JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J.:— The suit which has given rise to this appeal was brought up under the following circumstances:— The appellants, who are recorded co-sharers in a village, brought a suit in the Revenue Court against the first respondent, who is the lambardar, for their recorded share of profits, under the provisions of clause (h), section 93 of Act No. XII of 1881. The claim was resisted on the ground that the then plaintiffs, present appellants, were not co-sharers and were not therefore entitled to profits, The court of first instance (Assistant Collector) dismissed the suit holding that the appellants, although recorded as co-sharers, had ceased to be so. An appeal was preferred to the District Judge under section 189 of Act No. XII of 1881. He found in favour of the appellants and decreed their claim. This was after the present Tenancy Act (No. II of 1901) had come into force. Thereupon the present suit was brought by the respondents in the civil courts for a declaration that they are the owners of the share, in respect of which the appellants obtained a decree for profits, that they have been in adverse proprietary possession of the share, and that the appellants have ceased to own any share in the village. They purported to bring the suit under the last portion of sub-section (3), section 201 of the Tenancy Act, 1901. The court of first instance dismissed the suit, being of opinion that the plaintiffs were precluded from bringing it by the decision of the appellate court, in the suit for profits referred to above. The lower appellate court has held, that the suit is maintainable, having regard to the provisions of section 201, sub-Section (3), of the Tenancy Act, and has remanded the case to the court of first instance. From this order of remand the present appeal has been brought. 2. We are of opinion that as the appeal in the suit for profits was not decided under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, that Act having come into operation after the filing of the appeal, and as the court in deciding the appeal did not give effect to the presumption referred to in sub-section (3) of the Act, that sub-section does not apply. What we have to determine is whether the decision of the appellate court in the suit for profits is any bar to the maintenance of the present suit in which the plaintiffs seek to have their title established, that is to say, whether the decision in the suit for profits upon the question of title is conclusive between the parties. Our difficulty in deciding this question has arisen in consequence of certain observations contained in the judgment of the Full Bench in Sheo Narain Rai v. Parmeshar Rai, [1896] I.L.R., 18 All, 270.. After giving the matter our best consideration we are of opinion that the present suit is maintainable. The previous suit for profits was brought in the Court of Revenue under section 93 of Act No. XII of 1881. The decision of the appellate Court in that suit, although it is the decision of Civil Court, has no higher effect than if it were the decision of the Court of first instance, that is, of the Revenue Court. 3. Consequently the fact that it was the appellate Civil Court which determined the question of the title of the parties in that suit cannot affect the matter in issue in this appeal. There can be no doubt that it was necessary for the Revenue Court, in order to enable it to make a decree in the suit for profits, to decide the question of the title of the plaintiffs in that suit. So that the issue of title was a direct and valid issue in the suit. But we are unable to hold that the decision of that issue by the Revenue Court is conclusive in a suit brought in the Civil Court to try the question of title. The decision of the question of title in the suit before the Revenue Court was made for the purposes of that particular suit—and cannot be deemed to be conclusive as regards the question of title. Section 93 of Act No. XII of 1881 precluded the Civil Court from taking cognizance of any dispute or matter in which any suit of the nature mentioned in the section might be brought. Section 93 of Act No. XII of 1881 precluded the Civil Court from taking cognizance of any dispute or matter in which any suit of the nature mentioned in the section might be brought. A suit for the determination of the plaintiffs proprietary title to immoveable property is not one of the classes of suits which might be brought in a Court of Revenue under that section and the dispute or matter involved in such a suit is not the same disoute or matter in regard to which a suit might be brought in the Revenue Court. That section, therefore, is no bar to the maintenance of the present suit. In the recent case of Ashraf-un-nissa v. Ali Ahmad, [1904] I.L.R., 26 All., 601, it was held by a bench of this Court that when the decision of a question of title in a suit for profits or any other suit brought in a Rent Court cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit brought in the Civil Court in which the proprietary title of the parties is in question. We do not see sufficient reason for dissenting from this ruling. It is clear from the provisions of the Tenancy Act of 1901 that it is the intention of the Legislature that all questions of title should be determined by the civil courts. So that the question raised in this appeal will not arise in future. We are of opinion that the order of remand made by the court below was right and dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale.