Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (June 20, 1899) setting aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Lucknow (Nov. 3, 1898) and dismissing the suit with costs. The plaintiff Nawab Nur Jahan Begum, the predecessor of the appellants, sued to recover arrears of a pension which she claimed under a deed of trust executed by the King of Oudh on November 23, 1839, and for a declaration of her right to receive the same for ever. She was admittedly sister and sole heiress of Nawab Khakan Babu, a daughter-in-law of the King, who had died on March 21, 1889, and to whom under the deed of trust the pension had been granted, her name being mentioned therein in the list of pensioners. The material clauses of the deed are set out in their Lordships judgment. The common case of the parties was that by the terms of the deed the pension in suit was Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 135 ( 1904- 1905) Nawab Haidar Husain Khan V. Nawab Faghfur Mirza 43 transmissible by inheritance, and that the only question for decision was whether it was transmissible to heirs generally, or only to those who could claim by lineal descent. The Subordinate Judge held that "there is no ambiguity whatever in the words used in the above passages (meaning the 1st and 3rd articles), and they clearly denote that the pension is to lapse to the Huseinabad funds in case the pensioners or their heirs die without heir. There is nothing in these passages to shew, either by context or otherwise, that the right of succession to original pensioners shall be confined only to their descendants, and not extend to all their heirs." The Appellate Court, on the other hand, while ruling that it was not bound to construe the word " heirs " in arts. 1 and 3 as meaning heirs who are descendants, unless there would otherwise be a manifest inconsistency or the Court would be defeating the plain intention of the King, held that it was manifestly inconsistent with the provisions of art. 2 to interpret the above word " heirs " as meaning heirs generally. This was the sole ground assigned for giving to the word the restricted meaning contended for by the respondents. 2 to interpret the above word " heirs " as meaning heirs generally. This was the sole ground assigned for giving to the word the restricted meaning contended for by the respondents. The Court said— "In that article [i.e., No. 2] the King declares that it is necessary that the Resident for the time being should treat the pensioners enumerated in the deed and their descendants with kindness, and, considering them deserving of the support of the British Government, always afford them his aid and assistance. Who were the persons for whom the King invoked the kindness, aid, and assistance of the Resident for the time being ? Clearly the persons to whom the pensions were payable. If so, the persons intended by the King to be the recipients of the pensions after the pensioners were their descendants. But if the word heirs in arts. 1 and 3 means heirs generally, then the King intended that the heirs generally of the pensioners should receive the pensions. There is, therefore, a clear inconsistency. The only way to avoid this inconsistency is by restricting the meaning of the word ‘ heirs in arts. 1 and 3 to heirs who are descendants, for the word descendants in art. 2 cannot be construed as meaning heirs generally.5 Cowell, for the appellants, submitted that on the true construction of the clauses in the deed there was a trust declared in favour of each pensioner and his or her heirs, and that the deceased plaintiff was entitled to the pension in suit as nearest heir of the last holder, transmissible in turn to the appellants as her heirs and representatives. There was no inconsistency between arts. 1 and 3 on the one side and art. 2 on the other, because the class for whom the aid and assistance of the Resident were invoked was not shewn to be co-extensive with the class of persons who were the objects of the settlors bounty. It was submitted that art. 2 was collateral to arts. 1 and 3, and was not intended to limit or define the settlors gift, the two latter articles being alone operative for that purpose. The plaintiff was entitled under the plain and unambiguous meaning of arts. 1 and 3, and that meaning could not be controlled by conjecture either founded upon art. 2 was collateral to arts. 1 and 3, and was not intended to limit or define the settlors gift, the two latter articles being alone operative for that purpose. The plaintiff was entitled under the plain and unambiguous meaning of arts. 1 and 3, and that meaning could not be controlled by conjecture either founded upon art. 2, which does not relate to the same matter, or upon the deed executed by the King in the preceding year, set out in L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 175, which related to a different transaction. De Gruyther, for the respondents, contended that the intention of the deed, collected from the words of the various clauses and from all the collateral circumstances, was that only those heirs who were issue were entitled to succeed. In the deed of 1838 the Privy Council had held—see Nawab Sultan Mariam Begum v. Nawab Sahib Mirza (( 1889) L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 175.)