JUDGMENT : KNOX, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by one Lala Chunni Lal, who has died since this appeal was filed and is now represented by Lala Someshwar Das and Lala Sham-bhu Nath, to recover a sum of Rs. 19,065-2-9 odd on account of principal and interest due under a mortgage deed purporting to have been executed by the appellant Musammat Sharifunnissa on the 17th of September, 1896, and registered on the 26th of September, 1896. The defendant in her written statement did not specifically deny the execution or registration of the mortgage deed, although it appears that in the court below her legal advisers did deny the execution and registration of the instrument. She pleaded that she had no necessity to contract any debt, that she had never had any money dealings with the plaintiff, and that owing to her being a pardanashin lady and having given birth to a child shortly before the date of the bond, she was not in a position to understand its contents or to obtain any advice regarding it. She further pleads that her husband is a man of extravagant and licentious habits, who is always in debt and contends that if he, whilst she was in a helpless state, got the document executed and property hypothecated, it ought not to beheld binding upon her. She adds that the nature of the document was not explained to her and that she could not read it. The learned Subordinate Judge found it proved that she did sign the bond, and that out of the consideration set forth in the bond, Rs. 11,252-0-6 did actually come into her hands. He was not, however, satisfied by the evidence that the lady fully understood the nature of the transaction. As a result of these findings he gave the plaintiff a money decree for the above amount. He dismissed the balance of the plaintiff's claim and he also dismissed the suit so far as it asked for a decree for the sale of the property, He refused to allow the plaintiff any interest on the amount decreed. Both parties have appealed. The plaintiff in his appeal asked for a mortgage decree for the entire amount of his claim. The defendant in her appeal impugns on various grounds the decree which has been passed against her. Both parties have appealed. The plaintiff in his appeal asked for a mortgage decree for the entire amount of his claim. The defendant in her appeal impugns on various grounds the decree which has been passed against her. The first ground is that the plaintiff has not established that the appellant executed the document. In regard to this we have no hesitation in saying that we are satisfied upon the evidence that the appellant did execute the document. She has never gone into the witness-box to deny having done so. We think that the fact that she signed the: deed is fully established not only by the evidence, which was recorded in the court below, but also by the evidence of her husband taken in this Court. The plaintiff endeavoured in vain to procure his attendance in the court below and it was with difficulty that his attendance in this Court was secured. The next ground is that the Court below erred in holding that it has been proved that the appellant admitted execution of, the document at the time of registration and that it has not been proved that the money paid at the time of registration reached the hands of the appellant, The Registering Officer is unfortunately dead, but the ‘ registration endorsement upon the deed is admissible under section 60 of the Indian Registration Act for the purpose of proving that the facts mentioned in the endorsement did occur as therein mentioned. From the evidence and from that endorsement it appears that the Registering Officer went to the appellant's house in Babupur and that a lady, who was identified by the withnesses named in endorsement as the defendant Sharifunnissa did, after having heard the contents of the document, admit the execution, completion and conditions thereof. The endorsement further shows that the amount, for which the lower court has passed a decree, was made over in cash by the plaintiff's agent to Hafiz Muhammad Taqi, husband of Sharifunnissa, that this sum was taken by him behind the curtain and that the lady who had admitted the execution of the document admitted that she had counted the money and that it was all right. It has never been the case of the appellant that any one personated her at the time of registration. It has never been the case of the appellant that any one personated her at the time of registration. We entirely concur with the lower court in its finding that the money was made over to Musammat Sharifunnissa. The appellant's husband, whilst admitting that his wife was at the time inside the parda, said at first that she did not speak or utter a word whilst the Sub-Registrar was there, but immediately afterwards he qualified this by saying “I did not hear her.” He states that the Sub-Registrar did not read out any thing whilst he was there and that the Sub-Registrar never asked the lady whether she had executed the bond, nor did he read it to her. From the demeanour of the witness we have no hesitation in saying that these statements are false. 2. But the main plea upon which the appellant relies is that which is numbered 4 in the memorandum of appeal. The learned counsel who appears on her behalf contended strenuously that upon the finding that the document in question was not explained to the appellant, that she did not understand the liability she was incurring, that she had no advice of any sort in the matter, and that the mortgage transaction now in suit failed altogether, the suit of the plaintiff ought to have been dismissed in toto. With reference to the above plea it is first to be observed that what the Subordinate Judge did in fact find was, (1) that the Musammat did not receive any independent advice, and (2) that she did not fully understand the liability she was incurring. Reliance is placed upon the following authorities:— Sham Sundar Lal v. Achhan Kunwar, [1898] I.L.R., 21 All., 71, Shambati Koeri v. Jago Bibi, [1902] I.L.R., 29 Cal., 749, Mariam Bibi v. Sakina, [1891] I.L.R., 14 All., 8, Asghar Ali v. Delroos Begam, [1877] I.L.R., 3 Cal., 324, Behari Lal v. Habiba Bibi, [1886] I.L.R., 8 All, 267, Hakim Muhammad Ikram-ud-din v. Najiban, [1898] I.L.R., 20 All., 447. There is this fundamental difference between the facts found in the present appeal and those found in the cases cited above viz., that while we find it proved in tin's case that the money borrowed was made over to Musammat Sliarifunniss a, the finding in the cases relied on is in some to the express contrary, in others to the effect either (1) that no consideration passed or (2) that what evidence there was of debts being due or of the passing of the money into the hands of the lady affected was incomplete and unsatisfactory. 