JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - In this case Mr. Monahan, the Assistant Settlement Officer, after dismissing five suits instituted before him by the Petitioner called upon him and his putwari, Chooa Lal Dass to show cause why they should not be prosecuted under secs. 193, 196 and 109 of the Penal Code in respect of offences alleged to have been committed at the trial of these cases. On the 15th September cause having been shown, Mr. Monahan after stating that he was not satisfied recorded the following order : "I have therefore Complained under sec. 195(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code against Sheobux Ram (the Petitioner) and Chooa Lal" and at the same time he addressed a letter to the District Magistrate making a formal complaint. On the same day the District Magistrate issued warrants against the two accused fixing the 26th September for the hearing and transferred the case to Babu S.C. Mittra, Deputy Magistrate, for trial. The Petitioner applied to Mr. Vincent who was both Session Judge and Special Judge under the Settlement Act to refer the matter to the High Court with a view to having the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer set aside and Mr. Vincent thereupon sent for the record and it was accordingly forwarded to him. As Sessions Judge Mr. Vincent had power under sec. 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to call for the record in order to satisfy himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Magistrate, it having been alleged that the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was in valid as there was nothing to show that the Petitioner could be treated as in law an abettor and that the order was bad. As Special Judge however he had no power under that section to call for the record as the section only empowers, among other Criminal Courts, a Session Judge to call for record from an inferior Criminal Court, and so far as the special Judge was concerned the Deputy Magistrate was not an inferior Court. Had the Assistant Settlement Officer granted sanction to prosecute the accused instead of making as he did a complaint the Special Judge would have been competent to revoke the sanction. It is not quite clear in what capacity Mr. Had the Assistant Settlement Officer granted sanction to prosecute the accused instead of making as he did a complaint the Special Judge would have been competent to revoke the sanction. It is not quite clear in what capacity Mr. Vincent was addressed as the petition to him is not upon the record and in the proceedings on the case be has been variously described by himself and others as Sessions Judge, District Judge and Special Judge. The point however is not of material importance in the view which I take of the matter but having regard to the explanation of the Magistrate in showing cause I think it may be taken that the application was made to him as Special Judge. 2. On the 26th September the case was postponed on the application of the Petitioner pending the disposal of the application until the 3rd October. On the 5th October the trial of the case was transferred to the file of Mr. J.N. Chowdhuri, Deputy Magistrate. In the meantime however on the 1st of October Mr. Vincent had heard the application and had reserved judgment. It having been brought to his notice, however, that Mr. Monahan was about to go on transfer to Orissa and that his evidence was very material for a correct understanding of the facts he returned the record in order that Mr. Monahan's evidence might be taken and be directed that it be sent back within a week. 3. From the order-sheet of the Deputy Magistrate it appears that Mr. Monahan was examined on the 5th October and the Deputy Magistrate directed the record to be sent at once to the 'Session Judge' by a special messenger with a covering letter stating that the 12th October had been fixed for the cross-examination of Mr. Monahan and the examination of the other witnesses. It also appears from an order of the Deputy Magistrate that on the 10th October the record was sent back by the "District Judge" for re-submission after the cross-examination of Mr. Monahan and that the accused persons were to be informed that the case would be "put up on the 12th" (the date previously fixed) for the cross-examination of Mr. Monahan. On the 12th October Mr. Monahan was present for cross-examination but the Petitioner declined to cross-examine at that stage. Monahan and that the accused persons were to be informed that the case would be "put up on the 12th" (the date previously fixed) for the cross-examination of Mr. Monahan. On the 12th October Mr. Monahan was present for cross-examination but the Petitioner declined to cross-examine at that stage. The Deputy Magistrate, however, took up the enquiry which was pending before him examined the witnesses for the prosecution and after taking the statements of the two accused committed them for trial to the Sessions Court and thereafter sent the record to the Session Court. 