—that the words " heirs" and " issue " used therein were used as convertible terms, i.e., heirs were limited to those who were also issue; issue could only mean such issue as were preferential heirs. Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 135 ( 1904- 1905) Nawab Haidar Husain Khan V. Nawab Faghfur Mirza 44 If that deed was not part of the same transaction as the present, it at least shewed what were the general intentions of the King and in what sense he used the word heirs.” The objects of his bounty in 1838 were his blood relations, in 1839 of his relations by marriage, and it was most improbable that he intended that the latter should take a more extensive interest than the former. Further, the support of the British Government was invoked by art. 2 in the deed under consideration for his pensioners and their descendants, shewing that lineal succession was in his contemplation. And as the Appellate Court has held, there would be inconsistency between this and the other articles unless "heirs" were cut down to mean descendants. Then from other parts of the deed the inference was strengthened that heirs and descendants were used as convertible terms see the clauses relating to the descent of the trusteeships created thereby. He referred to Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooce Munraj Koonweree (( 1856) 6 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 411.) as to the necessity for construing Indian deeds liberally. Then from other parts of the deed the inference was strengthened that heirs and descendants were used as convertible terms see the clauses relating to the descent of the trusteeships created thereby. He referred to Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooce Munraj Koonweree (( 1856) 6 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 411.) as to the necessity for construing Indian deeds liberally. Cowell was not heard in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. This appeal relates to the construction of a deed of trust, executed on November 23, 1839, by Mohammad Ali Shah, then King of Oudh, by which he settled a sum of money deposited with or lent to the East India Company as security for certain pensions for the benefit of persons connected with his family, and for other purposes. One of the original pensioners was a daughter-in-law of the King, Nawab Khakan Babu, who died on March 21, 1889. The original appellant, Khakans sister and her sole heir according to Mahomedan law, claimed to be entitled to succeed to the pension, and brought the present suit against certain trustees to establish her title and to recover arrears. The only question is whether the title to the pension descended to the heirs general of the original pensioner, or whether the right to succeed was limited to heirs who are also issue. The deed is a very short one, and according to the transla- tion embodied in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, which all parties have accepted as correct, it is in substance as follows— " Art. 1. The sum of twelve lakhs of Lucknow sicca rupees .... has been deposited by us in perpetuity in the Honourable Companys treasury . . . . and the interest .... has been bestowed as a gift upon the persons herein mentioned, and for the expenses of Huseinabad Mubarak, &c. We have nominated and appointed .... and after them their descendants, generation after generation, to the situation of daroghas or superintendents of mosque, and .... and his descendants after him to the duties of vakeel of the pensioners only . . . . "It is incumbent on the officers of the Honourable Companys Government to pay in perpetuity . . . . to" (the daroghas of the mosque) "and to their descendants, generation after generation .... the money for the expenses of the Huseinabad Mubarak .... . . . "It is incumbent on the officers of the Honourable Companys Government to pay in perpetuity . . . . to" (the daroghas of the mosque) "and to their descendants, generation after generation .... the money for the expenses of the Huseinabad Mubarak .... The stipends of the pensioners are to be paid through" (the vakeel) ". . . . and should any of the pensioners enumerated in this deed, or their heirs, go and reside within the territories of the Honourable Company, the Resident for the time being shall cause their pensions to be remitted to their place of residence." [The list of pensioners follows, of whom Nawab Khakan Babu is one.] "Art. 2. As the pensioners enumerated in this deed are the objects of our peculiar consideration and favours it is necessary that the Resident for the time being, owing to the union and friendship subsisting between the two Governments, treat them and their descendants with kindness, and considering them deserving of the support of the British Government, always afford them his aid and assistance. Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 135 ( 1904- 1905) Nawab Haidar Husain Khan V. Nawab Faghfur Mirza 45 "Art. 3. Should it happen that any of the said pensioners, or after them any of their heirs, die without heir, the pension of the deceased shall be paid by the Resident for the time being for the expenses of Huseinabad Mubarak, &c, to the superintendent. . . . "Art. 4. As the whole of the income and disbursements of Huseinabad Mubarak and .... have been placed entirely at the disposal of" (the daroghas) "it is necessary that they and their descendants should receive with honesty the sums set apart .... and should no descendants of the mutawallis or superintendents of the mosque or of the vakeel remain, let the Resident for the time being, with the concurrence of three-fourths of the pensioners, appoint in the place of the person dying without heir one of the pensioners to the situation of the person dying without heir." The deed provides for two things, the religious endowment and the pensions, and appoints trustees to administer the one and a vakeel to pay the other, with a gift over, in case of the lapse of any of the pensions, of the amount so set free to the religious endowment. The clauses dealing directly with the beneficial enjojonent of the pensions and the succession to such enjoyment are clauses 1 and 3. These clauses are not framed as clauses of similar purport would probably have been framed by lawyers in this country. Clause 1, which embodies the gift, contains in the actual terms of gift no words of limitation. These are to be sought partly in other words in clause 1, but more clearly in clause 3, which deals with the expiration of the pensions and the gift over. And this is a method of dealing with such matters not unfamiliar in Indian documents. If these clauses stood alone there could be no doubt, first, that the pensions were to descend by inheritance (which is not disputed), nor, secondly, that the descent was to be to heirs general. But it is said that the literal meaning of these clauses must be rejected, and that "heirs " must be understood as including only heirs who are also issue ; and for this three reasons are given— First, it is said (and this is true) that in the year 1838, a year before the execution of the present trust deed, the King executed another document of the nature of a treaty or arrangement with the East India Company, by which he settled pensions upon other members of his family; that that document was construed by this Board in the case of Nawab Sultan Mariam Begum v. Nawab Sahib Mirza (L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 175.), in which it was held that in the document then under consideration, in which the words "heirs " and " issue " were both used, each must be understood as meaning heirs who were also issue; and it was argued in this case that the document so construed should be used for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of the one now before their Lordships. With respect to this contention their Lordships entirely agree with the learned judges in the Appeal Court in India. The document now in question does not embody or refer to the earlier document; the two documents are not in any sense parts of one transaction, they are not even contemporaneous documents. Nor does the decision on the earlier document afford a precedent for the interpretation of that now in question, for the language of the two documents is entirely dissimilar. Nor does the decision on the earlier document afford a precedent for the interpretation of that now in question, for the language of the two documents is entirely dissimilar. Apart from the attempt to import the meaning of the earlier into the construction of the later document, and limiting the inquiry to the language of the latter alone, two arguments were used. One was founded upon art. 2 of the deed of trust, which commended to the kindness and support of the British Government the pensioners " and their descendants." The Appeal Court in India, differing on this point from the First Court, thought that this clause introduced a manifest inconsistency with clauses 1 and 3 if construed literally. But this can only be so on the assumption that the class of persons commended to the good offices of the British Government were of necessity exactly co-extensive with the class who Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 135 ( 1904- 1905) Nawab Haidar Husain Khan V. Nawab Faghfur Mirza 46 could enjoy the pensions. And their Lordships are not prepared to make this assumption. The only point that remains for consideration is the argument based upon a comparison of certain words in clauses 1 and 4 of the deed, relating to the devolution of the rights of the mutawallis of the religious endowment and of the vakeel of the pensions, in which it is said that .the terms " heirs " and " descendants M are used as convertible terms, and it was contended that for this reason the word " heirs " must, throughout the whole deed, mean heirs who are also descendants. This contention did not find favour in either of the Courts in India. And their Lordships think that those Courts were right. The descent of the trusteeship and the descent of the beneficial interest in the pensions are distinct things, and their Lordships have no right to assume that the King intended them to be governed by the same rules. The ambiguity of the language used on the one subject cannot control the clear and unambiguous words employed with regard to the other. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the Judicial Commissioners Court should be set aside with costs, and that of the Subordinate Judge restored. The respondents will pay the costs of this appeal.