the loss of a horse caused by a spear wound inflicted by Colonel Turner, The facts of the case are not disputed, and are shortly these. On the evening of the 24th of March, 1904 Colonel and Mrs. Turner were being driven home from a garden party in the carriage of Mr. Chesney, the Editor of the Pioneer, drawn by two fast mares, when at the turning of the Pioneer office they were overtaken by a young two-year old country bred stallion, the property of the plaintiff. The horse attacked the mares, first coming at their heads when the coachman whipped him off; he then turned round and kicked at them but being at close quarters did no damage. Further on the road the horse again resumed the attack but was beaten off. At the Railway crossing which is close to Colonel Turner's house, the horse again rushed up to the mares screaming and kicking. Colonel Turner jumped out of the carriage and tried to beat off the horse with a croquet mallet, telling the coachman to drive home quickly; he himself stood at the gate of the compound with the croquet mallet in his hand to keep off the horse, and shouted out to Mr. Chesney to send him out a polo stick. The animal forced his way past, either jumping the compound fence or going through the gateway. The evidence on this point is not quite clear, Colonel Turner at once ran to the porch when Mr. Chesney handed him a spear. The stallion who had been madly careering in the compound, again rushed at the mares and as he was charging up, Colonel Turner lunged at him with the spear and drove him off. The horse then gallaped off to the other side of the house and again came round from that side and made for the carriage which was still under the porch when the servants who had been collected scared him off. He galloped away and ultimately left the compound. The horse then gallaped off to the other side of the house and again came round from that side and made for the carriage which was still under the porch when the servants who had been collected scared him off. He galloped away and ultimately left the compound. The spear struck the horse in the left hind quarter inflicting a severe wound from the effects of which the horse died the following clay. Colonel Turner, who as one would expect, has great experience of horses, deposed that he “never saw a more vicious or determined attack,” and that it was impossible for any one to catch the horse by the reins as it was so vicious. He described the animal as a ‘screaming stallion.’ These facts are deposed to by Colonel and Mrs. Turner and by Mr. Chesney and are not controverted. Mrs. Turner was so much terrified that she could’ with difficulty be restrained from jumping out of the carriage before it entered the compound. The plaintiff in his evidence deposed that the horse was a country-bred which he had bought a few months previously at the magh mela for Rs. 300, and that it was a quiet animal. On the evening on which the occurrence took place, he stated that he had ridden the horse to the house of one Pandit Chandika Prasad and there handed him over to the charge of some person, that after the lapse of about 20 minutes he saw the horse running away. The person into whose custody the horse is alleged to have been given was not examined, and we are therefore left in the dark as to how the animal managed to break loose. A post mortem examination showed that the horse died from the effects of the spear wound and the question for our determination is whether Colonel Turner was under the circumstances in the defence of person and property justified in inflicting the wound. Previous to the attack which we have recounted, the horse had made a determined and vicious attack in the public road on a horse which was being driven by Mr. Campbell, late Joint Magistrate of Allahabad. Mr. Campbell deposed that the horse kicked both his horse and dog-cart and injured several spokes of one of the wheels. He galloped up from behind, rushed open mouthed biting at his horse. Campbell, late Joint Magistrate of Allahabad. Mr. Campbell deposed that the horse kicked both his horse and dog-cart and injured several spokes of one of the wheels. He galloped up from behind, rushed open mouthed biting at his horse. He attacked repeatedly and kicked his horse in the mouth. The animal he said had apparently lost all control over himself, attacking his horse and cart with teeth and heels. Luckily, as Mr. Campbell says, his horse was a quiet old troop horse; otherwise he does not know what would have happened. The learned Judge of the Small Cause Court came to the conclusion that Colonel Turner exceeded the right of defence of person and property by using the spear and seemed to be of opinion that if he and his servants had made an effort to Catch the horse they could have done so and thus prevented any mischief. He accordingly decreed the plaintiff's claim and awarded him Rs. 300 damages. The learned Judge seems to us not to have fully appreciated the aggressive resources of a screaming stallion. The evidence of the witnesses shows that the horse was in such an infuriated condition that he could not be caught or held, and we have little doubt that, if the man in whose charge it was left by the plaintiff had been examined, it would have transpired that the horse broke loose from him. The learned Judge lays down the law in these words, “The law on the subject as laid down in Underbill on Torts (p. 305, VII Edition) is that the remedy of the owner of land for trespasses committed by cattle is by seizing the animals while trespassing and detaining them until reasonable compensation is made not only for damages done to the land but also for damage, if