4. The result of this action on the part of the Deputy Magistrate was to render abortive the application which was pending before Mr. Vincent and as to which he had reserved judgment on the 1st October for the special purpose of having the evidence of Mr. Monahan recorded On the 30th October the Deputy Magistrate himself recorded in the order-sheet that the record had been sent back to him for resubmission after the cross-examination of Mr. Monahan. 5. When the application came on again before Mr. Vincent he professed to find himself powerless to act in the matter. "By the time " he said "I received the record back the Petitioner had already been committed to the Court of Session and he went on to say that he thought that at that stage it would be obviously inadvisable and inexpedient to make a reference to the High Court. He further stated that inasmuch as he had been asked to make a reference to the High Court on a question of fact, the question of fact being apparently whether there was any evidence to justify the commitment he refused the application made to him and this he professed to do as "Special Judge." 6. As Special Judge Mr. Vincent had no power under secs. 435 and 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to make a reference to the High Court though as Sessions Judge he would have been competent to have made a reference be the High Court recommending if he took that view, that the proceedings before the Deputy Magistrate should be set aside as regards the Petitioner on the ground that there was no offence disclosed against him. Whatever his powers as Sessions Judge or special Judge were the fact remains that he refused to interfere and a commitment was made by the Deputy Magistrate. 7. Now a commitment once made by a competent Magistrate can be quashed by the High Court only and only upon a point of law and it has been contended that the Magistrate was not at the time, he committed the Petitioner competent by reason of the pendency of the application before Mr. Vincent to make a commitment. 8. No order was made by Mr. Vincent, and apparently none could legally have been made, for the stay of proceedings before the Deputy Magistrate. But the fact that the record had been called for and sent up to his Court operated ipso facto as a stay, and had it not been for the accidental circumstances that Mr. Monahan was about to be transferred and that Mr. Vincent considered it necessary to have his evidence, it is clear, I think, that the record would not have been returned to the Original Court, until the application pending before the special Judge had been disposed of in due course. The Deputy Magistrate appears to have taken advantage, I do not suggest that he did so improperly or intentionally, of the record having been sent back to him for the limited purpose of cross-examining Mr. Monahan to proceed with the enquiry as if nothing had happened and to commit the Petitioner and his co-accused. The action of the Deputy Magistrate was perhaps somewhat precipitate. But what we have to determine is whether the commitment was bad in law either because under the circumstances the Magistrate was not at the time competent to make the commitment or if he was competent because the commitment was in itself invalid owing to a defect in the proceedings in which it was made. 9. I am not prepared to say that the Magistrate was not at the time competent. The case was pending before him and he had not been restrained from going on with the enquiry by any order staying proceedings. That it was not contemplated by the Court before which the application dealing with the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was pending that anything would have been done in furtherance of the heating of the case except to cross examine Mr. That it was not contemplated by the Court before which the application dealing with the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was pending that anything would have been done in furtherance of the heating of the case except to cross examine Mr. Monahan admits, I think, of no doubt But it cannot be said that the Magistrate's jurisdiction was ousted. 10. A rule was granted to show cause why the commitment should not be set aside on two grounds, viz., (1) that the Magistrate was not at the time competent to make the commitment and (2) that on the facts the commitment of the Petitioner should not have been made, From what has been said above the first ground has not been established. 11. With regard to the other ground it is to be note 1 in the first place that the Petitioner has only been committed to take his trial for abetment under secs. (4/1 7/1 1/4)(I) and (4/1 7/1 1/4)(I) and (1/1 9/1 3/4)(I) of the Penal Code, that is to say, with having abetted his co-accused Chooa Lal in the commission of the offences of having intentionally given false evidence and of using as genuine evidence which he knew to be false and fabricated. The abetment is charged under sec. 114 of the Penal Code which declares that whenever any person who, if absent, would be liable to be punished as an abettor is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence. Therefore to bring a person within sec. 114 it is necessary first to make out the circumstances which constitute the abetment so that if absent the Petitioner would have been "liable to be punished as an abettor" and then to show that he was also present when the offence was