JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. The only point involved in this appeal is whether or not extrinsic evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing that a document which purports to be and is on the face of it a deed of sale is in reality a deed of gift. The plaintiff, Musammat Chaudhrain Faiz-un-nissa inherited, from several relatives; a considerable amount of immoveable property, representing an income of about Rs. 24,000 a year. She had two sons, namely, Abdul Ghafur and Abdul Shakur, and two daughters, Musammat Kulsum and Musammat Hanif-un-nissa. Abdul Shakur had an only daughter, namely, Musammat Bashir-un-nissa, and Abdul Ghafur had an only son, Ibrahim Ali Khan. On the 27th of September, 1889, the plaintiff executed a deed which purports to be an out-and-out conveyance of portion of her property, in consideration of the sum of Rs. 60,000 in favour of her daughter Hanif-un-nissa and her grandson and grand-daughter Ibrahim Ali Khan and Bashir-un-nissa, This is the document which has given rise to this litigation. There is a statement in the deed that the entire consideration had been paid. The grantees under it were at the date of the deed minors. On its execution mutation of names was effected in their favour, but up to the year 1895 the plaintiff continued to manage the property on their behalf, Subsequent to the date of this deed, the plaintiff executed deeds of gift in favour of her daughter and grandson Ibrahim Ali Khan, and she has in fact parted with all her property. 2. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen, was brought by the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the property comprised in the conveyance of the 27th of September, 1889, on the ground that the deed was executed by the plaintiff in-order to protect her against the importunities of her son Abdul Shakur Khan, who had become a profligate and spendthrift, and that it was fictitious; and in the alternative for payment of the amount of the consideration money with interest, and that, necessary, payment be enforced by sale of the property. Portions of the property comprised, in the deed have been sold by the grantees thereunder to several purchasers, To the portions so sold, the plaintiff lays no claim in this appeal. 3. Only the property which remains in the hands of the defendants-respondents is the subject matter of the appeal. Portions of the property comprised, in the deed have been sold by the grantees thereunder to several purchasers, To the portions so sold, the plaintiff lays no claim in this appeal. 3. Only the property which remains in the hands of the defendants-respondents is the subject matter of the appeal. The defence to the suit is, that the transfer of the 27th of September, 1889, was made out of natural love and affection, and was in fact a deed of gift, though it took the form of a deed of sale. This defence found favour with the learned Subordinate Judge, He came to the conclusion that the plaintiff never intended to claim payment of the consideration and that the real consideration was natural love and affection. 4. From this decision the present appeal has been preferred. A number of witnesses were examined on behalf of the respondents to prove that the intention of the plaintiff when she executed the deed was to make a gift of the property and not to receive payment of the price. This at once raises the question whether evidence was admissible, to prove an unexpressed intention, varying from that which the words used in the document imported, On the determination of this question this appeal must succeed or fail. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, that nothing can be elicited from the acts and conduct of the parties after the execution of the deed, as their acts and conduct would be as consistent with their position as vendees, as with that of donees. We may observe, however, as to this that in all subsequent documents the defendants-respondents are described as vendees only and in one document the distinction between the nature of the deed of the 27th of September, 1889, as a deed of sale, and a subsequent deed of gift of the 12th of August, 1890, is emphasised. This is a petition which was filed by the plaintiff as certificated guardian of the respondent Ibrahim Ali Khan on the 4th of October, 1895 (No. 100C of the record).’ In that petition there is the statement that the petitioner “is the single zamindar and lambardar of most of the villages sold by the petitioner for consideration and for services rendered to Musammat Hanif-un-nissa. Ibrahim Ali Khan and Musammat Bashir-un-nissa, under the sale-deed registered on the 29th of September, 1889, and also of all the villages given by the petitioner in gift, to Musammat Hanif-un-nissa under the deed of gift, registered on the 14th of August, 1890, in consideration of the services rendered by her, and the said persons have been from the dates of the sail and the gift in exclusive possession and enjoyment of their respective properties etc., etc.” The plaintiff in this document draws a clear distinction between the deed of the 29th of September, 1889, and the subsequent deed of gift the 12th of August, 1890. Before we deal with the legal question which has been raised, it may be well to refer to the language of the deed of the 27th of September, 1889. After a recital of the title of the plaintiff the plaintiff purports to dispose of the property using the following words:— ”Now, I, the executant, while in sound state of body and mind, have of my own free will and accord, and without the coercion and compulsion of any one, absolutely sold * * * * * * to Musauimat Hanifa * * * Ibrahim Ali Khan * * * and Bashir-un-nissa in equal shares in lieu of Rs. 60,000.” Then follows this statement:— “The sale is lawful, legal, valid, unconditional, and irrevocable. I received the entire sale consideration aforesaid in full, from the vendees aforesaid and brought it to my use and enjoyment, Not a single shell out of the sale consideration entered in this document as payable to me the executant, remains unpaid by the vendees. I have removed my possession from the aforesaid property sold, specified below, and put the same in proprietary possession of the vendees aforesaid, and made them owners in possession like myself. I have removed my possession from the aforesaid property sold, specified below, and put the same in proprietary possession of the vendees aforesaid, and made them owners in possession like myself. Now I and my representatives have no longer any claim or right to the property sold and the consideration thereof.” At the end of the deed there is a covenant for title, which is not consistent with the suggestion that the deed was intended to be a deed of gift, It is as follows;— “If for any reason the whole or a portion of the property sold passes out of the vendees' possession, the vendees shall have power to realize the sale consideration to the extent of the loss from my property in any way they like.” If Musam-mat Faiz-un-nissa had been making a gift of the property it is not likely that she would have bound herself to pay to the donees the value of any of the property of which they might for any cause be deprived. 5. It is admitted that no portion of the consideration money was paid. If there had been any controversy as to this, evidence would have been admissible to prove that there had been no such payment. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Shah Lal Chand v. Indarjit, [1900] I.L.R., 22 All., 370 held it to be “settled, law that notwithstanding an admission in the sale-deed, that the consideration has been received, it is open to the vendor to prove that no consideration has been actually paid. If it was not so,” their Lordships add “facilities would be afforded for the grossest frauds. The Evidence Act does not say that no statement of fact, in a written instrument, may be contradicted by oral evidence, but that the terms of the contract may not be Varied, etc. etc.” In admitting evidence to prove, that what on the face of it was a sale-deed, was really intended to be and was a deed of gift, the Court below has offended against one of the fundamental rules of construction, which forbids the admission of extrinsic evidence with a view to setting up an intention inconsistent with the plain meaning of the document itself. Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act embodies this rule in clear and unequivocal terms. Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act embodies this rule in clear and unequivocal terms. It provides that when the terms of any contract, grant or other disposition of properly, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved as required by the preceding section “no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument, or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from its terms,” There are some exceptions to the rule set forth in the section, but tin's case clearly cannot be brought within any of them. Sir Walter Colvin has suggested thai proviso (6) might apply but he did not press the point. This proviso runs as follows:— Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of the document is related to existing facts,” It manifestly relates to the admissibility of evidence necessary to make the words which are used fit the external things to which the words are appropriate. For example, if lands, at a certain place in the grantor's occupation are conveyed by a document, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show what lands were in his occupation. So also if a gift be made to a man's children, extrinsic evidence would be admissible to define who the children were. Other instances might be multiplied. The question before us is really ‘concluded by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Balkishen Das v. Legge, [1899] I.L.R., 22 All, 149. In that case a deed of sale of land for value was accompanied by a deed of agreement between the parties for repurchase by the vendor on payment by him of a sum of money on a future date. The deeds were followed by transfer of possession to the vendee and by his receipt of profits. The vendor did not exercise his right of repurchase, but after a number of years gave notice of his intention to redeem and brought a suit to enforce his right of redemption as upon a mortgage by conditional sale. Evidence of the respondent and of another party was admitted by the Subordinate Judge for the purpose of proving the real intention of the parties, and that evidence was to some extent relied upon in both Courts. Evidence of the respondent and of another party was admitted by the Subordinate Judge for the purpose of proving the real intention of the parties, and that evidence was to some extent relied upon in both Courts. Their Lordships laid down that Courts below were wrong in admitting evidence for the purpose of proving the intention of the parties, and that the case must be decided on a consideration of the contents of the documents themselves. They state in their judgment, “Their Lordships do not think that oral evidence of intention was admissible for the purpose of construing the deeds or ascertaining the intention of the parties. By section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act (Act I of 1872), no evidence of any oral agreement can be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument, or their representatives in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying or adding to or subtracting from its terms, subject to the exceptions contained in the several provisos. It was conceded that this case could not be brought within any of them. The cases in the English Court of Chancery, which were referred to by the learned Judges of the High Court have not in the opinion of their Lordships, any application to the law of India as laid down in the Acts of the Indian Legislature. The case must therefore be decided on a consideration of the contents of the documents themselves, with such extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances, as may be required to show in what manner the language of the document is related 10 existing facts.” In view of this clear statement of the law, it is unnecessary for us to consider the decisions to which we have been referred. The question before us is not one in regard to the admissibility of evidence to show that a recital of fact in a conveyance or contract is erroneous but of evidence to vary a deed the language of which is plain and unambiguous. We therefore must allow this appeal. 6. The plaintiff claims recovery of the property, the subject matter of the deed of conveyance, or in the alternative payment of the price. She clearly is not entitled to enforce her claim for recovery of the property but she is in our opinion entitled to recover the price. We therefore must allow this appeal. 6. The plaintiff claims recovery of the property, the subject matter of the deed of conveyance, or in the alternative payment of the price. She clearly is not entitled to enforce her claim for recovery of the property but she is in our opinion entitled to recover the price. We do not think that this is a case in which we should award her interest on the purchase money for the past time. We therefore set aside the decree of the Court below and give a decree to the plaintiff for recovery from the defendants of the sum of Rs. 60,000 with interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum from this date, and declare that the plaintiff is entitled to a charge or lien on the property now in the hands of the defendants for the amount decreed. We direct that in default of payment by the defendants of the said sum with interest within six months from this date, the property in their hands or a sufficient part thereof be sold to satisfy the decree. The defendants must also pay to the plaintiff the costs of this appeal and also the costs in the Court below, including fees in this Court on the higher scale. 7. The plaintiff is willing in lieu of a decree for the purchase money to take a reconveyance of the property remaining in the hands of the defendants-respondents at the date of the institution of the suit, We therefore direct that a rider be added to the decree, that if within two months from this date the defendants-respondents retransfer the property remaining in their hands at the date of the institution of the, suit free from incumbrances created by them or any of them and deliver up possession of the same to the plaintiff-appellant, the same shall be accepted as in full satisfaction of the decree save in respect of the costs hereby awarded to the appellant, and the decree shall not be executed save in respect of costs.