JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. 1. This appeal arises out of an application made under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, for an order absolute for sale, which has been dismissed by the court below on the ground of limitation. The only question which we have to determine in this appeal is whether the application is time-barred. 2. The decree under section 88 of the Act was passed in favour of two persons, Baldeo Prashad and Ram Ghulam, on April 13th, 1895, and the date fixed in it for payment of the mortgage money was the 13th of October, 1895. 3. The present application was made on the 19th of May, 1902. Whether this application is governed as to limitation by article 178 or by article 179 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act, it would be time-barred, unless the operation of limitation was saved, by certain applications which were made in the interval, and to which I shall presently refer. 4. On 11th April, 1898, Baldeo Prashad, one of the decree-holders, on his own behalf and on behalf of the other decree-holder, made an application for the sale of the mortgaged property. It was not in terms an application for an order absolute for sale under section 89, but it was in the usual form of an application for execution under section 235 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Oudh Behiri Lal v. Nageshar Lal, [1899] I.L.R., 31 All., 278 that an application for aa order absolute, under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, is an application in execution, subject to the rules of procedure governing such matters, and that an application for execution of the decree under section 88 of the Act is a good application under section 89, and a separate application is not requisite. Upon the authority of tin's ruling, the application made in this case, on the 11th April, 1898, may be deemed to be an application under section 89. Upon the authority of tin's ruling, the application made in this case, on the 11th April, 1898, may be deemed to be an application under section 89. The record shows that it was treated by the Court as such, as the Court made an order directing that notice under section 89 be issued to the judgment-debtors, A notice was accordingly issued, but it was returned unserved, and as the decree-holders' pleader failed to furnish the proper address of the judgment-debtors, the case was struck off the file, on the 4th June, 1898. 5. On the 13th February, 1901, another application in almost the same terms as the previous application was filed. The Court caused some formal defect in it to be amended and then the officer of the Court reported that an order absolute, under section 89, had been prepared upon the previous application of the 11th April, 1898. This report was in fact incorrect, as no order under section 89 had been actually made or prepared. The Court, however, assumed that such an order had been passed, but on the 27th February, 1904, rejected the application under the provisions of section 245 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that it had not been accompanied by an extract from the Collector's register as required by section 238 of the Code, 6. The next application was made on 29th May, 1901, It was dismissed on 17th June, 1901, the Court recording the following order:— “It appears that an application was made for an order absolute, but that application was struck off for default. So long as a decree absolute is not prepared, the property cannot be sold, Application dismissed”. 7. Upon the passing of this order the present application was made on the 19th May, 1902, for an order absolute under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act. As I have already pointed out, this application must, according to the ruling of the Full Bench in Oudh Behari Lal v. Nageshar Lal, [1890] I.L.R., 31 All., 278 which was followed in Chunni Lal v. Harnam Das, [1898] I.L.R, 20 All., 302 and other cases, be held to be an application for execution and will therefore be governed, as regards limitation, either by article 178 or by article 179 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act. The latter article will apply if any of the clauses specified in the 3rd clause of that article can be made applicable otherwise article 178 will apply, This was held in the analogous case of an application under section 87 for an order absolute for foreclosure in Ali Ahmad v. Naziran, [1902] I.L.R., 24 All., 542 and in the case of an application under section 89 in Udit Narain v. Jagannath, [1904] 1 A.L.J.R., 15. As none of the clauses in article 179 can apply to a first application under section 89, such an application will be governed by article 178. But subsequent applications will be governed by article 179. In this case it is contended, on behalf of the appellants, that the fourth paragraph of article 179 applies and that the previous applications to which I have referred, were applications in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution. In my judgment there is much force in this contention. Having regard tp the ruling of the Full Bench in Oudh Behari Lal v, Nageshar Lal, [1890] I.L.R., 13 All., 278 the previous applications were applications for execution, and although they did not in specific terms ask for an order absolute under section 89, they were nonetheless applications or such an order. As already stated, the Court treated the first application as an application under section 89 and ordered notice to issue under that section. When the next application was made, the Court assumed that an order under section 89 had already been made. As in both these applications, the prayer was that the property be sold, both of them may legitimately be treated as applications for an order for sale, although they were also applications for the actual sale of the property. The first two applications, dated respectively the nth April, 1898, and the 13th February, 1901, were thus applications for execution, made to the proper Court, in accordance with the law and the decision of the Court below to the contrary is, in my opinion, erroneous. The first application was made within three years of the date on which the applicant right to apply accrued and was therefore within time under article 178. The second application having been made within three years of the first was also within time under article, paragraph 4. The present application was made within three years of the second application. The first application was made within three years of the date on which the applicant right to apply accrued and was therefore within time under article 178. The second application having been made within three years of the first was also within time under article, paragraph 4. The present application was made within three years of the second application. Therefore, even if we do not take into account the third application, the present application was not time-barred. In my judgment the Court below was in error in holding it to be so, and this appeal must prevail. As Musammat Mamman Bibi, one of the respondents, was not served with notice of the appeal and no steps were taken to serve her, the appeal against her must fail and the application of the appellants must be dismissed as against her and her interests in the mortgaged property. As there was no other objection to the application save that of limitation and that objection is in my opinion untenable, the application for an order absolute should be granted against all the respondents, except Musammat Mamman Bibi. I would allow the appeal and, setting aside the order of the Court below with costs in both Courts, grant, the application of the appellants against all the respondents save Musammat Mamman Bibi and her interests in the mortgaged property. As against her and her interest the application should stand dismissed. The costs of this Court will include fees on the higher scale.