JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - In this ease, we gave judgment on the 22nd February 1905, allowing the appeal. It was subsequently represented to us that the Respondent had not been properly served and we consequently directed that the case should be re-argued in his presence. We have now had the advantage of listening to Counsel for him and I must say that I see no reason to differ from the conclusion at which we arrived previously. The matter, to my mind, is an extremely simple one. It is a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a small portion of immoveable property for a sum of Rs. 287 odd. The property belonged to a minor and the agreement which was entered into on the 18th May 1899 was entered into by the present Defendant who was the mother of the minor as his guardian. The minor is dead and the mother as his heiress has succeeded to the property and the suit was now brought against her for specific performance of this agreement. We have had on this occasion an advantage which we lacked at the previous hearing, namely, we have a copy of the contract before us and, to my mind, that contract emphasizes the correctness of our previous decision It is quite clear that this contract was entered into by the mother, not in her personal capacity, not as representing that the property was her own but, as the mother and next-friend of the minor. Both parties contracted upon that footing and both parties seem to have been conscious that it would be impossible to give the purchaser a valid title unless the consent of the District Judge were obtained to the same. That this was so is clear from this clause of the contract. "I have agreed to sell the same for that consideration and now, having received Rs. That this was so is clear from this clause of the contract. "I have agreed to sell the same for that consideration and now, having received Rs. 12-8 out of that price as earnest money to day, I execute and deliver this bainapatra and promise that, within five months from this date, I shall take out a certificate on behalf of the minor from the District Judge in respect of the property to be sold and permission to sell the same and duly execute a kobala and deliver the same registered on receiving the balance of the consideration money." It is quite clear from this that it was in the contemplation of the parties that the mother must obtain a certificate of guardianship from the District Judge before the sale of the property could be effected and that she was to have five months within which to do that. The minor died within the five months. The consequence was that this clause became inoperative and the mother could not apply for guardianship or permission to sell after the death of the minor. Such an application would have been unnecessary and inoperative and the parties seem to have contemplated that such an event might happen for the document contains this provision. "It should further be mentioned here that, if I fail to obtain permission of sale from the District Judge, I will refund the earnest money and lake back this bainapatra." It looks as if the parties contemplated that, unless a certificate and the assent of the District Judge were obtained, the whole bargain was to come to an end. How in these circumstances can the Plaintiff sue for specific performance against the mother ? As was pointed out on the previous occasion, the mother had no power to sell as the natural guardian of the son except for legal necessity and that has been found as a fact against the Plaintiff nor could she sell as a certified guardian because she was not such. It has been suggested that the case falls within sec. 18 of the Specific Relief Act and of sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. But sec. It has been suggested that the case falls within sec. 18 of the Specific Relief Act and of sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. But sec. 18 of the Specific Relief Act which is based upon a series of authorities familiar not only to practitioners in England but also in this country and which codifies the principles involved in those authorities, has no application to a case like the present. Here the Defendant never contracted to sell any property as if it was her own. She only contracted to sell as the guardian of her minor son. No doubt if she had contracted to sell the property as her own it not then being hers and the property had subsequently become hers by inheritance, sec. 18 of the Specific Belief Act would have assisted the Plaintiff. But these are not the facts. Nor do I see that sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act applies, for, there was no erroneous representation made by the mother here. The true state of affairs was disclosed to the attending purchaser and that section, therefore, has no application. On these grounds, I think that the appeal must succeed and the suit dismissed with costs in all Courts. Mitra, J. 2. I am of the same opinion.