any, done to the animals of the owner of the land. And it is said by Sir Frederick Pollock, at page 448 of his Law of Torts that the test in such cases is whether the party's act was such as he might reasonably in the circumstances think necessary for the prevention of harm which he was not bound to suffer.” He then observes “Applying this test to the present case, I think that taking all the defendant says as to horse having attacked his carriage on the road and in his compound to be true, he was yet not justified in using his spear at him., I do not agree with Major Turner in thinking that the spear was used innocently or simply to drive the brute away, for Major Turner himself says that if he could, he would have shot the horse,” This latter remark is based upon a statement which was made by Colonel Turner to the Police when they came to investigate the matter, namely, that if he could, he would have shot the horse as he was justified in doing so. This statement of Colonel Turner is taken by the Judge to be proof that he did not use the spear innocently or simply to drive the stallion away. This appears to us a wholly wrong inference from the statement of Colonel Turner to the Police. The reasonable inference is that so vicious and infuriated was the horse that in self-defence he would have been justified in shooting and would have shot him, The learned Judge seems to regard a screaming stallion at large in a compound as coming within the category of animals which could be readily secured and detained. He seems to have little appreciation of the resources of such a brute when he suggests that the defendant or one of his servants could have caught him if any attempt to do so had been made. No doubt when the horse had become exhausted, it was possible to secure him, but before that grave injury might have been inflicted. If Colonel Turner had not used a spear and driven the horse off, it is hard to say whether he or one of the Syces, to say nothing of the mares, would not have met with serious injury. The occur-rence is fortunately an unusual one. We know of no reported case in which in the defence of person or property a horse has been killed. The occur-rence is fortunately an unusual one. We know of no reported case in which in the defence of person or property a horse has been killed. In the case of dogs the law is well settled. To justify the shooting of another person's dog it is not sufficient to show that the dog was of a ferocious disposition and was at large, but it must also be shown that the animal was actually attacking the party at the time. If a dog whether he be of a mischievous disposition or not attack a man, the party attacked has sufficient justification for shooting him in self-defence, Morris v. Nugent, [1836] 7 Car. and P., 672. The principle of “law which is applicable in the case of dogs is equally applicable in the case of horses. If a horse attacks a man, the person attacked is fully justified in protecting himself or his property by all reasonable means, the test being as laid down by Sir F, Pollock in the case of an attack by an animal whether the party's act was “such as he might reasonably in the circumstances think necessary for the prevention of harm which he was not bound to suffer.” The’ force used must not be out of proportion to the apparent exigencies of the occasion. The right of defence must not be abused as it so readily may be; but if a person who is acting on the defensive uses only such force as he reasonably believes to be necessary, he is protected. We have no hesitation in this case in holding that the act of Colonel Turner was such as any reasonable minded man might have considered necessary under the circumstances, and that he was fully justified in using the spear as he did in the protection of person and property. There is no ground whatever for supposing that he acted with any other intention than to drive away the stallion, or that he used any more force than he believed to be necessary to avert impending injury. Owners of vicious and dangerous animals are bound to keep such animals under restraint and not permit them to wander on the public roads and into private compounds to the danger of the public. If they neglect to do so, they must take the consequences. This suit ought not in our opinion to have been brought. 2. Owners of vicious and dangerous animals are bound to keep such animals under restraint and not permit them to wander on the public roads and into private compounds to the danger of the public. If they neglect to do so, they must take the consequences. This suit ought not in our opinion to have been brought. 2. The learned Advocate for the respondent in the course of his argument submitted that we should not in revision lightly disturb a finding of fact of the lower court, We are at one with him in this. But the evidence given for the defence in this case is not controverted and if accepted, as it has been by the court below, furnished a complete answer to the suit. 3. The power of interfering in revision conferred by the Small Cause Courts Act is wide—wider than the power conferred by section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code—and if substantial grounds are shown for the interference of the court, the court is not merely justified in exercising but acts reasonably in the exercise of its revisional powers. In the present case we are of opinion that a grave injustice would be done if the decree of the court below were allowed to stand. 4. We therefore set aside the decree of the lower court and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs in this Court and in the Court of Small Causes.