committed. We have had the evidence laid before us. Therefore to bring a person within sec. 114 it is necessary first to make out the circumstances which constitute the abetment so that if absent the Petitioner would have been "liable to be punished as an abettor" and then to show that he was also present when the offence was committed. We have had the evidence laid before us. From that it appears that the facts upon which the commitment has been made are as follows :--The suits in which Chooa Lal was alleged to have committed the offences attributed to him were suits instituted on behalf of the Petitioner, that Chooa Lal was the putwari of the Petitioner and that the Petitioner " makes tepsil (i.e., collects the rents) sometimes and sometimes his putwari Chooa Lal makes tepsil" and that the Petitioner was present in Court, for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution or conduct of the suits when Chooa Lal was being examined and produced the books said to be fabricated, and I think it may be taken that he was interested in the results of the suits and would benefit thereby. 12. The question therefore is whether these facts constitute any evidence of abetment or afford materials from which abetment may be inferred. It is not whether there is sufficient evidence of abetment or sufficient material from which abetment may be inferred. The mere fact that the Petitioner was present in Court will not of course render him liable. It must be shown that if he had been absent he would in the circumstances alleged" have been liable as an abettor, The circumstances (other than the fact of his being present assisting in the conduct of the cases) which appear upon the evidence do not by themselves show that the Petitioner abetted the alleged offences. Nor do they coupled with the fact that the Petitioner was present in Court superintending the conduct of the litigation make out any case of abetment. There is nothing to suggest that he actually instigated his putwari to fabricate false evidence or to support false entries in the books by false evidence, nor is there anything to suggest that he was aware that the evidence given or produced by the putwari was false. 13. There is nothing to suggest that he actually instigated his putwari to fabricate false evidence or to support false entries in the books by false evidence, nor is there anything to suggest that he was aware that the evidence given or produced by the putwari was false. 13. It is the duty of a putwari to look after collections on account of his master and to see that the raiyats pay what his master is legitimately entitled to There are, it is well known putwaris who, from overzeal or from a desire to ingratiate themselves with their masters or possibly with a view in some way to benefit themselves, resort to practices which are not always honest or legitimate to swell the collections, but it cannot he assumed that when they have over-stepped the bounds of what is legitimate their masters are either cognizant or approve of their action. But apart from this consideration I have no hesitation in finding for the reasons which I have stated that there is nothing in the evidence recorded by the Deputy Magistrate or by the Assistant Settlement Officer to show that the Petitioner abetted the commission of any offence. 14. It is not, as I have said a question of the value of evidence, In my opinion there are no materials whatsoever from which it can be inferred that the Petitioner abetted the offences alleged to have been committed by his putwari. 15. It is true that the Deputy Magistrate has inferred from the facts which I have stated that the alleged forged papers "were evidently filed with his (the Petitioner's) knowledge and consent" and that those papers were filed in order to support the contention of the Plaintiff in the various suits against the raiyats. But I am wholly unable to conceive how the inference can be drawn. Were such an inference possible no litigant would be safe, if any of his witnesses should support his case with evidence found to be intentionally false. In my opinion this is a case in which the Petitioner ought not to be allowed to undergo the harassment of a trial though to my mind a trial could only result in his acquittal. Having expressed my opinion on the facts as I have done there can be no impropriety now in my expressing an opinion upon their value as evidence assuming that there is any evidence. Having expressed my opinion on the facts as I have done there can be no impropriety now in my expressing an opinion upon their value as evidence assuming that there is any evidence. Even if it he possible to say the there is some evidence which might be considered against the Petitioner it is, I consider, of such an exiguous character that it might be and I think ought to be disregarded. The object of a preliminary enquiry in a criminal case is to ascertain whether there is any real ease against the accused before a commitment is made and if all that can be said is that there is a mere scintilla of evidence then in my opinion there should be no commitment. 