JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - In this case it appears that a complaint having been filed by one Kamal Pramanick and others on the 27th September 1904 alleging that the Petitioners and others were " attempting to take kabuliyats from them at an enhanced rates and to realize many sorts of kharchas from them and thereby making various sorts of zulum on them and that by these there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace," the Petitioners after an inquiry by the Magistrate were by a notice, dated the 26th November, setting forth the information abovementioned under sec. 107, Cr. P.C. called upon to show cause why they should not be bound down in various sums with sureties to keep the peace for one year. In showing cause the Petitioners were all dealt with in one enquiry as if they had been associated together in the matter under enquiry and an order was eventually made requiring all of them to enter into bonds in terms of the notice. A Bench of this Court of which I was not a member issued a rule to show cause why the order should not be set aside on the ground that proceedings in the case of each of the Petitioners should have been held separately. 2. Sec. 117 (4), Or. P.C. provides that where two or more persons have been associated together in the matter under enquiry they may be dealt with in the same or separate enquiries as the Magistrate shall think just. It is necessary therefore to consider whether the Petitioners can be said to have been associated together in the matter under enquiry. In the first place it is to be observed that the Petitioners are all the servants of an influential zemindar Prasanna Nath Chaudhuri and it may be taken therefore that their acts wore done not in their own interests but in the course and within the scope of their employment, in the interest of their master and under the orders express or implied of him or his agents. Ordinarily in such a case the acts of the servants would be primarily and I think properly attributable to the orders given and not necessarily to any association together for the purpose of committing the acts. Ordinarily in such a case the acts of the servants would be primarily and I think properly attributable to the orders given and not necessarily to any association together for the purpose of committing the acts. In his judgment, the Deputy Magistrate has not dealt with the question whether the Petitioners were associated together but in the explanation submitted by him he has very rightly informed us that, no objection was taken before him that there should have been separate enquiries instead of a joint enquiry. In that explanation he has supplemented his judgment and pointed out that in his view the Petitioners had a common object to oppress Kamal Pramanick and other tenants of their master, and that as all their acts were done for one purpose, namely, for the benefit of their common master they might be said to be " associated together in the matter under enquiry." In the view which I take of the matter this explanation does not very much advance the case, not does it, afford an entirely satisfactory answer to the question raised. 3. It remains to be seen whether there is anything in the grounds upon which the notice was issued under sec. 107, Cr P.C. or in the findings in the judgment of the Deputy Magistrate to show that there were circumstances from which association together might be inferred. I have set out the grounds mentioned in the notice upon which the Petitioners were called upon to answer. and I do not think that these necessarily suggest that the Petitioners were associated together in the matters put forward. On reference to the judgment itself it will be observed that the Deputy Magistrate has found Kamal Pramanick and also Ishan and other raiyats were brought (it is not said by force) by the Petitioners Jamir Biswas and Chand Khan to Parsadanga where the zemindar lives and that kabuliyats at enhanced rates were demanded from them by the Petitioners Kudiram and Sreekanta and that they were confined for three days and it is stated that Kamal Pramanick in cross examination had (sic) the statement that his nose and ears were pulled and he was made to sit on a certain place. There is a further finding that Kala Pramanick and others were also taken by the Petitioner chand Khan to Parsadanga where, after a kabuliyat at an enhanced rate had been demanded, they were confined for 2 days. 4. There is a further finding, or to be more accurate, a statement by the Deputy Magistrate that the pitioner Mirjan went to the house of Ishan and threatened to beat him and demolish his huts. With regard to the petitioner Tulsi Ram all that is said or found by the Deputy Magistrate is that he had been sitting in the house of a raiyat Subedal Huq awaiting his return in order to rake him to the landlord's house, no reason being assigned by Court, for his waiting there, and none ought, I think, to be assumed against him. What 1 have set forth above is the sum total of what is stated or found in the judgment under consideration against the Petitioners. It is not made clear whether Kamal Pramanick was confined at the same time