JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of an application made by the Appellant before us to set aside a sale in execution of a rent decree under sec. 244, C.P.C. The property sold is a putni, and the Appellant bought it in execution on a money decree obtained against the putnidar, judgment-debtor; but he did not obtain the registration of his name in the zemindar's sheristha, the result being that the zemindar brought a suit for rent against the original putnidar (the recorded tenant) and recovered judgment and, in execution, caused the property to be sold and himself purchased it. 2. The question was raised in the Courts below, whether the Appellant was a representative of the sold-out putnidar within the meaning of sec. 244, C.P.C., so as to entitle him to apply under that section to set aside the sale in question. The Court of first instance held that he was such representative; but the Appellate Court has held otherwise and without going into any other question raised between the parties, has dismissed the (sic) page cut ground that he stood on the shoes of the judgment-debtor, and was bound by the sale in execution of the decree for rent. He then applied under sec. 244 of the Code to have the sale set aside; and the question was raised, as already indicated, whether he was a representative within the meaning of the section. 3. It appears to us that the principle laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ishan Chandra Sarkar v. Beni Madhab Sarkar ILR 21 Cal. 62 (1896) is applicable to this case. There, it was laid down that the term "representative," as used in sec. 244, when taken with reference to the judgment debtor does not mean only his legal representative, his heir, executor or administrator but it means his representative in interest and includes a purchaser of his interest who, so far as such interest is concerned, is bound by the decree; and that it does not exclude from its signification an execution-purchaser of the judgment-debtor's interest. In the present case, the Petitioner who had purchased the judgment-debtor's interest at an execution sale prior to the decree for rent obtained by the landlord is bound by that decree and the sale which took place in execution thereof, and as such in a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of sec. 244, as expounded by the Full Bench. As explained in the case of Asgarali v. Asaboddin 9 C.W.N. 134 (1904), "the essential criterion is not the point of time at which he acquired his interest, but the nature of the decree and the nature of his purchase. If, as purchaser, he is bound by the decree and consequently affected by the sale, he must be regarded as the representative." And, as further explained by Banerjee, J., in the Full Bench case already referred to, the execution proceeding is really against the Petitioner "though nominally against the judgment-debtor on the record," and it would he a manifest hardship if he were not permitted to come in and show, if he could, that the decree was barred or satisfied, or that for any other reason, the execution could not proceed, or that the sale was vitiated by fraud. Indeed, if he be not permitted to come in under see, 244, C.P.C., it is difficult to conceive what other remedy may be open to him; and, as already mentioned, in the proceeding held under sec, 336 of the Code, it was held between these very parties that the Petitioner stood in the shoes of the judgment-debtor, and an order was made against him under that section upon that ground. 4. We observe that the lower Appellate Court, in the decision it arrived at, proceeded upon the ease of Umed Rasul Saha v. Anath Bandhu Chowdhry 6 C.W.N. 128 (1901); but that case and the other cases bearing upon the point were considered, explained and distinguished by this Court in the recent case of Asgarali v. Asaboddin 9 C.W.N. 134 (1904) to which we have already referred. And it was therein laid down, in circumstances very similar to those which exist in the present case, that a person who had acquired the holding under a purchase from the registered tenant, but who had not got his name registered in the landlord's office, was bound by the decree for rent obtained against the recorded tenant, and was therefore a representative within the meaning of sec. 244 of the Code. 5. Our attention has however been called by the learned vakil for the Respondent to the case of Kameshwar Pershad v. Run Bahadur Singh (4). That case, no doubt, would seem to lay down a principle favouring the Respondent, hut we must be guided by the principle laid down by the later Full Bench case of Ishan Chandra Sarkar v. Beni Madhab Sarkar ILR 21 Cal. 62 (1896) to which we have already referred. 6. Upon these grounds, we hold that the order of the Court below is erroneous, that it should be set aside, and the case remanded to that Court for investigation into the matter of the petition presented by the Appellant. Costa to abide the result which we assess at three gold mohurs.