JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is a suit upon a mortgage-bond. The question is whether the provisions of sec. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act have been sufficiently complied with so as to make the mortgage an effectual one. It is contended for the Defendant, who executed the mortgage, that, inasmuch as the document was not attested by two witnesses, it is not an effectual mortgage. The question whether it was so attested or not is a question of fact. The finding of the Subordinate Judge is that one of the so called witnesses, Kedar Nath Chuckerbutty, signed the mortgage-bond before it was signed by the executant, and apparently not in his presence, and that the mortgage-bond was written out at the house of the Plaintiff, where the Defendant did not go to execute it, and further, that the Defendant Jadu Nath Saba, who was the other attesting witness, signed the document as an attesting witness at the house of the Plaintiff before it was signed by the mortgagor. Upon these findings it would be difficult to hold that the mortgage was duly attested within the meaning of sec. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act. 2. We have been referred to the case of Ramji v. Bai Parvati ILR 27 Bom. 91(1902). The facts in that case were quite different from those in the present, and therefore, it is unnecessary to say whether or not we agree with it. There it was apparently held that, by analogy to sec. 50of the Indian Succession Act, the language of which, however, is quite different from that of sec. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, the mortgage was sufficiently attested if, after it had been executed by the mortgagor, the mortgagor admitted his signature in the presence of the attesting witnesses, who then signed as witnesses. We have not that state of facts in the present case, nor need we consider the cases of Girindra Nath v. Bejoy Gopal ILR 26 Cal. 246 (1898), and Abdul Karim v. Salimun ILR 27 Cal. 190 (1899), which do not appear to be in point. 3. But then it is said, that, even if it be not a good mortgage, it operates as a good charge under sec. 100 of the Act. See. 246 (1898), and Abdul Karim v. Salimun ILR 27 Cal. 190 (1899), which do not appear to be in point. 3. But then it is said, that, even if it be not a good mortgage, it operates as a good charge under sec. 100 of the Act. See. 100 of the Act says:--"Where immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property." What we have to consider then is whether the present transaction amounted to a mortgage. The expression "amount to a mortgage," in sec. 100, means such a mortgage as is defined by sec. 58 of the Act, and although, we have not had the advantage of seeing the mortgage-bond, it has not been suggested that it was not a transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced by way of loan, so as to bring it within the definition of a mortgage in that section. If we were to assent to the argument of the Appellant that, though coming within the definition of sec. 58, it does not amount to a mortgage by reason of the fact that the requirements of sec. 59 have not been complied with, we might as well strikes the latter section out of the Act, for, if the transaction is bad as a mortgage because the document was not registered and attested as required by sec. 59, but is still good as a charge under sec. 100, the owner of that charge can afford to disregard sec. 59 altogether, for he would be amply protected under sec 100. We do not think the Legislature could have intended this, nor does its language warrant such a conclusion. The above view gains support from the ease of Rani Kumari Bibi v. Srinath Roy 1 C.W.N. 81 (1896), and from the observations of Mr. Justice Banerjee in the case of Tofaluddi Peada v. Maharali Shaha ILR 26 Cal. 79 at p. 81 (1898). The appeal must be dismissed with costs. Mitra, J. I am of the same opinion. I would only add that I have perused the mortgage-bond which is in the vernacular. Justice Banerjee in the case of Tofaluddi Peada v. Maharali Shaha ILR 26 Cal. 79 at p. 81 (1898). The appeal must be dismissed with costs. Mitra, J. I am of the same opinion. I would only add that I have perused the mortgage-bond which is in the vernacular. It is a simple mortgage within the provisions of sec. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act. Sec. 100 of that Act, therefore, cannot apply.