as Ishan and those alleged to have been with him or at the same time as Kalu Pramanick and those alleged to have been with him. There is enough in the judgment to show that acts of oppression had been committed and a condition of things is disclosed which is extremely reprehensible but for which the zemindar, is in my opinion, in the main responsible. At the most it amounts to this:--The Petitioners Jamir Biswas and Chand Khan are found to have together brought (not by force) two sets of people and the Petitioner Chand khan by himself a third set to Parsadanga where on their refusal to give kabuliyats these people were confined for periods of three and two days, while the Petitioner Mirjan is found to have threatened Ishan. In this connection it is to be noted in justice to the Deputy Magistrate that in giving his reasons for the order requiring the Petitioners to give security to keep the peace, in his judgment he made the following remarks : " The acts of oppression may be repeated if no restraint is put upon the accused and such acts are likely to occasion a breach of the peace." No doubt if the servants of a zemindar acting under orders of their master or out of zeal For their master's interests or for any other reason join or associate themselves together for the purpose of committing acts of oppression upon the raiyats they will render themselives liable to punishment for any offences which they commit and, it may be, if they are shown to have habitually committed extortion so as to bring them within the terms of sec. 110, Cr. P.C., liable to give security for their good behaviour. 5. Having regard to the fact that the raiyats were brought to the house of the zemindars it is to me obvious that the action of the Petitioners was done with the knowledge or connivance of their master and I think it, may reasonably and safely be inferred under his express orders. This does not in my opinion show (it certainly does not necessarily show that the Petitioners acted in concert for the purpose of committing extortions and I can see nothing in the judgment of the Deputy Magistrate from which such concert can be inferred. It does, however, show that on two occasions the Petitioners Jamir Biswas and Chand Khan were acting together in bringing raiyats to Parsadanga, but that on the other occasions mentioned the Petitioners Chand Khan, Mirjan and Tulsi were each acting independently. The Deputy Magistrate does not, it is to be observed, state specifically by whom the raiyats were confined. had the Petitioners been put upon their trial Jamir Biswas and Chand Khan might properly have been tried together for two attempts to extort kabuliyats and possibly for wrongfully confining raiyats, and Khudi Ram and Sreekanta if they took part in the wrongful confinement might also have been tried with them. A separate trial would have been necessary with regard to the third case of alleged wrongful confinement and in this Chand Khan and possibly Khudi Ram and Sreekanta might have been tried with him. A separate trial would have been necessary with regard to the third case of alleged wrongful confinement and in this Chand Khan and possibly Khudi Ram and Sreekanta might have been tried with him. It would have been necessary to have tried Mirjan and Tulsi separately from each other and from the others for the offences alleged against them. 6. I am not prepared to say that the words "associated together" imply that the persons to whom they may be properly applied must have been acting in concert, but I am inclined to think that persons associated together in the matter of an enquiry under sec. 107 must be persons shown to have been acting together on the various matters charged against them as grounds for binding them over to keep the peace. Here with regard to some of the matters charged some of the Petitioners were undoubtedly acting together but not all of them. The only link that seems to connect them all is their joint service under one master whose orders they were carrying out. I am unable therefore to hold that the Petitioners were associated together in the matter or rather the matters (for there are more matters than one) under enquiry. 7. Assuming then that the Petitioners were not associated together in the matter under enquiry, was the joint enquiry, under the circumstances, proper or legal ? In Pran Krishna Saha v. The Emperor 8 C.W.N. 180 (190), it was said that the main principles laid down by secs. 233, 239, Cr. P.C., as applicable to a criminal trial regarding joinder of charges and the joint trial of accused persons should be applied to enquiries under Chap. VIII of the Code and in that case it was held that there had been a misjoinder of the nature condemned by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Subramania Iyer v. King-Emperor 5 C.W.N. 866: s.c. ILR 25 Mad. 61 (1901), and such as could not be cured by sec. 537, Cr. P.C. In that case, which was a stronger case than this, an enquiry was held jointly under sec. 107, Cr. P.C., against 29 persons of one party along with 10 persons of an opposing party. 