JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— The question for determination in this appeal is whether a suit can be maintained for materials over the value of Rs. 20 supplied to a Municipal Board which is subject to the provisions of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh Municipalities Act, of 1883 (sic), in the absence of a contract in writing, signed by the Chairman or a Vice-Chairman and Secretary of the Municipality. The Municipal Board of Benares invited tenders for road ballast, whereupon the plaintiffs made a tender which was approved of by the Resident-Engineer, and was subsequently accepted by a resolution of the Board. The plaintiff acting on the resolution of the Board supplied some ballast for which payment was made. A further instalment of ballast was supplied, a part of which the Municipality refused to accept as being of inferior quality. The plaintiffs then brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, claiming the value of this ballast. The defendant Board set up the defence that the contract was not binding on them inasmuch as the requirement of section 47 of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh Municipalities Act, No. 1 of 1900, were not complied with. This section 47 corresponds with section 47 of the Act of 1883. In the written statement the Board expressed its willingness to pay to the plaintiffs Rs. 1,094-8-8, the price of the ballast actually used after deducting the cost of picking and sorting. This sum the Board subsequently deposited in court, and it was withdrawn by the plaintiffs. The court below dismissed the suit as not maintainable, and hence the present appeal. 2. Mr. Ryves, counsel on behalf of the Municipality, based the defence of the Board mainly on the ruling of the House of Lords in the case of H. Young & Co. v. The Mayor and Corporation of Royal Leamington Spa, [1883] 6 App. Cas., 517, affirming the judgments of the Court of Appeal and a Bench of the Queen's Bench Division. 3. The appellants rely upon sections 69, 70 and 72 of the Indian Contract Act as taking the case out of the ruling of the House of Lords. Section 47 of the Municipalities Act of 1883, directs that— (1) ”Every contract made by or on behalf of Municipal Board whereof the value or amount exceeds Rs. 3. The appellants rely upon sections 69, 70 and 72 of the Indian Contract Act as taking the case out of the ruling of the House of Lords. Section 47 of the Municipalities Act of 1883, directs that— (1) ”Every contract made by or on behalf of Municipal Board whereof the value or amount exceeds Rs. 20, shall be in writing; (2) “every such contract shall be signed by the Chairman or a Vice-Chairman, and the Secretary; and (3) “if a contract to which this section applies is executed otherwise than in conformity therewith, it shall not be binding on the Board.” 4. The case of Young and Co. v. The Corporation of Leamington had reference to section 174 of the Public Health Act of 1875 which imperatively requires that every contract made by Urban Authority, whereof the value or amount exceeds £ 50 must be in writing and sealed with the common seal of such authority. In that case the Corporation being an urban sanitary authority, by contract under seal employed a party to construct waterworks— one of the terms of the contract being that if the party employed should make default, the Engineer of the corporation might employ persons “to finish it and charge the party employed with the expense. Default was made in the completion of the contract and thereupon the defendant's Engineer by contract in writing employed the plaintiffs not only to finish the contract but to execute certain additional works not specified therein. The plaintiffs executed the work, and the defendants had the benefit of them. The contract of the Engineer with the plaintiffs was approved of by the defendants, but the provisions of section 174 of the Public Health Act were not complied with. A Bench of the Queen's Bench Division consisting of MATHEW and WILLIAMS, JJ., on a special case stated by an arbitrator, held that the contract was not binding on the defendants. On appeal from this decision, LINDLEY, COTTON and BRETT, L. JJ., upheld the decision of the Court below, [1883] 8 App. Cas. 517. A Bench of the Queen's Bench Division consisting of MATHEW and WILLIAMS, JJ., on a special case stated by an arbitrator, held that the contract was not binding on the defendants. On appeal from this decision, LINDLEY, COTTON and BRETT, L. JJ., upheld the decision of the Court below, [1883] 8 App. Cas. 517. Upon the point pressed in argument on behalf of the plaintiffs that as the contract had been performed and the defendants had the benefit of the plaintiff's word, labour and materials, the defendants were at all events liable to pay for these at a fair price, Lindley, L.J., observed: “In support of this contention cases were cited to show that corporations are liable at common law quasi ex contracts to pay for work ordered by their agents and done under their authority. The cases on this subject are very numerous and conflicting, and they require review and authoritative exposition by a Court of Appeal. But in my opinion, the question thus raised does not require decision in the present case. We have here to construe and apply an Act of Parliament. The Act draws a line between contracts for more than £50 and contracts