3. In all the cases cited to us we have been unable to find any one on all fours with the present, viz., a case in which it is proved that the plaintiff who, it must be noted did not stand in any fiduciary relation towards the appellant, advanced money to the appellant which was by her received on the execution of a bond and utilized in part in payment of debts due by her. 4. The larger portion of the money went to pay the debts incurred by the appellant's husband who from the evidence appears to be a man of extravagant habits. It is possible that it may have been owing to pressure put upon her by her husband that the plaintiff borrowed the money, but it is perhaps equally possible that the plaintiff who had given birth to her first-born son twenty-two days previously, may have been led by this event without any undue pressure on the part of her husband to borrow money to clear her husband from debt. It is we consider a significant circumstance that one of the husband's creditor, to whom upwards of Rs. 4,000 was due, paid up at the time of the loan by the hands of Khair-ud-din who, as appears from the evidence, is the brother of the appellant Musammat Sharifunnissa. But whatever may have been the motive which led Sharifunnissa to borrow the money, we can see no reason why the plaintiff who as remarked above stood in no fiduciary relation to her and who is not shown to have taken any undue advantage of her, should not get the money which he actually advanced to her. 5. But whatever may have been the motive which led Sharifunnissa to borrow the money, we can see no reason why the plaintiff who as remarked above stood in no fiduciary relation to her and who is not shown to have taken any undue advantage of her, should not get the money which he actually advanced to her. 5. On behalf of Sharifunnissa a plea was taken that at the date of the alleged execution and registration she was by reason of having recently given birth to a child physically incapable of the acts assigned to her. We do not think there is anything in the plea. Her child was born on the 26th of August, 1896. The bond in suit was executed on the 17th September, 1896, and registered on the 26th September, This was a sufficiently long interval after the birth to admit of the lady being in condition to understand what she was doing. 6. The plaintiff asked that the defendant should be ordered to pay the money sued for and that in default the mortgaged property might be sold. For the appellant it is contended that as the plaintiff asked for a decree for sale on his mortgage, it was not open to the Court below to pass a money decree. We consider that this plea is without any force. 7. Lastly it is contended that a suit for a money decree would have been barred by limitation at the date when this suit was instituted and that therefore such a decree ought not to have been passed. The money was lent on a registered bond and the suit having been instituted within six years of the date of execution, we are of opinion that this contention cannot be sustained. 8. The above is sufficient to dispose of the pleas which were urged before us in support of the appeal loged by the defendant Mnsammnt Sharifunnissa Bibi. That appeal fails and we dismiss it with costs including fees on the higher scale. 9. The plaintiff filed an objection under section 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also a separate appeal of his own. 10. The main contention both in the objection and in the appeal is that plaintiff ought to have got a decree for sale of the mortgaged property. 11. 9. The plaintiff filed an objection under section 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also a separate appeal of his own. 10. The main contention both in the objection and in the appeal is that plaintiff ought to have got a decree for sale of the mortgaged property. 11. The decisions which have been relied on, on behalf of the defendant-respondent, abundantly “show with what jealous care the interests of pardauashin ladies in this country have been guarded. While on the one hand we are satisfied on the evidence that the money for which the court below has given a decree actually reached the defendant's hands, we are not equally satisfied that she had in the course of the transaction independent advice or that she had explained to her the nature of the transaction into which she entered. The bond was no doubt read to her. There is evidence that she possesses some degree of education, but after hearing the terms of the bond in suit, which are in some instances couched in highly technical language,” we doubt whether she understood the full purport thereof and the liability which it imposed on her property. We do not overlook the statement which was elicited from her husband in cross-examination, viz., that he told his wife about the deed afterwards and that she said that her property would be sold. We think ‘the evidence falls short of sustaining the burden of proof which rests on the, plaintiff of shewing that all the conditions Which are necessary to bind a pardauashin lady have been fulfilled in this case. We, therefore, concurring with the court below, find that the lady though she received the money did not fully under-stand the liability she was incurring in the execution of this mortgage deed. The main plea in the plaintiff's appeal therefore fails, The second plea is that it is proved that Musammat Sharifunnissa received the whole of the consideration of the mortgage deed and benefited thereby. Part of the consideration was for an antecedent parole debt. We agree with the learned Subordinate Judge in finding that it has not been satisfactorily proved that she received or was benefited by any portion of this parole debt. 12. The last plea in the plaintiff's appeal is as to interest. Part of the consideration was for an antecedent parole debt. We agree with the learned Subordinate Judge in finding that it has not been satisfactorily proved that she received or was benefited by any portion of this parole debt. 12. The last plea in the plaintiff's appeal is as to interest. The court below has allowed the plaintiff no interest on the amount which has been found to have been paid to the defendant. The bond provides for compound interest with six monthly rests. We are not satisfied that the Musammat understood the effect of this provision, but we do not see why the plaintiff should not have simple interest for the money which he lent to the defendant, The rate of interest entered in the bond, viz. 9 per cent, per annum, is not by any means a high rate for this country, We so far allow the plaintiff's appeal as to vary the decree of the Court below by awarding to the plaintiff interest at the rate of 9 percent, per annum on the amount decreed from the 26th day of September, 1896, to the 18th day of September, 1901, the date of the institution of the suit, and thereafter at six per cent till date of payment. To this extent we allow the plaintiff's appeal with proportionate costs, including fees on the higher scale. Quoad ultra, it is dismissed.