61 (1901), and such as could not be cured by sec. 537, Cr. P.C. In that case, which was a stronger case than this, an enquiry was held jointly under sec. 107, Cr. P.C., against 29 persons of one party along with 10 persons of an opposing party. If, therefore, the reasoning in that case is to be adopted, then the joint enquiry into the case of all the Petitioners in the present case was improper, if not also illegal. While sec. 117 (4) permits either a joint enquiry or separate enquiries where two or more persons have been associated together in the matter of the enquiry it may be inferred that the intention of the Legislature was, though there is no express declaration to that effect, that where there is no association together, there should be separate enquiries. But without going so far as to lay down that a joint enquiry in the circumstances disclosed before us was illegal I think the rule granted in this case may be dealt with from another point of view, namely, whether or not the Petitioners have been prejudiced in consequence of there having been one joint enquiry instead of several separate enquiries, for that is the real ground upon which the rule was granted. I have already referred to and set out with great detail the findings of fact arrived at by the Deputy Magistrate for the purpose of ascertaining whether there were circumstances which show that the Petitioners had been associated together. But it is equally necessary to refer to these matters in order to ascertain whether the Petitioners or any of them have been prejudiced by the mode of procedure adopted and also for another purpose which will be mentioned hereafter. In my opinion it is evident from what is found in the judgment of the Deputy Magistrate apart from what the evidence may be that the Petitioner Tulsi could not possibly have been required to give security had his case been enquired into separately. As already pointed out the only finding against him is that he was seen sitting in the house of a raiyat awaiting his return. It is added that his intention was to take the raiyat to the zemindar but that addition is apparently a mere inference as to what might or might not be in his mind. As already pointed out the only finding against him is that he was seen sitting in the house of a raiyat awaiting his return. It is added that his intention was to take the raiyat to the zemindar but that addition is apparently a mere inference as to what might or might not be in his mind. It is obvious therefore that circumstances brought out at the hearing, adverse to the other Petitioners have been used against him and to his prejudice. It further seems to me that the accumulation of evidence made possible by the fact that all the Petitioners were dealt with in one enquiry must necessarily have prejudiced them also. I find, therefore, that (1) the proper procedure has not been followed, that in fact the be procedure has been irregular, if not illegal, and (2) that in consequence the Petitioners have been prejudiced and I would therefore make the rule absolute and set aside the order directing them to give securities. 8. A very serious question, however, remain for consideration, namely, whether under the circumstances fresh enquiries should now be held with regard to the Petitioner Tulsi. I consider that there is no ground for any such enquiry as the matters found against him in the judgment of the Deputy Magistrate clearly do not justify his being bound down to keep the peace. In this connection also I have considered the findings of the Deputy Magistrate with regard to the Petitioners. If in fact the Petitioners Jamir, Chand Khan, Khudi Ram and Srikanta did wrongfully confine certain of the raiyats and if the Petitioner Mirjan did threaten Ishan as found by the Deputy Magistrate there is no reason why they should not be tried for the offences which their acts constitute. As pointed out in Hari Talang v. The Empress 4 C.W.N. 531 : s.c. ILR 27 Cal. 781 (1900), an order for security to keep the peace would very seriously prejudice them in their trial should a prosecution be instituted against them. The object of sec. 107 is the prevention and not the punishment of offences. Here although it may be that the order made will prevent future oppression, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that proceedings have been taken under sec. The object of sec. 107 is the prevention and not the punishment of offences. Here although it may be that the order made will prevent future oppression, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that proceedings have been taken under sec. 107 when the more appropriate remedy for the evil was to institute regular trials, The Deputy Magistrate has found that the acts of all of the Petitioners, if repeated, are likely to occasion a breach of the peace and that being so it would be impossible to say that an order, made, after the holding of proper enquiries, that the Petitioners should execute bonds to keep the peace would be wrong. But having regard to all the circumstances of the case I do not think the case is one in which fresh enquiries should be directed to be held. So far I have dealt with the case of the Petitioner Tulsi as being different from that of the others, there being no finding of any acts by him likely to cause a breach of the peace. My learned brother, however, has drawn my attention to the fact that it appears from the evidence that he himself stated to a witness that he was waiting in the house of Subedul Huq to take him to the gomasta as he would not give a kabuliyat. Where an enquiry is found to have been defective or improper and a question arises whether a fresh enquiry should be directed it is ordinarily necessary to look to the evidence. In the present case, on the evidence being looked to, it is clear that his case is not really distinguishable from that of the others. 9. There is yet another point of view from which this case may be considered, the point of view from which it is assumed that the Petitioners were associated together within the meaning of sec, 117 (4), Cr. P.C. In that case the Deputy Magistrate had under the section a discretion to deal with the Petitioners in the same or separate enquiries as he might think just. The Deputy Magistrate, however, did not at any time during the enquiry apply his mind to the question whether under the circumstances appearing before him, the Petitioners should have been dealt with in the same or separate enquiries. The Deputy Magistrate, however, did not at any time during the enquiry apply his mind to the question whether under the circumstances appearing before him, the Petitioners should have been dealt with in the same or separate enquiries. Having regard to the information upon which the enquiry was started it might very well be that a joint enquiry would at first be right and proper but if at a leter stage it appeared that a joint enquiry might prejudice the persons concerned it would in my opinion be the duty of the Magistrate to stop the enquiry and institute separate enquiries. 10. Where, however, in a proper case the Magistrate had exercised the discretion vested in him this Court would not lightly interfere. But if it should come to the conclusion that the persons concerned had been prejuduced by the procedure adopted it should not, I think, hesitate to interfere as a Court of revision. As in the present case I have come to the conclusion that the Petitioners have been prejudiced by the procedure adopted I would, even on the assumption that the Petitioners had been associated together in the matter under enquiry, set aside the order made for security. 11. I regret that my learned brother and 1 have not been able to agree as to the order which should be made in this case. It will be necessary therefore that the case should be referred to a third Judge. Geidt, J. 12. The six Petitioners are servants of an influential zemindar, Prasanna Nath Chaudhuri. Several of his tenants complained that the Petitioners and other servants of the zemindar were illegally demanding kubuliyats at enhanced rent, and with the object of extorting them were committing various acts of oppression on the complainants and other tenants. An enquiry was held by the Magistrate and on its termination a notice was issued on the Petitioners calling on them to show cause why they should not be ordered to execute bonds in various sums to keep the peace. An enquiry was held by the Magistrate and on its termination a notice was issued on the Petitioners calling on them to show cause why they should not be ordered to execute bonds in various sums to keep the peace. The reason for this order was in the notice stated to be that the Petitioners "are attempting to take kubuliyats from the complainants and others at an enhanced rate of rent and realize many sorts of kharchas (i.e., illegal imposts) from them, and thereby making various sorts of zulum (oppression) on them, and for these their actions there is every likelihood of a breach of the peace by the Petitioners." An enquiry was accordingly held and the Petitioners were ordered to execute bonds to keep the peace. The present rule was issued to show cause why this order should not be set aside on the ground that proceedings in the case of each of the Petitioners should have been held separately. 13. The rule as to joint enquiries in proceedings under Chap. VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure is contained in cl. (4) of sec. 117, "Where two or more persons have been associated together in the matter under enquiry, they may be dealt with in the same or separate enquiries as the Magistrate shall think just." It is evident, I think, from the nature of the case that the association which will give the Magistrate jurisdiction to deal in one proceeding with two or more persons must be alleged or implied in the initiatory order. In the case of trials for offences the jurisdiction to try two or more persons jointly is vested in the Magistrate when they are accused of the same offence (sec. 239, Cr. P.C). It is to the accusation to which we must look, when we have to ascertain whether a joint trial is legal or not. If A, B and C are accused of having committed a dacioty, they may be jointly tried together, and if B and C only are found to have committed that offence their trial is not vitiated by the fact that A who on the same trial is found "nor guilty" was jointly tried with B and C. On the same principle in proceedings under see. 107 of the Code if, on the information received by the Magistrate, two or more persons are associated together in the wrongful acts which they are likely to commit and which may probably occasion a breach of the peace, he has jurisdiction to hold a joint enquiry in proceedings under sec. 107, and to make an order requiring the execution of a bond by all those whom he has reason to think to be associated together in the acts likely to be committed by them. Nor will his proceedings be vitiated, even if it should appear in the course of the enquiry that one or more of the poisons culled on to show cause are not associated with those against whom there is sufficient reason for making the order absolute. 