for £50 and under. Contracts for not more than £50 need not be sealed and can be enforced whether executed or not, and without reference to” the question whether they could be enforced at common law by reason of their trivial nature. The Act draws a line between contracts for more than £50 and contracts for £50 and under. Contracts for not more than £50 need not be sealed and can be enforced whether executed or not, and without reference to” the question whether they could be enforced at common law by reason of their trivial nature. But con tracts for more than £50 are positively required to be under seal; and in a case like that before us, if we were to hold the defendants liable to pay for what has been done under the con tract, we should in effect be repealing the Act of Parliament and depriving the rate-payers of that protection which Parliament intended to secure for them,” He further observes: “It may be said that this is a hard and narrow view of the law: but my answer is that Parliament has thought it expedient to require this view to be taken, and it is not for this or any other court to decline to give effect to a clearly expressed statute because it may lead to apparent hardship.” BRETT, L.J. in his judgment said:— ” I think that the mere want of seal prevents the plaintiffs from recovering, and I am further of opinion having read all the cases on the point that the fact that the defendants had the benefit of the contract, will not prevent them from setting up the statute in answer to the plaintiff's claim. The mere want of a seal is a complete bar.” 5. On appeal to the House of Lords, Lord BLACKBURN in the course of his judgment adopted the views expressed by LINDLEY and BRETT, L. JJ., and at the close of his judgment commenting on the effect of the view entertained by their Lordships, observes:— “It is true that this works great hardships upon the new appellants. They had an agreement, but it was not sealed, and though it is possible that if the agreement, had been under seal, the defendants might have established a defence on the merits to all or part of what is claimed, it is hard on the appellants that they should not be allowed to raise the question. It is however, for the legislature to determine whether the benefits derived by enforcing a, general rule are or are not too dearly purchased by occasional hardship. It is however, for the legislature to determine whether the benefits derived by enforcing a, general rule are or are not too dearly purchased by occasional hardship. A Court of law has only to inquire what has the legislature thought fit to enact.” Lord BRAMWELL in expressing his concurrence stated: “I must add that I do not agree in the regret expressed at having to come to this conclusion. The legislature had made provisions for the protection of rate-payers, share-holders and others who must act through the agency of a representative body by requiring the observance of certain solemnities and formalities which involve deliberation and reflection. That is the importance of the seal. It is idle to say that there is no magic in the wafar. It continually happens that carelessness and indifference on the one side and the greed of gain on the other cause a disregard of these safeguards and improvident engagements are entered into. Whether, that has been so in this case I have no notion, but certainly the rate-payers of Lamington may well be astonished at the amount claimed of them. The decision may be hard in this case on the plaintiffs who may not have known the law, They and others must be taught it which can only be done by its enforcement.” Lord WATSON and Lord FITZGERALD concurred. The case of The British Insulated Wire Co. v. The Prescot Urban District Council, [1895] L.R., 2 Q.B., 460., is an exemplification of the stringency with which the courts enforce the observance of the statutory requirements. In that case the plaintiffs and defendants entered into a contract in writing duly sealed with the seal of the defendants, whereby the plaintiffs agreed to light by means of electricity the streets within the defendants' district for a period of five years for the annual sum of £350. The contract which was otherwise in conformity with the requirements of section 174 of the Public Health Act of 1875 in every respect omitted to specify any pecuniary penalty to be paid in case its terms were not duly performed. The plaintiffs duly performed the contract on their part and would have been entitled to the sums claimed in the action if “the contract had been valid and binding upon and enforceable against the defendants. The plaintiffs duly performed the contract on their part and would have been entitled to the sums claimed in the action if “the contract had been valid and binding upon and enforceable against the defendants. The question for the opinion of the court was whether the contract was void, or not enforceable against the defendants by reason of the fact that it did not specify a pecuniary penalty to be paid in case of its breach. It was held by POLLOCK, B. and WRIGHT, J. that the enactment was obligatory and that a contract which did not specify any pecuniary penalty could not be enforced against the Urban Authority. To these decisions we naturally attach profound weight. But they are met by the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants in this case that in view of the