JUDGMENT : Knox, J.:— This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by Musammat Naraini for possession of a certain share of mauza Pirahari. She bases her light to the share both upon title and upon a deed of compromise, which was entered into in a previous suit between the parties on the 17th of July, 1899. If her right had been based on title alone, the provisions of section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure might have been an obstacle in the plaintiff's way, As regards, the compromise, section 43 cannot bar any right of action which arises out of the deed of compromise. The appellant did not in her written statement say that she was ignorant of the terms entered in the compromise or of the way in which the previous suit had been decided. She did not go into the witness-box. She has taken advantage of the terms of the compromise so far as they are favourable to her. 2. We think the Courts below were right in holding that it was binding on her. The learned Vakil for the appellant relied upon section 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure and on certain rulings under that section. The rulings which he cited are not in our opinion relevant to the present case. The ruling which is really in point and which is in favour of the respondent is that of Gupta Narain Das v. Bijoya Sundnri Debya : [1897] 2 C.W.N., 663. The facts of that case are similar to those of the present case, the only difference being that in the Calcutta case the right of suit on the compromise was expressly reserved. In our opinion the plaintiff has a right of suit on the contract expressed in the compromise independent of any right expressly reserved. These findings render the other pleas in appeal without any force. We dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale.