JUDGMENT Harington, J. - The substantial question raised in this appeal is whether the Plaintiffs' suit is barred by limitation. The suit was brought on August 9th 1900 on an allegation that the cause of action arose on 16th May 1887. The claim set up in the plaint was for possession of certain lands alleged to appertain to mouzah Narangi, Narangi formed part, of the Burdwan Raj Estate--after having been held in putni for many years it was sold for arrears of rent under Reg. VIII of 1819 and purchased on 14th May 1887 by the late Maharani Bandeo Debi, the widow and heiress of the late Maharajah of Burdwan. The cause of action therefore accrued to that lady who then represented the Burdwan Raj Estate. 2. She was a minor and therefore would under sec. 7 of the Limitation Act have been entitled to a period not exceeding 3 years after attaining her majority in which to exercise her right to sue. But before she attained her majority she adopted the Plaintiff as son to her deceased husband and she died without, it is said, ever attaining her majority. Her adopted son, the present Plaintiff, is still a minor, but the action is brought for him by his next friend. 3. For the Appellant it is argued that the Plaintiff cannot take advantage of sec. 7 of the Limitation Act because that section only provides that if a person entitled to institute a suit be at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned a minor he may institute the suit within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed therefor in the third column of the second schedule. Then follows a proviso limiting the extension to a period of 3 years. The Plaintiff was adopted after May 1887 so at the time from which the period of limitation was to be reckoned he was not a "person entitled to institute a suit" for at that time he had no interest at all in the property of his adoptive family. The person then entitled to institute a suit was the Rani : time had begun to run against her: he cannot take advantage of the 3rd and 4th paras, of sec. The person then entitled to institute a suit was the Rani : time had begun to run against her: he cannot take advantage of the 3rd and 4th paras, of sec. 7 because his interest is not that of legal representative of the deceased Rani but as heir to his adoptive father. 4. I do not think the Appellant's contention is sound. 5. Now as far back as May 1887 the Defendants were holding the property on their own behalf, and the true owner the Rani, who as heiress of the late Rajah represented the Burdwan Raj Estate, was entitled to immediate possession. She was entitled to sue by her next friend or she was entitled to wait until she attained her majority and then under the provisions of sec 7 to bring her suit within 3 years after the attainment of her majority. 6. Instead of exercising these rights she adopted the Plaintiff as son to her deceased husband. By this act she divested herself of all the rights she had as heiress of her deceased husband : she clothed the Plaintiff with those rights. She was no longer entitled to sue to recover khas possession of any land forming a portion of the Burdwan Raj Estate : it was the Plaintiff who, on the act of adoption, became entitled to bring such suit not as representing the Rani but as filling the place which the Rani had filled up to the adoption, namely, as representing the Burdwan Raj Estate in the character of the heir of the last full owner, i.e., the Rajah. 7. Is he entitled to the benefit of sec. 7 of the Limitation Act? I think he is. 8. In the Tagore case L.R.IndAp Sup. Vol. 47 (66) (1872) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered the position of an adopted son with respect to his power of taking a gift under a Will, and they say that an adopted child, whether adopted during the lifetime of the adopted father or after his death, is in contemplation of law begotten by the father who adopts him, or for, or on whose behalf he is adopted. There is therefore high authority for the proposition that for certain purposes an adopted son may be regarded as having been in existence at the time of his adoptive father's death. 9. There is therefore high authority for the proposition that for certain purposes an adopted son may be regarded as having been in existence at the time of his adoptive father's death. 