JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J.:— The suit which has given rise to this appeal was brought by the plaintiff for “joint possession in conjunction with defendant No. 6 of plots Nos. 142, 143, 144, 145 and 147,” of which the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and the defendant No. 7 are in possession. These plots of land appertain to a four biswa share in the village of which the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 were owners. They made a usufructuary mortgage of the 4 biswa share to Jagan Nath, defendant No. 5. The plots Nos. 142 to 145 were let by Jagan Nath to one Bhawani Kachhi who used to cultivate them. In 1306 Fasli Jagan Nath issued a notice of ejectment to Bhawani Kachhi, obtained an order for ejectment and duly obtained possession. Plot No. 147 was cultivated by the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 as tenants of Jagan Nath. In 1305 Fasli, Jagan Nath ejected the aforesaid defendants and let the land to one Sobhe, who used to pay rent to Jagan Nath. The defendants Nos. 1 to 4 sold two biswas out of the four biswas to the plaintiff and she redeemed the mortgage held by Jagan Nath. Subsequently, the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 sold 1 biswa out of the remaining two biswas to one Sundar Lal. The plaintiff claimed pre-emption in respect of that sale and obtained a decree, so that the plaintiff is at present owner of three biswas out of the four biswas. The defendants Nos. 1 to 4 purported to make an endowment of the one biswa, which remained with them, in favour of an idol, and the defendant No. 6 is the trustee of the endowment. The defendants deny the validity of the endowment, and the course have found in their favour. It is alleged that in the beginning of 1307 Fasli, corresponding to the 1st of July, 1899, and after the ejectment of Bhawani Kachhi, the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 took possession of the plots Nos. 142 to 145. Jagan Nath brought a suit in the civil court for ejectment of the defendants, but for some reason which does not appear he withdrew the suit. On the 6th of June, 1900, the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 mortgaged plots Nos. 1 to 4 took possession of the plots Nos. 142 to 145. Jagan Nath brought a suit in the civil court for ejectment of the defendants, but for some reason which does not appear he withdrew the suit. On the 6th of June, 1900, the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 mortgaged plots Nos. 145 and 147 to defendant No. 7 who took possession of these plots after turning out Musammat Khushalo, the wife of Sobhe, to whom plot No. 147 had been let by Jagan Nath. These facts alleged in the plaint are admitted by the defendants in their written statement. In 1901, the plaintiff applied to the Revenue Court for ejectment of the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and the defendant No. 7. The defendants contested the notice, denied that they were the plaintiff's tenants, and alleged that they were trespassers. The Revenue Court dismissed the application for ejectment. Thereupon the present suit was brought upon the allegation that the defendants are not entitled to retain possession of the plots in suit to the exclusion of the plaintiff. As I have said above, the defendants admitted in their written statement almost all the allegations of the plaintiff with the exception of the allegation as to endowment, They said that the endowment was only nominal and that they themselves were in proprietary possession of the one biswa share, the subject of the endowment. They contended that they were joint owners with the plaintiff of the property in suit and that she was not entitled to sue for possession. Both the courts below have dismissed the suit, being of opinion that there was no valid endowment and that the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are still owners of a one biswa share of the zemindari. The appellant, who has nothing to do with the said one biswa share, does not question the findings of the courts below upon the question of the endowment, but she contends that even if they are co-sharers the defendants are not entitled to exclusive possession, of the plots in dispute, and that therefore, the courts below should have given her a decree for possession jointly with the defendants Nos. 1 to 4. 1 to 4. There cannot be any doubt that having regard to the ruling of this Court, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree declaring that she is entitled to joint possession of the disputed lands being a co-sharer with the defendants of those lands. The courts below were, therefore, wrong in totally dismissing her claim. The share question to be determined is whether she can get any further relief. The share of the zemindari was in the possession of Jagan Nath, the mortgagee from the defendants Nos. 1 to 4, The plots Nos. 142 to 145 had been let by Jagan Nath to Bhawani Kachhi, and he had ejected Bhawani and obtained possession. The defendants Nos. 1 to 4 had, at the time when Bhawani was ejected and when the mortgage in favour of Jagan Nath was subsisting no right to take possession. So that, when in July, 1902, they took possession of the four plots mentioned above, they acted illegally and wrongfully. This wrongful possession they have still retained. Similarly, the defendants by executing a mortgage of plot No. 147 and allowing their mortgagee to eject the tenant to whom Jagan Nath had let if, and who was admittedly in possession, have taken wrongful possession of that plot also. This case is therefore different from the case of some of the shareholders in a village, taking possession of derelict land for the benefit of themselves and their co-sharers. As the plaintiff had redeemed Jagan Nath's mortgage, and she, is the owner of a three-fourth share in the zemindari she is entitled to hold possession of the disputed lands jointly with her co-sharers. As a matter of fact, she has been entirely excluded by those who, although they have been found to be the owners of an one-fourth share, had no right to take “possession when they dispossessed the mortgagee Jagan Nath and the tenant, to whom he had let a part of the land. The circumstance that the defendant took illegal and wrongful possession distinguishes this case from the case of Jagannath Singh v. Jainath Singh, [1904] W.N., p. 194. 2. Further, the plaintiff in that case apparently sought to obtain physical possession of a specific three-fourths share of the holding in dispute, as it is stated in the judgment that they, in effect, asked the court to make a partition. 2. Further, the plaintiff in that case apparently sought to obtain physical possession of a specific three-fourths share of the holding in dispute, as it is stated in the judgment that they, in effect, asked the court to make a partition. No such relief is asked for in this case. I see no reason why the plaintiff should not be granted a decree for joint possession of the lands in suit. If the Court were to refuse to put such a plaintiff into joint possession, the result would be that any co-sharer in a coparcenaries body, however small the extent of his share may be, may, if he is more powerful than his co-sharers, take exclusive possession of the bulk of the land jointly belonging to him and to his co-sharers and thereby drive the latter to the necessity of suing for partition, which, as is well known, entails delay and expense. It is true that the defendants in this case having been found to be co-sharers with the plaintiff are not liable to be ejected, but that seems to me to afford no justification for his being allowed to take exclusive possession and to completely oust the plaintiff, the owner of three-fourths of the property. In Ram Charatt Rai v. Kauleshwar Rai, [1904] W.N., p. 199., it was held that where certain of the co-owners of immovable property had been prevented by some of the other co-owners from exercising their legal rights in respect of the joint property, the dispossessed co-owners were entitled to a decree that they should be restored to joint possession of the joint property and not merely to a decree declaring their right to joint possession. With that judgment I fully agree. I need hardly point out that a suit for joint possession is a common form of action and was recognised in a recent Full Bench ruling of this Court. The case of Bhola Nath v. M. Buskin, [1894] W.N., p. 127. was referred to in the argument. The facts of that case were perfectly different and the decision arrived at has, in my opinion, no bearing upon the question raised in this appeal. In that case some share-holders in a thok had granted a lease under which the lessee, was in actual physical possession. was referred to in the argument. The facts of that case were perfectly different and the decision arrived at has, in my opinion, no bearing upon the question raised in this appeal. In that case some share-holders in a thok had granted a lease under which the lessee, was in actual physical possession. One of the co-sharers, who had not joined in granting the lease, sued the lessee for joint possession and mesne profits. The suit was practically one to eject the lessee so far as the share of the plaintiff was concerned. It was held that the plaintiff could not obtain a decree for joint physical possession as against Che lessee, who was not a trespasser, having been put in by the other co-sharers. That is not the case here, In Ram Jatan Shukal v. Jaisav Shukal, [1894] W.N., p. 166. one of two joint owners of immovable property having been forcibly ejected by the other, brought a suit to recover exclusive possession. It was held that he was not entitled to a decree for exclusive possession, but a decree was made to the effect that the plaintiff and the defendant as co-sharers of the village were entitled to joint possession of the land, that neither was entitled to possession to the exclusion of the other and an injunction was issued restraining the defendant from dealing with the land by cultivating it, letting it to a tenant and recovering the rents and profits of it in any way to the exclusion of the plaintiff without the previous consent of the plaintiff. There is no reason why in this case the plaintiff should not get a decree similar to the decree passed in the case last mentioned. The injunction would in substance restore the plaintiff to the joint possession which she claims. Of course, the defendants who are in possession, cannot be totally excluded, But the plaintiff is certainly entitled to such possession as the circumstances of the case may admit of. The injunction would in substance restore the plaintiff to the joint possession which she claims. Of course, the defendants who are in possession, cannot be totally excluded, But the plaintiff is certainly entitled to such possession as the circumstances of the case may admit of. I accordingly allow the appeal and setting the decrees of the courts below, make a decree in favour of the plaintiff, declaring that she is entitled to joint possession of the lands in suit and that the defendants are not entitled to exclude her from possession, and I direct that an injunction be issued to the defendants, restraining them from dealing with the lands in suit by cultivating them, by letting them to tenants or by recovering rents or profits to the exclusion of the plaintiff without her previous consent and that the plaintiff be restored to possession jointly with the defendants. As the suit has substantially succeeded, the plaintiff will get her costs from the defendants Nos. 1 to 4, in all courts including in this Court fees on the higher scale.