provisions of sections 65, 70 and 72 of the Indian Contract Act they have no application in the circumstances of the present case. Before we deal with this contention, it will de convenient here to refer to a decision of a. Bench of the Bombay High Court upon which the learned counsel for the appellants strongly relied, that is, the case of Abaji Sitaram Madak v. The Trimbak Municipality, [1903] I.L.R., 28 Bom., 66. In that case the plaintiff Municipality brought a suit to recover a sum of money from the defendants alleging that it was due from the principal defendant as the person to whom the right of levying and collecting certain tolls and taxes had been granted and from the other defendants as his surety. The defence was that the Municipality had at a meeting passed a resolution which was subsequently communicated to the principal defendants which have ‘the effect of dispensing with or remitting the performance by him of so much of his obligations as gave rise to the suit. The surety relied on the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Indian Contract Act as entitling him to a discharge from liability. By the resolution upon which the defendants relied, it was resolved that taking into consideration adverse circumstances such as the prevalence of plague, famine, cholera and other things, and the fact that the principal defendant was likely to suffer loss, it was proper to remit Rs. 7,000, and that that sum should be remitted out of the sum agreed to be paid by the principal defendants. 7,000, and that that sum should be remitted out of the sum agreed to be paid by the principal defendants. The resolution was passed by the Chairman and five members, but neither the president nor any official member was present at the time, and it was subsequently set aside at a general meeting at which it was held unanimously that the resolution should be cancelled. On behalf of the plaintiff Municipality it was contended that there had been no remission or dispensation within the meaning of section 63 of the Contract Act, first, because there was no communication of the resolution, and secondly, because the provision of section 30 of the Bombay Act II of 1884 had not been observed. It was contended that a dispensation or remission under section 63 requires an agreement or contract in view of the provisions of section 30’ of that Act, That section provides that every other contract or agreement, i.e., any grant or agreement, the amount of which exceeds Rs. 500 on behalf of the Municipality shall be in writing and shall be signed by the President and two other Commissioners and shall be sealed, with common seal of the Municipality.” It was held by JENKINS, C.J., and JACOB, J., that the meeting at which it was resolved to grant remission to the principal defendant, had not been duly convened in the manner prescribed by section 27 of the District Municipal Act, and further that assuming that there was a legal resolution and that it was communicated as alleged, still inasmuch as a dispensation or remission under section 63 requires an agreement or contract the resolution was of no legal effect since the provisions of section 30 had not been observed. So far this judgment is unfavorable to the appellants, But in the course of their judgment the learned Judges referred to a point which was raised by the Advocate-General before them, It appeared that the contract under which the principal defendant became entitled to levy and collect the tolls, was not under seal and so failed to comply with section 30 to which we have alluded. The Advocate-General relying on section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, asked the court to hold that there was no contract at all under which the plaintiff Municipality could claim. The Advocate-General relying on section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, asked the court to hold that there was no contract at all under which the plaintiff Municipality could claim. The court dealt with this argument in the following passage:— “Apart from the fact that this is traveling outside the pleadings of the parties, we think there is another reason why we cannot give effect to the contention. It is well recognised law in England that though a contract by a corporation must ordinarily be under seal, still where there is that which is known as an executed consideration, an action will lie though this formality has not been observed, Notwithstanding section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, we see no reason for not adopting the same view of the law here. For we think when regard is had to the principle on which the English Courts have proceeded, it is clear we do not run contrary to any provision of section 23 of the Contract Act in holding that in this country too, as in England, where there is an executed consideration, a suit will lie even in the absence of sealed contract. And on the fact of this case we hold that there has been an executed consideration. It is, however, at the same time manifest that doctrine we have here applied will on the facts in no way assist the defendant's contention that the performance of his promise had been legally dispensed with or remitted.” Section 23 of the Contract Act is the section which prescribes that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless among other things it is forbidden by law or is of such a nature that if permitted, would defeat the provisions of any law, We think that the statement of the law thus laid down is too wide. According to the ruling of the House of Lords to which we have referred, an action will not lie in England against a corporation which is governed by an Act, such as the Public Health Act of 1875 in the absence of a sealed contract even though there is an executed consideration. According to the ruling of the House of Lords to which we have referred, an action will not lie in England against a corporation which is governed by an Act, such as the Public Health Act of 1875 in the absence of a sealed contract even though there is an executed consideration. In view of the prohibition contained in section 30 of the Act to which we have referred, that no contract or agreement not executed as therein provided, should be binding on a Municipality, the contract entered into with the defendants was not, we think, enforcible at all events as against the Municipality, even though there was an executed consideration. Apart from sections 65, 70 and 72 of the Indian Contract Act, it appears to us that the agreement entered into between the appellants and the respondent Municipality not having been [committed to writing and signed as required by the Municipality Act, cannot form the basis of any suit against the Municipality notwithstanding that ballast was supplied in pursuance of it. But sections 65, 70 and 73, which have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants, we think, afford them no assistance. As regards section 65 it seems to be applicable to cases in which an agreement is void by reason of mistake or impossibility or in consequence of the want of a legal consideration. The illustrations annexed to the section point to this. The section opens with words. “When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void,” and applies only to such cases. As an illustration of the cases in which an agreement is discovered to be void, the following is given: “A pays B, Rs. 1,000 in consideration of B's promising to marry C. A's daughter. C is dead at the time of the promise. The agreement is void but B must repay A the Rs. 1,000.” Here the parties entered into an agreement in the mistaken belief that C was, alive, and there was a total failure of consideration for the payment of the Rs. 1,000. In the case before us, the agreement entered into between the appellants and the respondents Municipality was not discovered to be void. 1,000.” Here the parties entered into an agreement in the mistaken belief that C was, alive, and there was a total failure of consideration for the payment of the Rs. 1,000. In the case before us, the agreement entered into between the appellants and the respondents Municipality was not discovered to be void. There was no illegality in the action of the Municipality in passing a resolution accepting the appellant's tender, and therefore it cannot be said that he agreement, if any, constituted by the tender, and acceptance of it has been discovered to be void. The agreement is unobjectionable, but it did not ripen into a binding contract by reason of the neglect of the parties to comply with the provisions of the section under which the Municipality could alone contract. The subsequent words of the section, namely, “when a contract becomes void” evidently have no application because there was no contract. If we were to hold that this section was applicable, we should render nugatory the salutary provision of the Municipalities Act which provides that a contract executed otherwise than in conformity with it, shall not be binding on the Board.” Likewise section 70 appears to us to have no application. That section provides that where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him not intending to do so gratuitously, the person enjoying the benefit of the non-gratuitous act, shall be bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. Assuming, but without deciding, that this section has any application, we find that the appellants cannot be said to have lawfully delivered to the Municipality the ballast which the Board has not used. The plaintiffs without any legal contract authorising them in that behalf, chose to lay down ballast on the side of a public road, That ballast has not been used by the Municipality save to the extent for which the price viz., Rs. 1,094-8-8 has been paid to the appellants, i.e., the sum lodged in court and drawn out by the appellants. The Municipality has not enjoyed the benefit of the remainder of the ballast. The section nowhere imposes on a party any obligations to make compensation in respect to that of which he has not enjoyed the benefit. Section 72 also does not appear to us to help the appellants. The Municipality has not enjoyed the benefit of the remainder of the ballast. The section nowhere imposes on a party any obligations to make compensation in respect to that of which he has not enjoyed the benefit. Section 72 also does not appear to us to help the appellants. It provides that a person to whom money has been paid or anything delivered by mistake or under coercion must repay or return it. The ballast in this case was neither delivered by mistake nor under coercion. 6. For these reasons we think that the decision arrived at by the court below was correct. We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale.