JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— The main question raised in this appeal is one upon which considerable divergence of opinion is to be found in the judgments of this High Court. It arises in a suit for preemption brought by the plaintiffs to have an alleged right of preemption established under the following circumstances. At the time of the last revision of settlement, each of three villages, namely Anti, Dhundar and Phalra, formed a separate mahal. A fourth village, named Lalipur, consisted of three mahals. Phalra still continues as one entire mahal. After the last revision of settlement there was a perfect partition of the villages Anti, Dhundar and Lalipur, whereupon one of the three mahals in mauza Lalipur was divided into three mahals, namely, mahal Maniar Singh, mahal Sheo Charan Lal and mahal Ram Charan Lal. The plaintiffs became the owners of the entire of mahal Sheo Charan Lal, and the defendant Maniar Singh of the entire of the mahal Maniar Singh. In mauzas Anti and Dhundar the plaintiffs are co-sharers in mahal Hukum Singh, while the defen-dant Maniar Singh is the sole proprietor of mahal Dal Kuar, The plaintiffs were before partition admittedly co-sharers with the defendant Maniar Singh in the four villages, but since parti-tion they are not co-sharers in any of the new mahals in which the property the subject matter of the suit is situate. This property was sold by Maniar Singh to the defendants 2-4, who are strangers, and it is this sale which the plaintiffs seek to pre-empt, At the time of partition a new wajib-ul-arz was prepared for each of the new mahals, but these wajib-ul-arzes record the custom of pre-emption as it previously existed; they are in fact verbatim copies of the old wajib-ul-arzes of the villages before partition, In the case of mahal Musammat Dal Kuar in mauza Anti the new wajib-ul-arz thus describes the custom:— ” When a co-sharer sells his share, it is purchased first by a near sharer, then a sharer in the tkok, then a sharer in the village, then a stranger gets it.” In the case of mahal Musammat Dal Kuar in mauza Dhundar, the new wajib-ul-arz records the custom of pre-emption as follows:— ” When a co-sharer wishes to sell or mortgage his share, then first a near sharer, after him a sharer in the patti, then a sharer in the village takes it. When none of these takes it, then a stranger gets it.” In the ease of mahal Maniar Singh in mauza Lalipur the custom of preemption is thus recorded in the new wajib-ul-arz:— ” When a co-sharer sells his share, then first a near sharer and after him a sharer in the village takes it. When none of these takes it, then a stranger gets it.” The defendant Maniar Singh having sold the property to a stranger, the plaintiffs claimed the right of pre-emption as being sharers in the villages in which the mahals are situate, portions of which were the subject matter of the sale. It is admitted that the plaintiffs are entitled to pre-empt the sale so far as regards the portion of property sold which is situate in mauza Phalra, but as regards the residue their claim is resisted on the ground that they were not co-sharers with the vendor in any of the other mahals, shares in which belonged to the defendant Maniar Singh. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the case was governed by the decision in the case of Matadin v. Mahesh Prasad, [1892] 12 A.W.N., 100., and decreed the plaintiffs' claim. 3. He found, however, that the price mentioned in the sale-deed, namely, Rs. 6,500 was fictitious to the extent of Rs. 2,340, and that the true price was Rs. 4,160 only. From his decree this appeal has been preferred. 4. The appellants have raised before us the contention (1) that the plaintiffs, not being co-sharers in any of mahals in which the property is situate, are not entitled to pre-empt the sale, save in regard to the portion which is situate in mauza Phalra, and (2) that the true amount of the purchase money was Rs. 6,500; and if the plaintiffs are entitled to pre-empt the sale, they must pay this amount. 5. The plaintiffs-respondents' case is that though they are not co-sharers in the mahals in question, they are co-sharers in the gaon or village, and as such belong to the last class of pre-emptors mentioned in the new as well as the old wajib-ul-arzes. The defendants-appellants contend that the word gaon or village as used in the new wajib-ul-arzes ought to be construed as equivalent to mahal and that therefore the plaintiffs had no pre emptive rights. The defendants-appellants contend that the word gaon or village as used in the new wajib-ul-arzes ought to be construed as equivalent to mahal and that therefore the plaintiffs had no pre emptive rights. They further contend that each new wajib-ul-arz is evidence of a contract entered into between the co-sharers in each new mahal, and that the plaintiffs being no parties to the wajib-ul-arzes of the mahals in question, cannot take advantage of or sue upon such contract. 