9. If he be so regarded for the purpose of inheriting or receiving a gift, I see no reason why he should not be so regarded for the purpose of saving his right of suit under sec. 7 of the Limitation Act with respect to the present cause of action. But I do not think it is necessary to have recourse to that fiction of law to support the Respondent's case. The right to sue at the time of the Plaintiff's adoption had been neither exercised by the Rani nor had it become barred by limitation. It was a fight which the Rani had in virtue of her position as heiress of the deceased Rajah; when she ceased to be such heiress she ceased to have that right. In my opinion the Plaintiff on adoption became clothed with all the rights which the Rani had at the time of adoption in her character as heiress to the deceased Rajah. He therefore bad the same right to sue as the Rani had up to the time of the adoption. The right vesting in the heir of the Maharajah under sec. 7 of the Limitation Act had never been determined. In my opinion the heir in the person of the adopted son is just as much entitled to the benefit of that section as the heiress in the person of the Rani was until the adoption took place. 10. For these reasons I hold that the suit is not barred by limitation and the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Mookerjee, J. 11. This is an appeal on behalf of some of the Defendants in an action for recovery of possession of immoveable property commenced against them on the 9th August 1900 by the Plaintiff-Respondent, the Maharajah of Burdwan. The Plaintiff alleges that the land in dispute appertains to his mouzah Narangi, that the mouzah was in the possession of putnidars from the 20th June 1838 to the 14th May 1887, when it was sold under Reg. VIII of 1819, and purchased by Maharani Bandeo Debi, the adoptive mother of the Plaintiff, who at the time represented the Burdwan Raj. VIII of 1819, and purchased by Maharani Bandeo Debi, the adoptive mother of the Plaintiff, who at the time represented the Burdwan Raj. It is further alleged that during the continuance of the putni, the Appellants had dispossessed the putnidar of the lands now in claim and that consequently the Maharani was unable to obtain possession after her purchase. The Plaintiff was adopted by the Maharani in August 1887 and at the time of the institution of the present suit was still an infant; it was therefore brought on his behalf by his next friend Raja Ban Behari Kapur. The Defendant resisted the claim substantially on two grounds, namely, first, that the land in dispute is a contiguous accretion to their mouzah Bhitsair, and, secondly, that the claim is barred by limitation. The Courts below have found concurrently in favour of the Plaintiff upon the question of title; they have also held that no question of limitation arises because time runs from the date of purchase at the putni sale on the 14th May 1887 and on that date, as also on the date when the Plaintiff was taken in adoption, the Maharani was a minor, so that since the purchase the property has been owned by two infants successively, namely, first by the Maharani and next since the adoption by the present Maharajah. In this view of the matter, the Courts below have made a decree in favour of the Plaintiff, which is now challenged before us on one ground, namely, that the suit ought to be dismissed as barred by limitation. 12. In support of his argument, the learned Counsel for the Appellants had contended that as the suit was instituted more than 12 years after the sale under Reg. VIII of 1819, it is barred under Art. 142 of Sch. 11 of the Limitation Act, because sec. 7 of that Act which refers to the extension of time in the case of a minor Plaintiff has no possible application to the circumstances of the present case. The learned Counsel for the Respondent on the other band has contended that Art. 144 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act is applicable, that the possession of the Defendants became adverse to the Plaintiff only on the date of his adoption, and that as ever since that date he has been an infant, the claim is not barred by limitation. II of the Limitation Act is applicable, that the possession of the Defendants became adverse to the Plaintiff only on the date of his adoption, and that as ever since that date he has been an infant, the claim is not barred by limitation. The question involved in the appeal is, by no means, free from difficulty, but upon a careful examination of the arguments addressed to us on both sides as also of the authorities to which I shall presently refer, I must hold that the Plaintiff is entitled to succeed. 13. The first point, which arises for consideration, is as to the point of time at which the rights of an adopted son arise in the case of an adoption by a widow after her husband's death; in other words, do his rights relate back to the death of the father when he may be considered as having been born ? In my opinion, the title of a son adopted by a widow under authority from her husband does not relate back to the death of the husband and that when the adoption has taken place, his fictitious birth in the new family cannot be antedated. I think this conclusion is fairly deducible from the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Bamun Dass v. Tarini 7 Moo. I.A. 169 (1858) and Raghunadha v. Brozo Kiskore L.R. 3 IndAp 154 (1876). In the first of these cases, the question was raised whether a widow who had received an authority to adopt was thereby debarred from suing for her husband's estate in her own right, because by a fiction she must be imagined to be a pregnant widow and could consequently sue only on behalf of the son whom she was about to bring forth, The whole of the authorities on the subject were minutely examined in an elaborate judgment of the Sudder Court in Bamun Das v. Tarinee Beng. S.D.A. (1850) 535, and it was held by a Full Bench that although a son, when adopted, enters at once into the rights of a natural born son, his rights do not relate back to any earlier period. This view was affirmed by the Judicial Committee and is in accordance with a series of oases decided by the Bengal Sudder Court mentioned in Morley's Digest, N.S., Vol. This view was affirmed by the Judicial Committee and is in accordance with a series of oases decided by the Bengal Sudder Court mentioned in Morley's Digest, N.S., Vol. I, p.186, including the cases of Kishen Munee v. Oodwunt 3 Mac. Sel. Rep. 304 (1824), Ram Kishen v. Srimutee 3 Mac. Sel. Rep. 489 (1824), which are referred to in the judgment of the Sudder Court in Bamun Dass v. Tarini 7 Moo. I.A. 169 (1858), and by the later cases of Doorga Soondaree v. Gouree Persad Beng. S.D.A. (1856) 170, Sreenath v. Ruttun Malla Beng. S.D.A. (1859) 421, and Manikmulla v. Parbuttee Beng. S.D.A. (1859) 515. The same view has been followed by the High Court of Madras in Lakhmana v. Lakshmi ILR 4 Mad. 160 (1882) and by the High Court of Bombay in Lakshman v. Radhabai ILR 11 Bom. 609 (1887) This position is not inconsistent with the observations of the Judicial Committee in Tagore v. Tagore L.R.IndAp Sup. Vol. 47 (66) (1872), where their Lordships observed as follows: "The Hindu law recognises an adopted child, whether adopted by the father himself in his lifetime or by the person to whom he has given the power of adoption after his death from amongst those of his class, of one to stand in the place of a child actually begotten by the father. In contemplation of law such child is begotten by the father who adopts him, or for and on behalf of whom he is adopted, such child may be provided for as a person whom the law recognises as in existence at the death of the testator, or to whom, by way of exception, not by way of rule, it gives the capacity of inheriting or otherwise taking from the testator, as if he had existed at the time of the testator's death having been actually begotten by him." These observations must be limited in their application to the purpose of determining the capacity of the adopted son to inherit or otherwise take from the person for or on behalf of whom he is adopted. The application of the fiction cannot be extended for the purpose of entitling the adopted son to take the property as it stood at the moment of the death of the person to whom he is adopted; he cannot dispute the previous acts of the adoptive mother unless they were in excess of her legal powers as widow in possession nor can he question the acts of a previous male holder in whom as a member of a joint mitakshara family, the property had vested as full owner and whose estate was divested by adoption; it is equally well settled that the fiction cannot be applied so as to entitle an adopted son to come in among the heirs of a collateral relation subsequent to whose death the adoption has been effected; Bhubaneswari v. Nil-komul L.R. 12 IndAp 137 : s.c. ILR 12 Cal. 18 (1885), Faizuddin v. Tincowri ILR 22 Cal. 565 (1895). I must hold accordingly that the rights of a son adopted by a widow after her husband's death do not relate back to a period earlier than the date of adoption. 