14. I proceed next to consider what is the meaning of the words " associated together." I am of opinion that this phrase applies to persons acting in concert, whether that concert is due to mutual agreement among themselves, or to obedience to the orders of a common master. 15. If a band of soldiers in obedience to the orders of their leader assaults a village and some of them knock down the walls while others set fire to the roofs or kill the inhabitants I should say that the soldiers taking part in the assault might be properly said to be associated together in the destruction of the village. 16. In the case before us the proceedings drawn up by the Magistrate imply that on the information received by him the Petitioners were acting in concert, the acts which they were committing and were likely to commit were acts having a common object, namely, the enhancement of the tenant's rents for the benefit of their common master. In my opinion the condition required in sec. 117 (4) for a joint enquiry was fulfilled. 17. The foregoing observations are sufficient for the disposal of the rule in respect of the single ground on which it was issued, namely, that the proceedings in the case of each of the Petitioners should have been held separately. In my opinion the condition required in sec. 117 (4) for a joint enquiry was fulfilled. 17. The foregoing observations are sufficient for the disposal of the rule in respect of the single ground on which it was issued, namely, that the proceedings in the case of each of the Petitioners should have been held separately. As however learned Counsel for the Petitioners was not confined to the ground specified in the rule and as the view which I hold in respect of the arguments addressed to us does not, I regret to say, coincide with that taken by my learned brother, it is perhaps desirable that I should consider the remaining points over which the discussion has ranged. 18. I have already indicated my opinion that in determining the legality of the joint enquiry which must have regard to the allegations in respect of which the Petitioners were called upon to execute bonds to keep the peace. If on the other hand we are at liberty on this rule to consider the findings of fact, we ought not, to set aside the order as regards any but those who are not found to be associated together in the acts which may occasion a breach of the peace. Looking however at the findings of the Magistrate's judgment it appears to me that the Magistrate has in effect found that the acts which the Petitioners have committed and are likely to commit are acts committed in concert by the Petitioners with a common object, namely, raising by illegal and oppressive methods the rents of their master's tenants. The findings are in my opinion sufficient to indicate that the Petitioners have been associated together in the past and are likely to be associated together in the future in the acts that may probably occasion a breach of the peace. It is true that the Magistrate has not in terms discussed the question whether the Petitioners have been associated together in the matter under enquiry. It is true that the Magistrate has not in terms discussed the question whether the Petitioners have been associated together in the matter under enquiry. The Petitioners had legal advice and they put forward a careful and deliberate statement of the grounds on which they showed cause why they should not be bound over to keep the peace neither in this statement nor, as would appear from the judgment, in the oral arguments addressed to the Court did they advance any objection that they had not been associated together in the matter under enquiry, probably because they felt that it would be futile to raise such a plea in a Court where there would be ample evidence to meet It. However that may be, the Magistrate's judgment does in effect show that he was of opinion that the Petitioners were acting in concert, and therefore associated together, and on this finding they were all rightly bound over to keep the peace. With regard to Tulsi there is only one act found, namely, that he was waiting for the return of the tenant in whose house he was sitting; but the evidence shows that he was waiting there to take the tenant to the gomasta because he would not execute a kabuliyat. His object was similar to that of the other Petitioners, the coercion of the tenant to paying enhanced rent to their common master. If now going beyond the judgment