JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is an appeal by the principal Defendant against a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Dacca, dated the 30th September 1902. The suit was one for possession of certain immoveable property and the learned Subordinate Judge has made a decree in favour of the Plaintiffs. The facts are a little complicated, but, when they are once understood, I do not think the case presents any real difficulty. It appears that, on the 22nd October 1883, a mortgage was created in favour of the predecessor of the Plaintiffs on the property in question which is a share of an estate, not an entire estate to secure the sum of Rs. 30,000 with interest. On the 29th June 1888, a suit was instituted to enforce that mortgage security and an ordinary mortgage decree was made in that suit on the 29th April 1889. On the 16th January 1890, that decree was set aside as against one of the Defendants, Khanum, but, on the 16th September 1890, an ordinary mortgage decree was made against her. She appealed to this Court against that decision and that appeal was dismissed on the 17th March 1892. It appears that, on the 27th June 1892, the property in suit in respect of which a separate account had been opened was sold for arrears of revenue due for the March kist of 1892 and was purchased by one Dengu Nath Bepari. On the 28th April 1893, an application was made by Defendant No. 1 to reopen the decree of the 29th April 1889, and, on the 16th September 1803, that application was acceded to, but, on the 31st March 1894, the usual mortgage decree was made against that Defendant. He appealed from that decree and on the 21th June 1896, his appeal was dismissed. In the result then, by orders made on the 20th July 1889, 11th April 1893 and 2nd January 1897, the decree was made absolute against all the Defendants. Pausing there for a moment, we find that, at that time, the Plaintiffs had obtained in that suit a decree absolute as against all the parties interested in the equity of redemption. On the 10th December 1897, the property was put up to sale in execution of that decree and was purchased by the Plaintiffs. Pausing there for a moment, we find that, at that time, the Plaintiffs had obtained in that suit a decree absolute as against all the parties interested in the equity of redemption. On the 10th December 1897, the property was put up to sale in execution of that decree and was purchased by the Plaintiffs. On the 5th January 1898, an application was made by the judgment-debtors to set aside that sale and it was ultimately set aside on the 16th July 1898. The Appellant says this was a collusive transaction. In the meantime, default having been made by the previous auction purchaser, Dengu Nath Bepari, in payment of the revenue due for the January kist of 1898, the property was again put up to sale by the revenue authorities, and was purchased by Defendant No. 1 on the 25th March 1898 for Rs. 11,000. As he was only the purchaser of a share in the estate, he purchased subject to the Plaintiffs' mortgage charges (see sec. 54 of Act XI of 1859). On the 10th October 1898, the Plaintiffs purchased at a fresh sale which was held in execution of their mortgage decree, and that sale was confirmed on the 17th December 1898, and. on the 10th January 1899, the Plaintiffs granted two miras ijars to the Defendant No. 2. I ought to state that, on the 21st May 1898, an application was made by the Plaintiffs, I fail to appreciate why, to set aside the revenue sale; that application was dismissed on the 29th June of the same year. Upon these facts it is difficult to see why the Plaintiffs should not succeed. Defendant No. 1, who is the sole Appellant before us, says, however, that they are not entitled so to do, and he bases his contention on two grounds. He says the application of the 5th January 1898 to set aside the sale of the 10th December 1897 to the Plaintiffs, and which sale was set aside on the 16th July 1898, was a collusive proceeding between the judgment-debtors and the Plaintiffs, and is not binding upon him. It is sufficient to say that the Court below has found that the Appellant has failed to prove any such collusion, and we have not had placed before us any evidence in support of that contention. This part of the case then fails. It is sufficient to say that the Court below has found that the Appellant has failed to prove any such collusion, and we have not had placed before us any evidence in support of that contention. This part of the case then fails. And even if it had succeeded other difficulties in the Appellant's path would arise: but it is unnecessary to consider them. 2. The second point is that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply as against the Appellant, the sale to him not having been a voluntary one by the previous owner but in invitum as against the latter. Assuming that sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to the present case at all, we have been referred to the case of Upendra Chandra Singh v. Mohri Lal Marwari I. L. R. 31 Cal. 745 (1904) to show that this is not a 'contentious' suit within the meaning of the section. I think the facts I have stated are sufficient to establish the contentious nature of the proceedings whatever they may have been in the case cited. 3. It is reasonably clear, that sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies only to transfers of property by act of parties: in fact the whole act proceeds upon that footing, as may be gathered from the Title and Preamble of the Act itself. The act is silent to transfers in invitum as in the case now before us: the law is not codified as to the effect of such transfers in relation to the doctrine of lis pendens. But the matter has been much debated in the Courts of India, and the later authorities,-and to my mind the weight of authority,-are in favour of the application of the doctrine of lis pendens to transfers of immoveable property in invitum. I do not propose to go through them, they are to be found collected at page 800 of Dr. Rash Behari Ghose's well-known work on mortgages. I do not propose to go through them, they are to be found collected at page 800 of Dr. Rash Behari Ghose's well-known work on mortgages. I refer only to the case of Raj Kishen Mookerjee v. Rudha Madhub Holdar 21 W. R. 349 (1874) (to which decision Sir Richard Couch was a party), and I point out that the latter's view upon the question of lis pendens would appear to have received the approbation of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Radhu Madhub Holder v. Monohur Mukerji I. L. R. 15 Cal. 756 (1888). 4. There their Lordships say:-"Therefore their Lordships conceive that the matter was expressly decided by the High Court in the rent suit; but they desire to add that even if it had not been so decided, they see no reason to believe that any amount of argument would induce them to come to a different conclusion than that to which the High Court came." The same principle seems to be involved in the case of Prem Chand Pal v. Purnima Dasi ILR 15 Cal. 546 (1888). I therefore think the Appellant was bound by the proceedings in the then pending mortgage suit and that he cannot succeed on this head. The point was not very seriously contested by the learned vakil for the Appellant in the face of the authorities. 5. The only other point urged before us was, that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree for possession, because they were only reversioners. The answer seems to be that Defendant No. 2 is the lessee and does not object. I have now dealt with all the objections urged. I think the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Mitra, J. I concur.