6. I shall first deal with the last mentioned contention. There appears to me to be a ready answer to it, namely, that the new wajib-ul-arzes did not record a contract but a pre-existing custom which the parties desired to perpetuate. The old wajib-ul-arzes recorded a right of pre-emption existing by custom and new wajib-ul-arzes recorded the determination of the old proprietary body to retain the old custom notwithstanding the disintegration of the villages for fiscal purposes, If the right intended to be recorded in the new wajib-ul-arzes, where a right springing from contract, it would not be properly described in the wajib-ul-arzes as it has been, namely as a custom. As STRACHEY, C.J., observed in the case of Dalganjan Singh v. Kalka Singh, [1899] I.L.R., 22 All, 9.:“When a Settlement Officer records a custom of pre-emption in the wajib-ul-arz of a new mahal, created by perfect partition of an old one, what is that custom? It cannot be something absolutely new, or the word ‘custom’ would be a misnomer. It must, therefore be something which existed before the new mahal and before the partition, some tiling therefore, which existed in the time of the old mahal, which has survived the partition and which is recognized as still applicable within the new mahal. In one of the cases cited to us, and no doubt in many other cases, the Settlement Officer simply copied verbatim in the new wajib-ul-arz the pre-emption clause of the old one. This implies that the old custom thus con-tinued is regarded as a custom of the co-sharers still applicable to all who notwithstanding the partition stand in the relation of co-sharers, not a custom necessarily confined to co-sharers while members of the co-parcenary body of the old and undivided mahal.” In this view I entirely concur. This implies that the old custom thus con-tinued is regarded as a custom of the co-sharers still applicable to all who notwithstanding the partition stand in the relation of co-sharers, not a custom necessarily confined to co-sharers while members of the co-parcenary body of the old and undivided mahal.” In this view I entirely concur. From the fact that all the members of the coparcenary body of each of the old undivided mahals accepted on partition the pre-emption clauses contained in the old’ wajib-ul-arzes, it is manifest I think, that their intention was to keep in force the old custom. The present case appears to be on all fours with the case of Matadin v. Mahesh Prasad, [1892] 19 A.W.N., 100 which was decided by MAHMOOD, J. In that case where a mauza originally consisting of one mahal was divided by perfect partition into three mahals and a separate wajib-ul-arz was prepared for each of the new mahals in which was inserted the following clause relating to pre-emption:— ”The co-sharers of the mauza, provided that they pay the proper price, can become pre-emptors When a transfer of property is made”—it was held that the right of pre-emption was not limited to co-sharers in the mahal in which the property sold was situate. There is no force therefore in my opinion in the contention that the plaintiffs are not in a position to take advantage of the provisions of the new Wajib-ul-arzes. 7. This leads me to the consideration of the true construction of the clauses as regards pre-emption in the new wajib-ul-arzes. In clear and unequivocal terms the right of pre-emption is given to sharers in the gaon or village. Now whether the word denoting village is the Hindi word “gaon “, or the Arabic word mauza”, Or the Persian word “deh“, there is no ambiguity, about it. It means village and not part of a village or a mahal in a village. Now whether the word denoting village is the Hindi word “gaon “, or the Arabic word mauza”, Or the Persian word “deh“, there is no ambiguity, about it. It means village and not part of a village or a mahal in a village. In Wilson's Glossary mauza is defined as “one of more clusters of habitation and all the lands belonging to their proprietary inhabitants” a mauza is defined by authority to be a parcel or parcels of lands having a separate name in the revenue records and of known limits.” In the case of Gokal Singh v. Mannu Lal, [1885] I.L.R., 7 All., 772, PETHERAM, C.J., and MAHMOOD, J., held that the term village as used in a wajib-ul-arz, meant a definite area of land with houses upon it, and does not necessarily imply a joint ownership of such land inasmuch as after partition there may remain some community of interest, and things held and used in common by all the inhabitants—every one who lives in that area had a share in it, and therefore may be regarded as a share-holder within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz, in that case it was contended that after perfect partition the whole of the inhabitable and cultivable area of the village being absolutely divided, and the joint ownership of the shares determined, there ceased to be any entire thing which could be called a village in the sense in which the term was used in the wajib-ul-arz, for the reason that each of the original co-sharers was the owner, of a separate property. The contention was properly in my opinion rejected. A village does not cease to exist by reason of the sub-division of its area for fiscal purposes into separate mahals. In the case of Matadin v. Mahesh Prasad, MAHMOOD, J., in his judgment says, “I cannot interpret the word mauza to mean other than a mauza. I cannot limit it by saying that it only means a mahal, because I am aware that there may be a mahal including many, mauzas. There may be a mauza including more than one mahal, as in this very