16. It follows necessarily from the finding at which I have arrived that the commitment was had, as upon the facts either alleged or even found by the committing officer, no offence by the Petitioner has been made out or disclosed. In my opinion therefore the rule ought to be made absolute on the second ground and the order of commitment so far as the Petitioner is concerned quashed. 17. As we are unable to agree, the case must be laid before the Chief Justice in order that it may be referred to a third Judge. Geidt, J. 18. The Petitioner, Sheobux Ram, brought a suit under sec. 106, Bengal Tenancy Act, against certain of his tenants. In the course of that suit his putwari Chooa Lal produced certain collection papers containing entries showing payment of rent by those tenants, and gave evidence that the rent thus shown had been paid by them. The Assistant Settlement Officer trying the cases was of opinion that these entries were fabricated and made a complaint both against Chooa Lal who had produced the papers and given the evidence and also against his master the Petitioner who had been present in Court during the progress of the suits. The enquiry was held by a Deputy Magistrate and both Chooa Lal and Sheobux have been committed for trial, the former for giving false evidence, using false evidence, and using forged documents offences punishable respectively under secs. 193, 196 and 471 of the Penal Code and the latter for abetting the above offences under sec. 114 of that Code. The enquiry was held by a Deputy Magistrate and both Chooa Lal and Sheobux have been committed for trial, the former for giving false evidence, using false evidence, and using forged documents offences punishable respectively under secs. 193, 196 and 471 of the Penal Code and the latter for abetting the above offences under sec. 114 of that Code. During the course of the enquiry an application was made to the Sessions Judge to have the case referred to the High Court in order that the prosecution of the Petitioner might be stayed. The Sessions Judge sent for the record and on 5th October the Deputy Magistrate recorded the following order: "Examined-in-chief Mr. Monahan to-day. Send the record at once to the Sessions Judge by a special messenger with a covering letter stating that the 12th October has been fixed for the cross-examination of Mr. Monahan and the examination of the other witnesses." The Sessions Judge on 7th October addressed the following letter to the Deputy Magistrate: "I have the honor to return the record of the case noted on the margin. Please send it to me after Mr. Monahan is cross-examined." On October 10 the Deputy Magistrate recorded the following order "Record sent back by the District Judge for re-submission after cross-examination of Mr. Monahan. Inform the accused persons about this and put up on the 12th (the date previously fixed) for the cross-examination of Mr. Monahan." 19. On 12th October seven witnesses were examined by the Deputy Magistrate the statements of the accused recorded, a charge was framed and the case was committed for trial to the Court of Sessions. The defense declined to cross-examine either Mr. Monahan or any other of the witnesses examined on that day except the peshkar. The record was then returned to the Sessions Judge who finding that the case had been committed declined to proceed further with the matter. 20. On an application made by the Petitioner a rule was issued to the District Magistrate to show cause why the order of commitment made in this case should not be set aside on the grounds, first, that at the time when the commitment was made the Magistrate was not competent to make the order, and, secondly, that he should not have committed the case on the facts. 21. With regard to the first ground Mr. 21. With regard to the first ground Mr. Jackson on behalf of the Petitioner has argued that as the case was before the Sessions Judge on revision, the jurisdiction of the Deputy Magistrate to proceed with it was in abeyance and the order of commitment was therefore ultra vires. With this contention I am unable to agree. The Sessions Judge had passed no order to stay further proceedings, and I am unable to discover in the Code of Criminal Procedure any provision conferring on him authority to pass such an order. Sec. 435 gives him power to call for the record of any proceeding before a Magistrate and while the record is with the Sessions Judge the case before the Magistrate cannot proceed. But this is the result, not of any want of jurisdiction but of the facts that the papers necessary for dealing with the case are out of his reach. As soon as the record is returned to the Magistrate, this impediment is removed, and if there is no legal bar, and the Magistrate resumes the case, his proceedings are not ultra vires. 22. At the same time I wish to make it clear that in my opinion a Magistrate would incur a grave responsibility if he proceeded with a case after an order for stay of proceedings had been passed by the Sessions Judge to whom for purposes of revision he is subordinate. But in the present case no such direction had been given. The Sessions Judge from the covering letter which he received with the record was aware that the 12th of October had been fixed by the Deputy Magistrate, not only for the cross-examination of Mr. Monahan but also for the examination of the other witnesses, and yet when he returned the record he made no order that the examination of the other witnesses must not be proceeded with and further proceedings stayed. There is nothing to show that the Deputy Magistrate was in any way aware of the nature of the application made to the Sessions Judge. All that he was informed was that Sheobux Ram whose prosecution had been ordered had applied for revision. There is nothing to show that the Deputy Magistrate was in any way aware of the nature of the application made to the Sessions Judge. All that he was informed was that Sheobux Ram whose prosecution had been ordered had applied for revision. When therefore the record was returned to him the Deputy Magistrate may well have thought that as the Sessions Judge, who had been informed of the contemplated examination of the other witnesses on the 12th October, had passed no order staying their examination he was at liberty to proceed with the case. It appears to me impossible to say that the Deputy Magistrate in committing the case was acting without jurisdiction, and the first ground on which the rule was issued fails. 23. As regards the second ground mentioned in the rule Mr. Jackson has contended that there is no evidence that the Petitioner abetted Chooa Lal in the commission of the offences with which the latter has been charged and that the Petitioner ought, therefore, not to have been committed to take his trial. The circumstance on which the Settlement Officer mainly relied in directing his prosecution was that the Petitioner had been present in Court while his putwari was in the witness box. Mr. Jackson contends that this circumstance does not make him an abettor and in support of this contention he refers to sec. 114 of the Penal Code. Now the presence of a person at the commission of an offence may be regarded in one of two aspects either as an element in the decree of criminality or as a link in the chain of evidence by which his complicity is sought to be established. With the latter aspect, the Penal Code, a portion of Substantial law, has nothing to do. It is in regard to the former aspect that sec. 114 lays down that when a person if absent would be liable to punishment as an abettor, that person if present when the act or offence abetted is committed, shall be punished as a principal and not merely an abettor. I entirely agree with the decision quoted by Mr. Jackson,--Queen v. Niruni 7 Suth. W.R. Cr. 49 (1867), that in order to bring a prisoner within sec. I entirely agree with the decision quoted by Mr. Jackson,--Queen v. Niruni 7 Suth. W.R. Cr. 49 (1867), that in order to bring a prisoner within sec. 114 it is necessary first to make out the circumstances which constitute abetment, so that if absent he would have been liable to be punished as an abettor; and then to show that he was also present when the offence was committed. 24. But the question for consideration in the present discussion is not what was the degree of criminality involved in the Petitioner's presence when his putwari was giving evidence but whether his presence on that occasion is a relevant fact having any bearing on the issue whether the Petitioner abetted the act of his servant. His mere presence on that occasion undoubtedly will not make the Petitioner liable: otherwise every one in Court including the Settlement Officer, the pleaders, and spectators would be liable. But in my opinion the presence of the Petitioner in Court is a matter which may be taken into consideration in connection with other matters in determining whether the Petitioner know of and abetted the alleged perjury and forgery. Moreover the evidence shows that the Petitioner not merely was present but was actively assisting in the conduct of the suits. 25. To illustrate my remarks regarding the two points of view in which the presence of a person at the commission of an offence may be regarded I will take a concrete instance. B is charged with having caused the death of her husband C by administering poison to him, and A is charged with abetment of that offence by procuring the poison and giving it to B in order that she might administer if to her husband. If A is not present when the poison is administered he will be liable to punishment as an abettor under sec. 109 of the Penal Code. But if he is present on that occasion he will by virtue of sec. 114 be deemed a principal and not merely an abettor. The presence of A is thus an element in the degree of his criminality. But it may very well also be that the circumstance that A was present when the poison was administered is in connection with other facts a relevant fact in determining whether A had instigated B to administer the poison. The presence of A is thus an element in the degree of his criminality. But it may very well also be that the circumstance that A was present when the poison was administered is in connection with other facts a relevant fact in determining whether A had instigated B to administer the poison. For instance if A lived in a distant house and appeared at C's house when the poison was administered at a time when he had no other occasion to be there, his presence at the house may be a material fact in connection with other evidence to show that he had previously instigated B to murder her husband. 