JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - The question raised upon this rule is whether upon the facts found the Petitioners were rightly convicted of cheating by personation under 419 of the Penal Code. The facts found are these:--In the Treasury at Durbhanga there was a sum of Rs. 207 due to the Petitioners and two other persons Thakur Prasad and Rajnarain who were minors. The Petitioners and these two persons were members of a joint Hindu family of which the Petitioner, Ram Dihal, was the kurta. Ram Dihal having applied for payment of this sum to him as representing the family, the Collector on the 2nd August made an order directing him to produce a power-of-attorney from the others or to cause them to appear and admit his authority to sign on their behalf. On the 10th August Ram Dihal filed a petition before the Collector representing that the family being joint no power-of-attorney was necessary to enable him to draw the money but no notice was taken of the petition. On the 6th September the Petitioners and two other persons who put themselves forward as being Thakur Prasad and Rajnarain presented themselves at the Treasury and a receipt for the money was signed by the Petitioners for themselves and by the other two persons in the names of the minors, and upon this being done the money was paid over. That Thakur Prasad and Rajnarain were personated admits of no doubt. It has been specifically found that the family was joint and that the Petitioner Ram Dihal was authorised in any case to draw the money on behalf of the family, including Thakur Prasad and Rajnarain, the other members of the family having authorised Ram Dihal to take the money and sign for all. Upon these facts the Petitioners and one Jagawan Singh, who personated one of the minors, were convicted under sec. 419 of the Indian Penal Code of cheating by personation and sentenced to undergo terms of imprisonment and some of them were also sentenced to pay a fine. The question to be determined is whether upon these facts the Petitioners were rightly convicted. 2. 419 of the Indian Penal Code of cheating by personation and sentenced to undergo terms of imprisonment and some of them were also sentenced to pay a fine. The question to be determined is whether upon these facts the Petitioners were rightly convicted. 2. A person is said to cheat if by deceiving another person, he fraudulently or dishonestly induces the persons so deceived to deliver any property to any person or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do anything which he would not do were be not so deceived and which act causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. In either case some one must be deceived and here the Collector is found to have been deceived by the personation of the two minors In the former case it is necessary that the person deceived should be fradulently or dishonestly induced to deliver up property. The word "fraudulently" is defined by sec. 25 of the Penal Code thus :--"A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise." This definition is obviously imperfect as it leaves undetermined the word "defraud." The word "fradulently" being used in the section together with the word "dishonestly" must mean, if it is to have any meaning at all, something different from "dishonestly." A person is said to do a thing " dishonestly" if he does it with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another. "Wrongful gain" is defined to be gain by unlawful means of property to which the persons gaining is not legally entitled and "wrongful loss" is the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled." It having been conceded that the Petitioner, Ram Dihal, was authorised to draw the money due to the members of the family, it follows that he was legally entitled to the money and that the money was not property to which the Collector was legally entitled, for he could have been compelled, on proof of the authority, to pay it over to Ram Dihal, and no doubt, had he realised that he would have been justified in paying it to Ram Dihal on his sole receipt, he would have paid it. Therefore it cannot be said that the Collector was dishonestly induced to part with the money. Apparently, however, the word "fraudulently" is not confined to transactions in which there is wrongful gain on the one hand, or wrongful loss on the other, either actual or intended. The word "defraud," which is not defined in the Code, may or may not imply deprivation, actual or intended. The Collector was undoubtedly deceived. He had refused to pay upon the receipt of Ram Dihal and would not have paid, but for the fact that the receipt purported to be, though in fact it was not, signed by all the persons entitled to the money, but in the general acceptation of the word he was not defrauded. He was, I think, induced by what may be described as a trick, or a lie which was acted upon to deliver up property (which he had erroneously determined to retain although he was not legally entitled to do so) to the person who was legally entitled to receive it. The case is somewhat similar to a case in Madras: Reg. v. Long Hurst (1). In that case the accused was indicted for obtaining a carriage from the prosecutor by a false pretence. He admitted the fact, but he said that the prosecutor owed him money (and this was admitted) and that he got the carriage in order to compel payment. In charging the jury Bittleston, J., said :--"If you think he (the accused) did not obtain it (the carriage) with the intention of keeping it, but of putting a screw upon the prosecutor then I think he is not guilty of the offence. The prosecutor admits that there was a debt due and there is evidence of an arbitration between them as to a money dispute. If you think it was merely a trick resorted to for the purpose of pressure then I recommend you (1) Mayne's Crl. Law, 2nd Ed., 780; 4th Sess. (1858), Madras. to acquit. It is very dangerous to convict in a criminal charge where the case comes merely to a matter of civil dispute." That, however, was a case in 1860 before the Penal Code came into force and was tried according to the principles of English law and is not necessarily an authority on the construction of sec. 415 of the Penal Code. In a more recent case, Reg. 415 of the Penal Code. In a more recent case, Reg. v. Loothy Bewa (2), where one Koomaree who had agreed to sell land, set out to register the conveyance, but fell ill on the way and sent on the Defendant who, by personating her had the deed registered in her name, it was held that the Defendant had committed an offence under sec. 93 of the Registration Act XX of 1866, but that he was not guilty of cheating by personation under sec. 419 of the Penal Code. It was considered that there was nothing to show that the prisoner intended to defraud or injure any one in personating Koomaree and doing an act which Koomaree doubtless would have done had she not been prevented by illness from going to the office of the Registrar in person. 3. In my opinion there was no intent to defraud the Collector in this case and the facts found therefore do not come within the first part of sec. 415, by which cheating is defined,--it not having been shown that the act was done fraudulently or dishonestly. In the latter part of the section, however, the words "fraudulently" or "dishonestly " do not find a place, and may accordingly be disregarded in considering whether the facts found come within the latter part of the section. The words (omit-(2) 2 B.L.R., Cr. 25 : s.c. 11 W.R. 24 (1869). ting what is unnecessary) are "whoever by deceiving any person.....intentionally induces the person so deceived to do.. anything which he would not do... if he were not so deceived and which act.. causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind or reputation is said to cheat ?" Here again there is no question that deception was intentionally practised and that the Collector was actually deceived and in consequence of the deception he made over the money which he would not have paid but for the deception. But, in my opinion, it cannot be said upon the facts found that the act done, that is, the payment of the money, caused or was likely to cause damage or harm to the Collector in body, mind, or reputation, for he was legally bound (though he was on titled to insist upon the authority being proved) to hand over the money to the person or persons authorised to receive in, and Ram Dihal has been found to have been so authorised. In my opinion therefore the Petitioners are not guilty of cheating by personation and I would make the rule absolute and setting aside the convictions and sentences, direct that the Petitioners be discharged and the fines, if paid, be refunded. Geidt, J. 4. I entirely agree with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother. It seems clear that there was neither fraud nor dishonesty on the part of the Petitioners nor any harm nor likelihood of harm to the Collector in the Petitioners' conduct. It cannot therefore be brought within the definition of cheating contained in sec. 415, Penal Code. Had the false personation occurred in a suit or criminal proceeding, it would have been punishable by sec. 205 of the Penal Code. False personation in Registration proceedings is also punishable by sec. 82(d) of the Indian Registration Act, 1877. In neither of these cases is fraud or dishonesty an essential ingredient in the offence. But there is no similar provision, as far as I am aware, with regard to false personation in proceedings before a Collector. I agree in making the rule absolute and in setting aside the conviction and sentence.