14. The next point which requires consideration is the effect of the sale under Reg. VIII of 1819. It is now well settled that a person who has held possession of property adversely against a putnidar, cannot successfully set up such adverse possession against a person who has purchased the property at a sale under Reg. VIII of 1819; as against such a purchaser the adverse possession commences from the date when the sale becomes final and conclusive; Woomeh v. Raj Narain 10 W.R. 15 (1868), Khantomoni v. Bejoy Chand ILR 19 Cal. 787 (1892), and Nuffer Chandra v. Rajendra Lal ILR 25 Cal. 167 (1897). VIII of 1819; as against such a purchaser the adverse possession commences from the date when the sale becomes final and conclusive; Woomeh v. Raj Narain 10 W.R. 15 (1868), Khantomoni v. Bejoy Chand ILR 19 Cal. 787 (1892), and Nuffer Chandra v. Rajendra Lal ILR 25 Cal. 167 (1897). In the first of these cases, the principle which underlies this position was elaborately examined by Sir Barness Peacock, C.J., and it was pointed out that the cause of action of a purchaser of a tenure sold free from encumbrances accrues when he purchases it because it is sold in the state in which it was created, and the purchaser is entitled to have it in the state in which it was created, notwithstanding any under tenure which may have been created by the defaulter, and notwithstanding any encroachments by trepassers upon the holders of snob under-tenures; the purchaser has consequently a right to turn out under-tenants and is also entitled to turn out persons who have encroached upon the defaulter. It is manifest therefore that the possession of the Defendants-Appellants, must be treated as having been adverse against the Maharani purchaser from the 14th May 1887, and as against the present Maharajah from the time of his adoption in August 1887. 15. The third and last point which arises for consideration is whether the claim for recovery of possession is barred by limitation by reason of the adverse possession of the Appellants having extended for a longer period than 12 years from the date of the sale under Reg. VIII of 1819. It is clear that Art. 142 has no application to the case. Neither the Plaintiff nor his adoptive mother was dispossessed or discontinued possession, while in possession of the property in suit. The article therefore which applies is Art. 144, which provides that a suit for possession of immoveable property not otherwise specially provided for, must be instituted within 12 years from the time when the possession of the Defendant became adverse to the Plaintiff, or reading this with the definition of the word 'Plaintiff' in sec. 3, within twelve years from the time when the possession of the Defendant became adverse to any person from or through whom the Plaintiff derives his right to sue. 16. 3, within twelve years from the time when the possession of the Defendant became adverse to any person from or through whom the Plaintiff derives his right to sue. 16. Now from what I have already pointed out it is clear that the Plaintiff as an adopted son does not derive his right to sue from or through his adoptive mother, consequently the Plaintiff is entitled to bring this suit within 12 years from the date of his adoption in August 1887. But as at that time he was admittedly an infant, he is entitled to sue at any time during his minority or within three years from the cessation of infancy, Jagadindra v. Hemanta Kumari L.R. 31 A.I. 203 (1904) and as at the date the action was commenced, he was an infant, the suit has been brought amply within time. It has been contended, however, by the learned Counsel for the Defendants-Appellants, that their adverse possession against the widow commenced on the 14th May 1887, that time having once begun to run, under sec. 9 of the Limitation Act, it did not stop when by reason of the adoption the estate was divested from the widow and became vested in the adopted son, that consequently they are entitled to tack on their adverse possession against the widow to their adverse possession against the adopted son, and that the Plaintiff-Respondent is not entitled to the benefit of either para. 1 or para. 3 of sec. 7 of the Limitation Act--not of the first paragraph, because, at the time from which the limitation is to be reckoned, he was not a minor inasmuch as he was in the eye of law, not in existence, and not of the third paragraph, because though the widow was under disability as an infant, the Plaintiff did not become her legal representative by her death. This argument is ingenious, but in my opinion wholly unsound; it involves the obvious fallacy of regarding the Plaintiff as the representative of his adoptive mother, for the purpose of tacking together the adverse possession against each, but not a representative for the purpose of extension of time on the ground of legal disability. To put the matter in another way, sec. To put the matter in another way, sec. 9 has no application in a case like the present where the Plaintiff who institutes the suit, does not derive his right to sue from or through the person who was dispossessed. This is well illustrated by the cases of Bhagwanta v. Sukhi ILR 22 All. 33 (1899), Gobinda Pillai v. Thayamina 14 Mad. L.J. Rep. 209 (1904), and Abinash Chandra v. Hari Nath ILR 32 Cal. 62 (1904) in which it has been held that where there are several