JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— The suit which has given rise to this appeal was brought to have a lease of the 1st of December, 1898, executed in favour of the defendant, Sheikh Wazir Ali, set aside. The circumstances under which the lease was executed, are as follows:— Sarju Prasad and others executed a mortgage of their property in favour of the plaintiffs, Moti Chand and others. The plaintiffs in order to enforce payment of the mortgage debt brought a suit and obtained a decree for sale on the 8th of November, 1892. The decree then passed, was based on a compromise, the object of the compromise being evidently to give time to the mortgagors to pay off the mortgage debt which exceeded Rs. 40,000. According to the terms of the compromise it was provided that the mortgage debt with interest thereon at the rate of annas 12 per cent, per mensem should be paid by annual instalments of Rs. 7,000 on the last day of Jeth of every year. There was in the compromise a provision that if any instalment of the mortgage debt remained unpaid for more than one year, that is, after waiting for one more instalment to become due, the mortgagees should have the right to realise the whole amount due together with interest by putting into execution the decree and obtaining a sale of the mortgaged property. It appears that the mortgagors did not comply with the provisions of the decree in regard to payment, and it was consequently necessary for the mortgagees to put the decree into execution. 2. Before however, this step was taken, the mortgagors entered into an agreement with the defendant to grant a lease to him of the mortgaged property for a term of 15 years. This agreement was the subject of litigation between the mortgagors and the lessee. It was necessary, in fact, for the lessee to institute a suit for specific performance of it. The suit was decreed, and on appeal to the District Judge and to the High Court the decree was affirmed and a lease in accordance with the agreement was executed by the court. The plaintiffs, in 1899, took steps to realise the amount due to them on foot of their decree and put up part of the property to sale and purchased it themselves. The plaintiffs, in 1899, took steps to realise the amount due to them on foot of their decree and put up part of the property to sale and purchased it themselves. Again, in 1901, they sold other parts of the property under their decree and satisfied part of the mortgage debt.’ The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought on the 17th of November, 1902. The defence set up was that the lease Was a good and binding lease, that its terms and provisions were fair and reasonable, and that there was no ground for setting it aside, particularly having regard to the fact that there was no active prosecution of the plaintiff's suit for a number of years so as to entitle the plaintiff to the benefit of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Now it is obvious that there could be no prosecution of the plaintiff's suit for several years if the terms of the decree passed on the 8th of November, 1892, were observed, because by that decree, the sum due to the mortgagees was payable by yearly instalments which would extend over a period of about six years. The answer, however, to the con-tention preferred by the respondents is that under the circumstances it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to call in aid the provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of property Act, because in no event could the lessee, who derives his title from the mortgagors, acquire an interest in the leased property prejudicial to the rights of the mortgagees who became the auction-purchasers of the property. A mortgagor ordinarily cannot without the concurrence of his mortgagee execute a lease which would be binding upon the mortgagee He may execute a lease which may be binding upon himself, and so long as the mortgage does not interfere with the possession of the lessee so long may the lessee enjoy the benefits of that lease but ordinarily without the concurrence of the mortgagee a mortgagor cannot grant; a lease which will be binding upon the mortgagee. In this case it is obvious that the lease which has been granted is prejudicial to the rights of the mortgagee, and although it may be that a fair rent is payable under it, and that the terms are otherwise equitable, yet that is immaterial because the mortgagee may prefer to have the property in his own occupation and not saddled with a tenancy. Here the mortgagee himself has purchased the property and he has a right to say that he wishes to have the possession of the property delivered over to him as it was at the date when the mortgage in his favour was executed. 3. For these reasons we think that this appeal must fail, and we therefore dismiss it with costs on the higher scale.