JUDGMENT : Aikman, J. Sheo Prasad and Daya Ram were owners of 2½ biswas of mauza Ganauli. In 1884 and 1885, they mortgaged this share, together with a share in another village with which we are not concerned, by deeds of conditional sale to Kunwar Dharam Singh for an aggregate sum of Rs. 5,000. The defendants-appellants purchased the rights of the mortgagee. ‘On 19th March, 1898, they sued to foreclose the mortgages. They got a decree on 26th April, 1898, which was made absolute on 28th January, 1899. Before institution of the suit on the mortgages, Lachman Singh, father of the plaintiffs-respondents, had in execution of a simple money-decree against the mortgagors, purchased their zamindari rights in a portion of their sir land in mauza Ganauli. The appellants, although aware of this purchase, did not make Lachman Singh a party to their suit for foreclosure. Lachman Singh is dead, and his sons have brought the suit out of which this appeal arises for the redemption of the share of the mortgaged property purchased by their father on payment of a proportionate amount of the mortgage money. 2. They obtained a decree from the first Court, which was affirmed on appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge. Against his decision the defendants have preferred this second appeal. One plea in appeal is that the suit is bad owing to want of parties. 3. The only parties to whose absence from the record the appellants took exception (vide paragraph 12 of the written statements) we, the mortgagors and the heirs of one Mani Ram, who it was alleged, had bought a portion of the sir. As to the mortgagors, they had ceased to have any interest in the properly, and were not, in my opinion, necessary parties. 4. As to Mani Ram's heirs, the Court below finds that they had no interest in the property at the time this suit was brought. The plea as to want of parties therefore fails. Another plea in the memorandum of appeal as to the amount found by the Courts below to be payable by the plaintiffs for redemption. The amount was fixed by the Court on consideration of an inquiry made by a commissioner to whose report the defendants took no objection. This plea was not pressed before me in appeal. 5. Another plea in the memorandum of appeal as to the amount found by the Courts below to be payable by the plaintiffs for redemption. The amount was fixed by the Court on consideration of an inquiry made by a commissioner to whose report the defendants took no objection. This plea was not pressed before me in appeal. 5. The main ground on which the appellants rest their case is that set forth in the first ground of their memorandum of appeal, namely, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to redeem a part only of the mortgaged property, but must redeem the mortgage as a whole. 6. Had the defendants made Lachman Singh a party to their suit for foreclosure, he could not have saved that portion of the mortgaged property, the equity of redemption of which he had bought, without redeeming the mortgage as a whole. 7. But the defendants, although they knew of Lachman Singh's interest in the property, did not make him a party to their suit. Are Lachman Singh's representatives bound, under these circumstances, to sue to redeem the whole of the mortgage? 8. The lower Courts have answered this question in the negative. They rely on the last paragraph of section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act:— “Nothing in this section shall entitle a person interested in a share only of the mortgaged property to redeem his own share only, on payment of a proportionate part of the amount remaining due on the mortgage except where a mortgagee has acquired in whole or in part the share of a mortgagor.” 9. I have not been able to discover, and have not been referred to any case on all fours with the present. After giving the question full consideration, I am of opinion that the view taken by the Court below is right. In my opinion the ordinary objection to the redemption of a mortgage piecemeal do not exist in a case like the present, where, as between, the mortgagor and the mortgagee, the mortgage has come to an end. After giving the question full consideration, I am of opinion that the view taken by the Court below is right. In my opinion the ordinary objection to the redemption of a mortgage piecemeal do not exist in a case like the present, where, as between, the mortgagor and the mortgagee, the mortgage has come to an end. The appellants have acquired the whole estate of the mortgagor, with the exception of that portion in which the plaintiffs have still the equity of redemption, and this being so, this Courts below are in my judgment right in holding that the plaintiffs are entitled under the concluding words of section 60 to redeem that portion on payment of a proportionate part of she mortgage money. 10. For the above reason I am of opinion that the appeal fails, and I dismiss it with costs including fees on the higher scale.