26. In the present case it could not be contended that the Petitioner's presence in Court of itself instigated the putwari to give or use false evidence. From the nature of the case, the instigation must have taken place before the suits came on for hearing. To bring the Petitioner within the scope of see. 114 he must be shown to have previously instigated or aided the putwari to give and use false evidence and in my opinion it cannot be said that there are no materials from which such aid or instigation can be inferred. For the determination of this question the following facts, of which evidence has been given, appear to me relevant : -- (1) The Petitioner was the Plaintiff in the suits in which the alleged false evidence was given and the alleged false evidence was used. (2) That alleged false evidence advanced the Petitioner's suits. (3) It was given by a servant, of the Petitioner. (4) That servant was prima facie in no way personally benefited by the fabrication or use of the evidence. (5) The Petitioner is a man who often makes collections himself. It is therefore possible that he knew exactly what rents his raiyats pay and therefore knew that the evidence was false. The degree of association between the Petitioner and his servant and the probability or improbability of the latter acting without the knowledge or active concurrence of the former are matters of fact to be considered in connection with heads 3, 4 and 5. The degree of association between the Petitioner and his servant and the probability or improbability of the latter acting without the knowledge or active concurrence of the former are matters of fact to be considered in connection with heads 3, 4 and 5. When false evidence is given by a witness in furtherance of a litigant's case there is more ground for suspecting that the evidence has been given at the instance of the litigant when the witness is his servant than when there is no such tie between the two, and there is in my opinion no room for apprehension that litigants in general will be suspected of complicity in perjury committed by their witnesses (6) The Petitioner was present in Court actively assisting in the conduct of the suits in which his servant was adduced as a witness for the purpose of giving that evidence which is alleged to be false and using that evidence which is alleged to be fabricated. Evidence of any other purport would have been inconsistent with the claim set up. If the Petitioner was aware of the nature of the suits which he had instituted, and which ho was conducting, would he or would he not also be aware of the nature of the evidence which his servant was about to give ? That is a very material question of fact arising for determination in this case. 27. It is in my view, quite outside our duty on this occasion be express an opinion whether from these materials the correct inference is that the Petitioner did or did not know of the falsity of the evidence and did or did not instigate the giving and using of the false evidence. That is a question for judges of fact. But I hold that these are materials which may properly be taken into consideration in coming to a decision on that question. It may indeed be the case, as suggested by my learned brother, that putwaris from overzeal or a desire to ingratiate themselves with their masters, or possibly with a view to benefit themselves resort to dishonest practices to swell their collections. But to import such considerations into the discussion of the matter of Itself indicates to my mind that there is a case to meet. But to import such considerations into the discussion of the matter of Itself indicates to my mind that there is a case to meet. Whether these considerations override the facts which I have mentioned as relevant is a matter which cannot be decided without an appraisement of evidence and a balancing of probabilities that come entirely within the province of judges of fact. That is a function which we are precluded from assuming on this occasion. A commitment once made to a Court, of Sessions can be quashed only on a point of law. Whether the evidence be strong or weak, sufficient or insufficient to justify a conviction is a question of fact and not of law, and it appears to me that, our duty on this part of the rule is to confine our attention to this single point whether there is or is not evidence in support of the prosecution which might properly be placed before a jury. 28. I am of opinion that there is such evidence and I would accordingly discharge the rule on both the grounds on which it has been issued. 29. Owing to this difference of opinion the case was referred be Harington, J. 30. His Lordship's Judgment was as follows :-- The Petitioner in the present case has been committed to the Sessions to take Ins trial on charges of abetment of perjury sec. (1/1 9/1 3/4)(I), abetment of the offence of using evidence known to be false sec. (1/1 9/1 6/4)(I) and abetment of the offence of using as genuine a forged document sec. (4/1 7/1 1/4)(I). A rule was issued calling on the District Magistrate to show cause why the commitment should not be set aside (1) on the ground that the Magistrate was not competent to commit, (2) on the ground that the committal should not have been made on the facts. 