JUDGMENT 1. The question before us in revision is whether the applicant, Abru Mia, was properly convicted under sec. 500 of the Penal Code. The facts found are these : In a case concerning false weights in which one Haidar Ali was the accused, the applicant (who was the complainant) deposed as a witness. He was asked, (1) whether he knew one Kanu, (2) whether Haidar Ali had had any quarrel with Kanu, and (3) whether Kanu had asked pardon of Haidar Ali in a punchayet. The convicting Magistrate goes on to say : "The alleged objectionable statement was apparently made in continuation of the 3rd question and not in answer to any put by the pleader cross-examining him." The statement so made was--" Accused (Haidar Ali) admitted in the punchayet that Kanu beat him with a wooden shoe." This was a false and very defamatory statement. There was no punchayet. Thus, the applicant has been convicted under sec 500, I.P. Code. 2. We are not disposed to interfere in this matter. The riding in Wooljun Bibi v. Jesarat Sheikh ILR 27 Cal. 202(1899) is, no doubt, in favour of the contention that Abru Mia should have been prosecuted for giving false evidence, and not for the offence of defamation. But that case makes no reference to sec. 132 of the Evidence Act, the proviso to which has been construed, in Moher Sheikh v. Queen-Empress ILR 21 Cal. 392 (1893), to be not applicable to voluntary statements. On the other hand, some Bombay and Madras authorities, for instance, Queen-Empress v. Babaji ILR 17 Bom. 127 (1892), Queen-Empress v. Balkriehna Vithal ILR 17 Bom. 573 (1893). (5) I. L.R. 11 Mad. 477 (1888) and Manjya v. Sesha Setti (5) go very much further than the above first-cited ruling, and apply the English rule, of protection against indictment for defamation, to witnesses in this country. But that rule is stated in Odger's work on Libel and Slander to be subject to certain qualifications. "A remark made by a witness in the box wholly irrelevant to the matter of enquiry, uncalled for by any question of counsel, and introduced by the witness maliciously for his own purposes, would not be privileged. (P- 227). 3. We think that even according to the above rule, as limited, Abru Mia has been rightly convicted. "A remark made by a witness in the box wholly irrelevant to the matter of enquiry, uncalled for by any question of counsel, and introduced by the witness maliciously for his own purposes, would not be privileged. (P- 227). 3. We think that even according to the above rule, as limited, Abru Mia has been rightly convicted. His voluntary statement as to shoe-beating was not relevant to the issue whether Haidar Ali was found to be in possession of false weights. It was not elicited by the pleader putting questions to Abru Mia. Again it is perfectly clear, from the judgment of the Magistrate, that Abru Mia was actuated by malicious motives against Haidar Ali who is a wholesale dealer in the bazar against whom the retail sellers have combined. Then, the case of Moher Sheik v. Queen Empress ILR 21 Old. 392 (1893) is directly in point and we follow that authority. We, therefore, decline to interfere. Let the papers be returned.