JUDGMENT 1. This case was remanded to the lower Court to decide whether the allowance which the decree-holder has attached is a compassionate allowance which cannot he attached as a "debt" within the meaning of sec. 266, Code of Civil Procedure. The Judge has decided that it is a "debt" and has allowed the execution. 2. The Subordinate Judge's order is appealed against, and it has been argued (1) that the allowance is not a debt, and (2) that it has not been validly attached. 3. The rubokari granting the allowance is at p. 12 of the paper-book. 4. It would seem to us that the grantor the Maharaja of Bettia, intended to create a charge on certain properties in order to give the judgment-debtor an allowance for some antecedent obligation. The document he executed purporting to be a grant creating charge, being unregistered, is of no effect as a legal deed affecting immoveable property. 4. The Court of Wards now in charge of the Maharaja's estate while declining to give the lady any such pension as the Maharaja wished to assign to her, recognised his wish that she should have a regular allowance, fixed that allowance at Rs. 450 a month without making it a charge on any particular village or villages, and acknowledged the debt, in account books kept in the regular course of business. 5. The allowance is, therefore, in no sense a compassionate one, but an acknowledged debt, accruing due and actually existing with a right to payment on and after the first of the following mouth. 6. It therefore appears to be such a debt as in the ruling in Haridas Acharjia v. Barada Kishore Acharjia ILR 27 Cal. 38 (1899), is expressly declared to be capable of attachment, and wholly to be distinguished from the contingent debt which by that ruling was held not to be attachable. 7. In our opinion, then, there was on any given date in December 1901 at least an existing debt, though it may have been payable at a future date. Were the lady to have died on any date in December 1901, her allowance would have been an existing debt due to her estate up to the date of her death. 8. The distinction between the prohibitory order issued in the case cited above and the order of the attachment issued in this case is clear. Were the lady to have died on any date in December 1901, her allowance would have been an existing debt due to her estate up to the date of her death. 8. The distinction between the prohibitory order issued in the case cited above and the order of the attachment issued in this case is clear. The prohibitory order in Haridas Acharjia v. Barada Kishore Acharjia ILR 27 Cat. 38 (1899) was an order, dated 5th August 1887, prohibiting the payment of a contingent allowance from September 1888 to November 1890. In the present case, the prohibitory order which was only for the attachment of half the judgment-debtor's allowance for December, was against an existing debt which had then accrued due though payable on the first of the following month and which therefore falls within the ruling in Tuffuzzool Hussein Khan v. Rughoo Kath Pershad 14 Moo. I. A. 40 (1871). 9. We have only to look at the nature of the relief sought from the Court in the petition for execution, dated 21st December 1901, to see that this is the case. Three weeks of the December allowance had already become an existing debt, and the contingency of the lady dying before the 1st of January was therefore fully covered. 10. Such a debt could, we think, on the authority of Tuffuzzool Hossein Khan v. Rughoo Nath Pershad 14 Moo. I. A. 40 (1871) be made the subject of a prohibitory order by way of attachment. For these reasons we find that the allowance in question was a debt which could be attached, and that the attachment was validly made. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs, 3 gold mohrus.