31. On the rule coming on for argument before Henderson and Geidt, JJ., the learned Judges differed in opinion as to whether the rule should be made absolute or discharged on the second ground. 32. The question has now been referred to me. 33. 31. On the rule coming on for argument before Henderson and Geidt, JJ., the learned Judges differed in opinion as to whether the rule should be made absolute or discharged on the second ground. 32. The question has now been referred to me. 33. The test which in my opinion should be applied to decide whether a committal ought or ought not to be made on the facts is this--assuming that the whole of the evidence telling against the accused is true, is there a case which a Judge at a trial could leave to a jury ? If the evidence is such that a Judge would have been bound to rule that there was no evidence on which a jury could convict, then a committal ought not to be made, If there was any evidence which called for an answer, however great the preponderance in favour of the prisoner might be--then the committal was proper. 34. Now, the Petitioner was Plaintiff in a number of suits under sec. 106, Bengal Tenancy Act, which were heard before the Settlement Officer. That officer was called as a witness, he proves that the Plaintiff was present in Court when these suits were tried, and he was examined as a witness, and his putwari was also examined. The putwari produced a number of documents in support of the Plaintiff's case which were forgeries. 35. The Petitioner was present in Court, taking an active part in the prosecution of his suits. 36. The next witness called for the Crown was the holder of a jote who proved the amount of rent, and that the Petitioner sometimes made tehsil himself. 37. The other witnesses carry the case against the Petitioner no further, indeed the only material matter that anyone of them proves is the Petitioner's deposition. 38. That document ought to contain important evidence but it does not. There is a general statement by the Plaintiff that he tested the jamabandis, but it does not appear that he was asked one single question with respect to the forged documents nor does any cross-examination appear to have been directed to disclosing the extent to which he tested the documents prepared by the putwari and whether he had tested the documents in question. He apparently was not even asked whether he had seen the forged documents before they were produced by Chooa Lal in the witness box. He apparently was not even asked whether he had seen the forged documents before they were produced by Chooa Lal in the witness box. 39. The result of the neglect to test the Petitioner's connection with the forged evidence is to leave only this evidence (1) that a servant in the employ of the Petitioner gave false evidence and produced forged documents at the trial of curtain suits, (2) that the Petitioner was present actively prosecuting those suits, (3) that the evidence if believed would have supported the Petitioner's case, (4) that the Petitioner sometimes made collections and had sometimes tested jamabandis. On this the learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that it was necessary for the prosecution to prove under sec. 114, (a) some facts which would have justified the conviction of the Petitioner of abetment of the offence committed by the putwari had he been absent and (b) that he was present. 40. The prosecution unfortunately has not been represented before me : but they can rely on the fact, that the documents were produced by the Petitioner's servant in the Petitioner's presence in a suit in which the Petitioner was taking an active part as Plaintiff and that he would have benefited by the production had the documents been believed. 41. In my opinion this just stops short of a case which would properly be left to a jury. 42. It is a ease of suspicion--possibly strong suspicion--but in the absence of any evidence that the Petitioner had seen, or knew of the contents of the documents produced by the putwari, I do not think there was a case for him to answer. 43. The putwari does not seem to have been asked whether he had shown the papers to his master, or whether his master was aware of the contents. 44. He ought to have been cross-examined on this point and the Petitioner should have been recalled and given an opportunity of explaining if the putwari connected him in any way with the documents. 45. This was not done and the result is that there is a link wanting in the chain of evidence. 46. In my opinion the facts disclosed on the depositions do not give rise to an inference which can make good that defect. 45. This was not done and the result is that there is a link wanting in the chain of evidence. 46. In my opinion the facts disclosed on the depositions do not give rise to an inference which can make good that defect. The result is that I agree with the judgment given by Henderson, J., and am of opinion that the rule should be made absolute and the commitment quashed on the ground that no primd facie case is made out against the Petitioner on the depositions.