reversioners entitled successively under the Hindu law to an estate held by a Hindu widow, no one such reversioner can rightly he held to claim through or derive his title from another, but he derives his title from the last full owner, and, therefore, although the right of the nearest reversioner for the time being to contest an alienation or an adoption by the widow may have become barred by limitation against him, this will not bar the similar rights of the subsequent reversioner; in other words, the right "I" any reversioner to sue for a declaration cannot accrue before he is born, and if, therefore, he is an infant at the date of the alienation or is born subsequently, he is entitled to the benefit of sec. 7 of the Limitation Act. The only reasonable construction to be put upon that section is that the words "period of limitation" mentioned therein signify the period of limitation for the suit which the Plaintiff or someone through whom he claims is entitled to institute. I must hold accordingly that the title of the Plaintiff accrued when he was adopted, and that the present action commenced during his infancy is not barred, as he is entitled to the benefit of sec. 7 of the Limitation Act, and is not affected by the adverse possession against his adoptive mother. The view I take is supported by the decision of the High Court of Bombay in two recent cases, Moro Narayan v. Balaji ILR 19 Bom. 809 (1894) and Hari Vithal v. Waman Hari 2 Bom. L.R. 411 (1900). 7 of the Limitation Act, and is not affected by the adverse possession against his adoptive mother. The view I take is supported by the decision of the High Court of Bombay in two recent cases, Moro Narayan v. Balaji ILR 19 Bom. 809 (1894) and Hari Vithal v. Waman Hari 2 Bom. L.R. 411 (1900). In the first of these cases, it was held that where a childless Hindu widow in possession of her husband's property had unlawfully alienated a portion in 1868 and twenty years later taken a son in adoption, a suit brought by the adopted son in 1890 to recover the property was not barred by limitation, this conclusion was founded on the ground that the possession of the Defendants did not become adverse to the Plaintiff until he became entitled to possession of the property upon his adoption, and as he did not derive his right to sue from or through his adoptive mother, he was not affected by the adverse possession against her. Mr. Justice Farran pointed out that if the Plaintiff instead of being the adopted son had been a reversionary heir, he would undoubtedly have been not affected by the adverse possession against the widow, and added that it would be a strange anomaly if the right of a Defendant to retain the property of a Hindu husband wrongfully wrested from his widow should depend upon whether the husband is eventually succeeded after the widow by an adopted son or by a collateral heir. It will be observed that in this case the widow was in possession and made an unlawful alienation of the property. In the second case, however, the widow was out of possession, and the property was held adversely to her by a transferee from her mother in-law, who had no title to or authority to deal with the property. Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., held that the distinction is immaterial, and adopting the principle of the earlier case decided that limitation does not commence to run against an adopted son until the date of his adoption, and his right to the ancestral property are unaffected by possession adverse to the adoptive mother. The first of these cases was followed by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in the case of Sreeramulu v. Kristamma ILR 26 Mad. 143 (1902), where Mr. The first of these cases was followed by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in the case of Sreeramulu v. Kristamma ILR 26 Mad. 143 (1902), where Mr. Justice Bhasyam Ayyangar observed that if the widow does not represent the inheritance for purposes of limitation against the reversionary heirs of her husband, it would be unreasonable to hold that it would be otherwise as against a son adopted by her when he claims under his adoptive father. These cases, it may be noticed, go much further than is necessary for the purpose of the case before me, because in each of them, the title of the adoptive mother had been extinguished by adverse possession before the adoption, whereas here the adverse possession against the widow had lasted for a few months only, during her minority. The result, therefore, is that the only ground upon which the decision of the District Judge has been challenged can-not be successfully maintained, and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.