JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - The first question, which arises on this appeal, is whether an appeal lies. We think it does under sec. 15 of the Letters Patent. In the circumstances the order made was in effect one granting a new sanction and not extending an old one. Such an order is appealable. The second question is whether Mr. Justice Henderson, sitting on the Original Side, had jurisdiction to make the order, and this depends upon what is the true meaning of the words "High Court" in sec. 195, sub-sec (6) of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to the definition of High Court (sec. 4, sub-sec. j) it means "the Highest Court of Criminal Appeal or Revision for any local area," unless a different intention appears from the subject or context. We think such a different intention does so appear. Sec. 195 is apparently the only section which gives the Civil Courts any jurisdiction in quasi criminal matters; it is the Civil Court which is to grant or refuse the sanction. Then the sanction may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it, is subordinate; this again must be a Civil Appellate Court, then the High Court, for good cause shown, may extend the time. This must, we think, mean, regard being had to the definition, which points to the High Court, in its Appellate Jurisdiction--the Appellate Side of the High Court, and seeing that the section indicates clearly that the Civil Courts are to deal with these questions, the context would seem to show an intention that the Appellate Side of that Court, sitting in the exercise of its Civil Jurisdiction, was the proper Court to extend the time. The legislature could scarcely have intended that, when all the other applications in this connection are to be heard by the Civil Court, an application for extension of time was to be heard by the Criminal Appellate Bench of the High Court. A Judge, sitting alone on the Original Side of the High Court, is not subordinate to a Division Bench of that Court, though the latter can sit in appeal from a decision of the former. 'High Court' in sec. A Judge, sitting alone on the Original Side of the High Court, is not subordinate to a Division Bench of that Court, though the latter can sit in appeal from a decision of the former. 'High Court' in sec. 195 cannot, we think, mean a Judge sitting on the Original Side of the Court, but, for the reasons given above, we do not see why it should not mean a Civil Appellate Bench of the High Court. Mr. Justice Henderson consequently had no jurisdiction to hear the application. 2. The other question do not, in this view, become material, but as they have been argued, we may say that we do not agree with the view that the time can be extended when it has expired, for there is nothing to extend The cases of the Madras High Court*, upon which the Court of first instance relied, were heard ex parte, apparently without the question being argued, and can scarcely be treated as authorities Anyway we respectfully differ. The appeal must be allowed with costs in both Courts. ___________________________________________________________________________ * Reporter's Note.-These case are Karuppana v. Sinna, ILR 26 Mad. 480 and In re Muthu Kudam, ILR 26 Mad. 191.