JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. This appeal arises out of the rejection by the court below of an application to file an award under section 525 of the Civil Procedure Code. The award was passed in arbitration proceedings entered into by the parties without the intervention of the Court. The present appeal has been preferred against that order. A preliminary objection has been raised to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that no appeal lies from such an order. This question was the subject of determination by Full Bench of this Court so long ago as the year 1884, In that year in the case of Bhola vs. Gobind Dayal, (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 186, it was held by four out of five Judges constituting a Full Bench of the Court, that an appeal does not lie from an order disallowing an application for the filing of an award under section 525 of the Civil Procedure Code, The learned advocate for the appellant, however, relies upon an observation of Lord MACNAGHTEN in a judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Ghulam Khan vs. Muhammad Hassan, (1901) I.L.R. 29 Cal. 167, as being in conflict with the Full Bench ruling. At page 183 of that judgment his Lordship, in dealing with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to awards, classifies them under three heads the last head being the case of awards which have been made in arbitration proceedings without the intervention of the Court. 2. 167, as being in conflict with the Full Bench ruling. At page 183 of that judgment his Lordship, in dealing with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to awards, classifies them under three heads the last head being the case of awards which have been made in arbitration proceedings without the intervention of the Court. 2. He observes that “In cases falling under Heads II and III proceedings described as a suit and registered as such must be taken in order to bring the matter—the agreement to refer or the award as the case may be—under the cognisance of the Court, That is or may be a litigious proceeding—cause may be shown against the application—and it would seem that the order made thereon is a decree within the meaning of that expression as defined in the Civil Procedure Code.” The learned advocate relies upon these words as indicating that an order rejecting an application made by an applicant under section 525, as well as an order made in his favour, are both decree within the meaning of “decree” as defined in the Code, As was pointed out by a Bench of this Court in the later case of Katik Ram vs. Babu Lal, (1903) I.L.R. 26 All. 205 dealing with this question, the point for decision by their Lordships was a different one from that which is at issue before us. They say, “The case before them was not upon the same basis as the present one, in which the parties had proceeded without the inter-vention of a Court until an application was made to file the award, The question, therefore, was not before them for decision,” Then they refer to the words which we have quoted from Lord MACNAGHTEN'S judgment and say, “It seems to us that what their Lordships said was intended to apply to cases where an order has been made directing an award to be filed and not to cases where such application is rejected,” We entirely concur in the view entertained by the learned Judges in this case. It appears to us that their Lordships of the Privy Council only had in contemplation a case in which an order for the filing of an award was passed in pursuance of the provisions contained in section 525. It appears to us that their Lordships of the Privy Council only had in contemplation a case in which an order for the filing of an award was passed in pursuance of the provisions contained in section 525. This appears to be manifest from the earlier decision of their Lordships in the case of Muhammad Newaz Khan vs. Alam Khan, (1891) I.L.R. 18 Cal. 414, 418. In that case it was held that the refusal of an application for the filing of an award under section 525 merely leaves the award to have its own ordinary legal effect, Lord Morris, in delivering the judgment of their Lordships, observes in the course of his judgment: “The first contention on the part of the appellants before their Lordships has been that the decree of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the claim of Alam Khan to file the award, pursuant to section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has the effect, under, section 13 of the same Code, of a res judicata. One of the Judges of the Chief Court says that that contention was not very strongly pressed before them. It has been most strenuously urged before their Lordships, who cannot accede to it. Though the application under section 525 was refused, that merely left the award to have its ordinary legal validity. It could not be successfully contended that an award is not valid because, the party in whose favour it was had never applied to have it filed in Court. Can then the refusal to file, or of an application made to do so, have the effect that the award can never be relied upon in any suit relating to the subject-matter dealt with by it?” Now, if an order refusing to file an award does not amount to a res judicata, it follows that it cannot be a decree. Their Lordships held in the case which we have last cited that it is not res judicata. Therefore it appears to us that it cannot be regarded as a decree, and consequently no appeal lies from it. The preliminary objection is therefore allowed and the appeal is dismissed with costs, including fees on the higher scale.