case. The two terms mauza and mahal are not convertible, and so long as the wajib-ul-arz is explicit, no reason is shown against its ordinary meaning. There may be a mauza including more than one mahal, as in this very case. The two terms mauza and mahal are not convertible, and so long as the wajib-ul-arz is explicit, no reason is shown against its ordinary meaning. I understand a mauza to mean a mauza and a mahal, and will not depart from the safe rule of interpretation by holding otherwise in the present case that the word mauza only means a mahal,” In the case of Ghure v. Man Singh, [1895] I.L.R., 17 All, 226, my brother KNOX passed the following comment upon the decision in Matadin v. Mahesh Prasad:“This was one of those cases in which the village record of custom prepared after partition was a verbatim copy from the record of village customs prepared at the time of settlement. In that case whether from accident or of design, the record of village custom prepared after the partition conferred in express terms a right of pre-emption upon the co-sharers of the mauza. In that case the word mauza was deliberately used, after partition had not only been intended but had been completed, and not used as deh has been in the present case when partition was not yet within the horizon.” I gather from this that my brother Knox did not disapprove of the ruling of MAHMOOD, J., in the case to which I have referred, The decision of my brothers, BLAIR, and BANERJI, in the case of Sukhdeo Pershad v. Durga Pershad, Second Appeal No. 782 of 1902, as yet unreported, is in entire agreement with the decision of MAHMOOD, J. Finding then no ambiguity whatever in the terms of the new wajib-ul-arzes, it appears to me that the Court is bound to construe them, according to the plain sense of the word used, and that we ought not to put a construction contrary to the plain senses in view of any thing de hors the documents.’ So interpreting the wajib-ul-arzes the decision of the Court below upon this branch of the case appears to me to be correct, and the plaintiffs are entitled to pre-empt the sale. 8. [His Lordship then discussed the evidence on the question of price and proceeded.] I would, therefore, allow the appeal and modify the decree by increasing the amount to be paid by the plaintiffs on pre-emption from the sum of Rs. 631 to Rs. 8. [His Lordship then discussed the evidence on the question of price and proceeded.] I would, therefore, allow the appeal and modify the decree by increasing the amount to be paid by the plaintiffs on pre-emption from the sum of Rs. 631 to Rs. 2,971 and would extended the time for payment. BURKITT, J.:— Having had an opportunity of perusing the judgment of the learned Chief Justice, I have come (though not without some hesitation) to the conclusion that his decision as to the meaning to be given to the words “mauza” or “deh” when used in a wajib-ul-arz is correct. 9. It is no doubt surprising that when the co-sharers of a mauza have so far intimated their desire, by entering into a perfect partition, to have nothing to do with one another in future, they should still agree to retain a custom of pre-emption by which the co-sharers of each separated mahal remain entitled to interfere to a large extent with transfers of land made by the separated co-sharers of other mahals which were comprised in the mauza before partition. I have no doubt that in a large number of cases the words “deh” or “mauza” or “gaon” crept into the new wajib-ul-arzes through the ignorance or carelessness of the Settlement Officer's muharrir when copying the wajib-ul-arz of the parent mauza. Nevertheless, it appears to me that the current of authority in this Court is conclusive that, in cases of pre-emption between co-sharers of separate mahals which formerly were comprised in one mauza, where the word ‘mauza’ or ‘deh’ or ‘gaon’ is used in connection with the custom, we are bound to give to these words their ordinary meaning, and should not hold them to be synonymous with “mahal.” I therefore concur with the learned Chief Justice on the question of law raised in this appeal. As to the question of fact, I have no doubt that the lower court went wrong. The grounds on which the learned Subordinate Judge held that the lower price was the true one are unsubstantial in the extreme. 10. The evidence produced for the vendees appellants is, in my opinion, credible and truthful. It conclusively proves that the larger sum was paid. 11. For the above reasons I concur in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice and assent to the order he proposes. 10. The evidence produced for the vendees appellants is, in my opinion, credible and truthful. It conclusively proves that the larger sum was paid. 11. For the above reasons I concur in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice and assent to the order he proposes. BY THE COURT.— The order of the Court is that the decree of the court below be modified by increasing the amount to be paid by the plaintiffs on pre-emption from the sum of Rs. 631 to Rs. 2,971. In other respects the appeal is dismissed. The time for payment will be extended for a period of six months from to-day. As the appellants have in part failed and in part succeeded in the appeal, we make no order as to costs,