Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (July 16, 1900) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Allahabad (May 18, 1899). The question decided was whether an application made by the respondents on November 23, 1897, under the circumstances stated in the judgment of their Lordships, to execute a decree passed on April 11, 1883, was barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge decided in the affirmative. The High Court held that the application of November 28, 1897, was only a continuation of a previous application made on August 24, 1888, and was, therefore, not barred. De Gruyther, for the appellant, contended that the former execution proceedings referred to by the High Court came to an end before the close of the year 1889, and that the applica- tion the subject of this appeal was a fresh attempt to execute the decree and was barred. He referred to Civil Procedure Code, as. 230 and 647; Act XV. of 1877, s. 14, and Sched. II. art, 179, example 2. See also Thakur Pershad v. Sheikh Fakiralluh. (( 1894) L. R, 22 Ind. Ap. 44.) Ross, for the respondents, was not heard. Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 102 ( 1904- 1905) Shaikh Kamar-Ud-Din Ahmad V. Jawahir Lal 28 March 24. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. The question raised by this appeal is whether certain proceedings in execution were barred by limitation as falling under art. 179 of the 2nd schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. The material facts are few. On April 11, 1883, Thakur Prasad, now represented by the respondents, obtained a decree upon a mortgage bond against the appellant. On August 29, 1885, the decree-holder applied for execution, and on January 5, 1886, that application was struck off the list by consent. On August 24, 1888, a second application for execution was made, and notwithstanding objections by the judgment debtor, an order was made on December 18, 1888, that the execution should proceed; and other steps followed which appear on the order sheet. On November 29, 1889, an order was made to the effect that, the property to be sold being ancestral, the case should be struck off the file, and the papers transferred to the Court of the Collector for the completion of the sale proceedings. On November 29, 1889, an order was made to the effect that, the property to be sold being ancestral, the case should be struck off the file, and the papers transferred to the Court of the Collector for the completion of the sale proceedings. On December 23, 1889, there appears another order "In this case the decree-holder has not up to this date deposited R. 1 on account of the order for sale by auction, and the copy of the decree to be sent to the Collectors Court. Therefore it is ordered that in default of prosecution on the part of the decree-holder the record be not sent to the Collectors Court for taking the sale proceedings." "While these execution proceedings were pending, and at an early stage of their progress, on February 15, 1889, an appeal was brought in the High Court against the original order of December 18, 1888, under which the execution proceeded. The High Court on January 7, 1890, allowed that appeal on grounds which it is not now necessary to notice. On a further appeal to her late Majesty in Council that decision of the High Court Was reversed, the judgment of this Board being delivered on November 24, 1894, and embodied in an Order in Council of December 12, 1894. The application now in question was made on November 23, 1897. It asked by its terms that the sums due by virtue of the decree be "realized by sale of the mortgaged property," that " the execution case instituted on the 24th August, 1888, which was sent to the Collectors Court on the 23rd December, 1887 " (this ought apparently to be November 29th, 1889), "may be revived, and it may be sent to the Collectors Court, and by issue of a warrant of arrest." It was objected that this application was barred by limitation ; and the Subordinate Judge gave effect to the objection. The High Court, on appeal, dissented from this view, holding that the present application is "not a fresh application, but one praying the Court to revive the suspended order and permit it to be pushed through to completion." The appeal now before their Lordships is against that decision of the High Court. The High Court, on appeal, dissented from this view, holding that the present application is "not a fresh application, but one praying the Court to revive the suspended order and permit it to be pushed through to completion." The appeal now before their Lordships is against that decision of the High Court. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the former execution proceedings were finally disposed of and came to an end by the orders of November 29 and December 23, 1889, or one of them, and that the present application could only be regarded as one for a fresh execution, and therefore was barred under art. 179. But the first of those orders was in aid of the execution. As to the second order, there is nothing to shew on whose application or in whose presence or under what circumstances it was made, and the learned judges of the High Court have shewn reasons for doubting its regularity. But assuming it to have been perfectly regular, it was in no sense a final order. If the appeal to the High Court against those proceedings and the judgment of that Court, and the appeal to Her Majesty in Council rendered necessary by that judgment, had not intervened to interrupt the Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 102 ( 1904- 1905) Shaikh Kamar-Ud-Din Ahmad V. Jawahir Lal 29 course of the execution, there was nothing in the terms of the order to preclude the decree-holder from coining again to the Court, satisfying the conditions indicated in the order, and obtaining the transmission of the case to the Collectors Court. Their Lordships are of opinion that the execution proceed ings commenced by the petition of August 24, 1888, were never finally disposed of, and that the application now under consideration was in substance as well as in form an application to revive and carry through a pending execution, suspended by no act or default of the decree-holder, and not an application to initiate a new one. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs.