JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. 1. This appeal arises out of an application for the execution of a decree, and the only question, which we have to determine, is that of limitation. The decree was passed on the 2nd of December, 1885, for sale of mortgaged property. It further provided, that in the event of the proceeds of such sale proving insufficient, the person and other property of the mort-gagor would be liable. The decree was thus a combination of decrees under sections 88 and 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. The decree-holder proceeded to execute the decree and after taking some steps for realising the amount of it by sale of a part of the mortgaged property, they, on the 29th of November, 1897, made an application to the court, for sale of non-hypothecated property. The judgment-debtor objected to that application on the ground that it was premature, the whole of the mortgaged property not having been exhausted. The objection was over-ruled by the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, but it prevailed in this Court, which held that the decree-holders were not entitled to proceed against non-hypothecated property at that stage and dismissed the application for execution. On the 26th of August, 1901, the present application was made for sale of the remainder of the mortgaged property. The question is whether this application is barred by limitation. 2. It is admittedly barred unless the operation of limitation is saved by the previous application of the 27th of November, 1897, If that application was an application in accordance with law, it would afford to the decree-holder a fresh start for the computation of limitation. We have, therefore, to consider whether that was an application in accordance with law, within the meaning of article 179 of Schedule II, to the Limitation Act, It has been held by this Court in Chattar v. Newal, [1890] I.L.R. 12 All., 64 that the term applying in accordance with law means “applying to the court to do somethings which by law that court was competent to do. It does not mean applying to the court to do something which either to the decree-holders direct knowledge of facts or his presumed knowledge of law he knew that the court was incompetent to do.” The same view was held in a recent unreported case, E.S.A. No. 165 of 1902 decided by Mr. It does not mean applying to the court to do something which either to the decree-holders direct knowledge of facts or his presumed knowledge of law he knew that the court was incompetent to do.” The same view was held in a recent unreported case, E.S.A. No. 165 of 1902 decided by Mr. Justice AIKMAN, on the 28th of May, 1903. The facts of the case last mentioned are very similar to those of the present case. Applying the principle of the rulings to which we have referred we must hold that the application of the 29th of November, 1897, was not an application, to the proper court, for execution in accordance with law, and consequently that application could not save the operation of limitation. We accordingly allow the appeal, and setting aside the decree of the lower appellate court, with costs, here and in the court below, restore that of the court of first instance. Costs in this Court will include fees on the higher scale.