we are at liberty to look at the evidence in order to ascertain whether there is any support for the findings arrived at by the Magistrate, I may point out that one witness deposes that all the Petitioners had demanded kabuliyat from him, and he and the other witnesses depose to various acts committed with the object of extorting enhanced rents, though it may be that except in the above instance no witness speaks to acts committed by all the Petitioners in regard to himself. I revert again to my illustration of a band of soldiers assaulting and pillaging a village. Supposing some of the soldiers battered the walls, some set fire to the houses, while others again killed or robbed the inhabitants, the fact that these various acts' were spoken to by different witnesses would be no ground for holding that the soldiers were not acting in concert. Supposing some of the soldiers battered the walls, some set fire to the houses, while others again killed or robbed the inhabitants, the fact that these various acts' were spoken to by different witnesses would be no ground for holding that the soldiers were not acting in concert. In the same way in the present case I am of opinion that the fact that the witnesses do not. name all the Petitioners as having been concerned in any one act does not negative the idea, based on other materials, that the Petitioners were acting in concert. 19. It was argued by Mr. Jackson that some of the acts deposed to by the witnesses are offences, e.g., wrongful confinement, for which the Petitioners may be tried, and that they should not be bound over to keep the peace for having committed those acts; if it is desired to punish them they ought to be regularly tried for the offences they are alleged to have committed. This argument, it appears to me, loses sight of the object of sec. 107 of the Code. The object of proceedings under that section is not to punish persons for anything that they have done in the past, but to prevent them from doing in the future something that may probably occasion a breach of the peace. The evidence as to acts committed in the past is brought forward to show that while the conditions remain unchanged, similar acts may be committed in the future. If those acts are wrongful and are like to occasion a breach of the peace, the Magistrate's jurisdiction to take security against their commission is in my opinion in no way impaired by the circumstance that those acts are offences for which the offenders may be punished when they are committed. Powers are given to him to guard against any wrongful acts which may occasion a breach of the peace, whether those acts are offences or not. 20. It has also to be borne in mind that the initiation of proceedings under Chap. VIII of the Act rests with the Magistrate. He is primarily responsible for the peace of the district and the apathy or the timidity of persons against whom offences have been committed should not be made a reason for restraining the exercise of the powers created for the attainment of that object. VIII of the Act rests with the Magistrate. He is primarily responsible for the peace of the district and the apathy or the timidity of persons against whom offences have been committed should not be made a reason for restraining the exercise of the powers created for the attainment of that object. It is very often useless for the Magistrate to institute a prosecution for an offence unless the victim of the offence desires to have the offender punished, and this is specially the case where offence like wrongful confinement is compoundable. 21. I confess that I am unable to share the apprehension entertained by my learned brother that the Petitioners may be seriously prejudiced by the order complained of, if at any future time they should be prosecuted for some of the acts of which evidence has been given in the present case. There is no indication that such a prosecution will be instituted, and as far as I can judge the probability is that there will be none. But even were it otherwise I should attach little weight to such a consideration. We shall be in a position to deal with the question of prejudice when it arises. Sitting on a Criminal Bench we are often called upon to deal with cases where in the course of a trial a Magistrate has expressed an opinion on a state of facts which has become the subject of a second trial. As far as my experience goes the only objection taken in these cases is to the second trial being held by the Magistrate who expressed the opinion in the first trial and that objection is removed by the transfer of the case to another Magistrate. I have little doubt that if a similar difficulty should arise on a prosecution of the Petitioners at present only hypothetical it could be solved by the same simple expedient. 22. In my opinion the rule fails on the ground on which it was granted and also on the other grounds which have been taken at the bearing, I would therefore discharge it. 23. Owing to this difference of opinion the case was referred to Rampini, J. Rampini, J. 24. 22. In my opinion the rule fails on the ground on which it was granted and also on the other grounds which have been taken at the bearing, I would therefore discharge it. 23. Owing to this difference of opinion the case was referred to Rampini, J. Rampini, J. 24. This is a rule issued in the following terms: "Let the record be sent for and a rule issue on the District Magistrate to show cause why the order directing the Petitioners to be bound over to keep the peace should not be set aside on the ground that proceedings in the case of each of the Petitioners should have been held separately." It is therefore not what is known as an "open" rule, but one granted on one ground only--viz., that the proceedings in the case of each of the Petitioners should have been held separately. 25. Nevertheless, the learned Counsel who appeared in support of the rule before the learned Judges of the Criminal Bench seems to have been allowed to argue, as if it were an open rule, and the pleader who has appeared before me has claimed and exercised the same privilege. 26. The rule comes before me as the learned Judges of the Criminal Bench have differed in their views with regard to it. 27. The facts are that the six Petitioners have been called on under sec. 107, Cr. P.C., to execute bonds and to furnish security to keep the peace for one year. They are the servants of a powerful zemindar, named Prasanna Nath Chaudhuri, and have been charged with and shown to have bean going about and seizing the raiyats of the zemindar and taking them to the zamindari cutehery where kabuliyats at enhanced rates were demauded from them, and where on their refusing to execute these kabuliyats, some of the raiyats were confined for 2 or 3 days at a time and one had his ears and nose pulled. 28. They have been called on to execute bonds and furnish security to keep the peace so as to prevent future similar acts of oppression. 29. Now, as has already been pointed out, the only ground on which the rule was granted was whether the case against them should have been tried jointly as it was, or whether the case of each should have been separately enquired into. 30. 29. Now, as has already been pointed out, the only ground on which the rule was granted was whether the case against them should have been tried jointly as it was, or whether the case of each should have been separately enquired into. 30. The Deputy Magistrate pointed out that no objection to their cases being enquired into jointly was made before him or the District Magistrate. He justifies the joint trial under the provisions of sec. 117, sub sec. (4) which provides that " where two or more persons have been associated together in the matter under enquiry, they may be dealt with in the same, or separate enquiries as the Magistrate shall think just." 31. It seems to me that the terms of this section fully justify the joint enquiry made with regard to the Petitioners. 32. They were all associated together in the matter of the extortion of kabuliyats at enhanced rates from the tenants of their master Prasanna Nath Chaudhuri for his benefit. They were sent for the raiyats. They seized them, and the principal Petitioner Srikanta ordered some of the raiyats to be confined. 33. This would seem to me to dispose of the ground on which the rule in this case was granted. But as I have already said the learned Counsel who appeared before the Judges of the Criminal Bench and the pleader who appeared before me, have argued that one of the Petitioners named Tulsi at least has been prejudiced owing to his case having been enquired into along with that of the others, because all that has been proved to have been done by him is that he went to the house of a raiyat named Subadul Huq and sat down there and waited for him. But one of the witnesses says that Tulsi said to him that he had gone to the house of Subadul Huq to take him to the gomasta, as he would not gave a kabuliyat. His visit to Subadui Huq was therefore not an innocent one. He on his own showing had a criminal intent. In any case, had his case been enquired into separately, evidence of his being associated with the others to extort kabuliyats might have been given against him. 34. His visit to Subadui Huq was therefore not an innocent one. He on his own showing had a criminal intent. In any case, had his case been enquired into separately, evidence of his being associated with the others to extort kabuliyats might have been given against him. 34. The last ground which the learned pleader for the Petitioners has urged before me is that the Petitioners committed the acts imputed to them as servants of the zemindar and not as individual members of society, and so cannot be proceeded against under sec. 107. All T think I need say in reply to this argument is that in whatever capacity the Petitioners have done wrongful acts which may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquility, (as they have done before in the past history of this province, e.g., the agrarian disturbance in 1873 in Pubna, the very district to which the present Petitioners belong), they are liable to be proceeded against under sec. 107, and cannot escape the liability for their acts by pleading or showing that they acted in obedience to the orders of their employer. I accordingly discharge this rule.