JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J.:— The only plea raised in this second appeal, which arise out of a suit brought by the respondents for possession, is that the defendants-appellants should have been allowed an opportunity to redeem the mortgage held by the respondents upon the basis of which they obtained the decree in execution of which they purchased the property in suit. In order to understand the plea it is necessary to state a few facts. [His Lordship after stating the facts as given above continued:] 2. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that as they purchased the property on the 22nd of November, 1883, that is, subsequently to the mortgage made, in favour of the respondents, by Shibba, they as purchasers of the equity of redemption are entitled to redeem that mortgage, that as they were not made parties to the proceedings which ended in the order absolute for sale and the actual sale of the property, their right of redemption still subsists, that the court below ought to have afforded them an opportunity to redeem the respondent's mortgage, and that the decree for possession to have been made conditional upon their not redeeming that mortgage. 3. We are of opinion that the appellants are precluded from raising this contention. The plea is one which the appellants might have raised had they so chosen and ought to have raised in their defence, in the former suit brought by the respondents which ended in the decree of the 13th July, 1899. If they had put forward that plea in the former suit, the court would have determined the question, whether they had a right to redeem the mortgage made by Shibba in favour of the respondents. They did not advance any such plea, and the suit was decided against them. Therefore, under the provisions of section 13, explanation II, of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendants are as much bound by the decision in the former suit as if they had expressly set up the defence now put forward, and it had been decided adversely to them. Consequently, it is no longer open to them to put forward the same defence in the present suit. Consequently, it is no longer open to them to put forward the same defence in the present suit. Under the circumstances it must be taken that their right to redeem the respondent's mortgage, was negatived by the court in the former suit when it made a decree in favour of the respondents. There must be an end to litigation, and if we were to allow the defendants appellants to raise a plea which they might and ought to have raised in the previous litigation between the parties, there would be no end to the litigation which might arise. The appellants here had upon several occasions an opportunity to set up the defence which they now bring forward. In the’ suit which the respondents brought upon their mortgage, the appellants, who were impleaded as defendants, could very well have urged that they were entitled to redeem the respondents. Before the auction sale which took place in execution of that decree, they might have discharged the amount of the decree and thus averted the sale of the property. Subsequently, when they themselves brought a suit after the auction they could have advanced the plea that they had a right to redeem the mortgage for the discharge of which that sale had taken place. Again, when the respondents brought their suit for possession, the defendants could certainly have raised the plea that they as subsequent purchasers were entitled to redeem the plaintiffs, and we think that they were bound to raise that plea. It would we think be promoting, instead of putting an end to litigation if after the omission of the defendants to avail themselves of those opportunities they were permitted to advance the same contention in the present suit. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that as, according to the Full Bench ruling of this Court in Sita Ram v. Madho Lal , I.L.R. 24 All., 44., a mortgagor who once obtained a decree for redemption, may bring another suit for redemption upon his failure to pay the mortgage money in compliance with the decree, the appellants in the present suit should be allowed to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage. This contention in our judgment has no force. The question is one of the appellants' right to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage. This contention in our judgment has no force. The question is one of the appellants' right to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage. If that right was negatived in a previous suit, they cannot in any subsequent suit ask for redemption upon the basis of the same right. As we have already pointed out, the effect of their omission to set up in the previous suit the defence which they now raise is, that it must be taken that the court refused in the previous litigation to recognise the right which they now claim. That being so, we think the defendants are precluded from setting up the plea which they now put forward, and the courts below were justified in repelling that plea, We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale.