JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. The facts of this case so far as they are not in controversy are as follows:— One of the defendants, Gopal Ram, was the owner of zemindari shares in II villages. He became heavily indebted and allowed payment of the Government revenue to fall into arrear. In consequence of default in payment of the revenue, the Collector caused his zemindari shares to be attached and took the same under his management. The plaintiff, Kanhai Lal, who is a nephew of Gopal Ram, Was prepared to take a farming lease from the Collector of the property (of Gopal Ram), for a term of 15 years; and in order that he might become a co-sharer and so be eligible as a lessee, under the provisions of section 157 of the Land Revenue Act as amended, it was arranged that Gopal Ram should sell to him a one kachwansi share, that is a 1/400th share, in each of the ten villages. The arrangement was carried out, and on the 17th of February, 1900, a one kachwansi share in each of ten villages, was conveyed by Gopal Ram to the plaintiffs, and the price therefore, Rs. 49, was paid. On the 19th of February, 1900, Gopal Ram also sold to the plaintiff his share in two villages, viz., Bhatnansa and Barehra Buzurg, for a sum of Rs. 2,500, and this share was duly conveyed to the plaintiff. The Board of Revenue refused to sanction the lease proposed to be made by the Collector, owing to the length of the proposed term, and this letting therefore fell through. On the 30th of June, 1900, Gopal Ram being unable to meet his liabilities, applied for a declaration of insolvency to the District Judge of Shahjahanpur, and his application was granted on the 8th of August, 1900, and Nazir of the District Judge's Court was appointed receiver of his property. On the 9th of January, 1902, the Collector, acting on behalf of the Receiver, sold and conveyed to the defendant, Kalka Prasad, all the property of Gopal Ram, including the property comprised in the sale-deeds executed in favour of the plaintiff on the 17th and 19th of February, 1900, respectively, the consideration being Rs. 14,114. On the 9th of January, 1902, the Collector, acting on behalf of the Receiver, sold and conveyed to the defendant, Kalka Prasad, all the property of Gopal Ram, including the property comprised in the sale-deeds executed in favour of the plaintiff on the 17th and 19th of February, 1900, respectively, the consideration being Rs. 14,114. This sale, the plaintiff claims, a right to pre-empt, under the terms of the Wajib-ul-arzes, prepared at the settlement of the villages in question, with the exception of share in two villages in respect of which no right of pre-emption is claimed. 2. The main defences set up were that the sale-deeds of the 17th and 19th of February, 1900, were fictitious and were executed without consideration and also that the plaintiff had refused to purchase the property. 3. The lower Court held that the sale of the 17th of February, 1900, was fictitious, but that the sale of the 19th of February of the same year was a good sale. 4. It also held that the plaintiff refused to purchase the property and so was debarred from claiming pre-emption; and further that the plaintiff ought to have claimed a right to pre-empt the entire property and not a portion only. The plaintiff's claim was accordingly dismissed. 5. In this appeal there are two questions of fact for determination. The first is whether or not the sale of the 17th of February, 1900, was a good sale, and secondly, whether or not the plaintiff refused to purchase. In the course of the hearing a question of law has been raised on the part of the respondents which must also be determined. Mr. Porter on their behalf contended, that admitting that the plaintiff was a co-sharer in the villages, the subject-matter of the suit, and had as such in the case of an ordinary sale a pre-emptive right, no such right existed in the case of a sale carried out by the Collector under the circumstances which we have stated; that the property was attached and under the management of the Collector and that the sale by him was on behalf of the receiver in the insolvency matter and was in fact a compulsory sale, in execution of a decree, carried out to satisfy the debts of the creditors of the insolvent. For this contention he relies upon, amongst others, the decision in the case of Baij Nath v. Sital Singh, [1891] I.L.R., 13 All., 244. 6. The sale of the 19th of February, 1900, has been held to be a good sale, and this finding has not been impeached in appeal. Therefore, as regards two villages, shares in which were conveyed to the plaintiff upon that sale, in the ordinary course the plaintiff would have a right to pre-empt the sale. It is not disputed that if the plaintiff was a co-sharer in the villages which are the subject-matter of the suit at the time when the sale to the defendant, Kalka Prasad, was carried out, he had a pre-emptive right under the wajib-ul-arzes of the villages. The first question for our determination is whether the Court below was right in holding that the sale of the 17th of February, 1900, was fictitious. He based his conclusion upon the evidence of the Tehsildar to which he refers and also upon the evidence of the plaintiff himself. This sale was carried out in order to place Kanliai Lal in a position to obtain a lease from the Collector. So long as he was not a co-sharer in the property, a lease could not be made to him the Collector being only empowered to give a lease to a co-sharer. It is also the case that the transfer made to the plaintiff was of a very small share, namely, one kachwansi of each village, and that the price was proportionately small. From the mere fact, however, that the sale was of very small shares in the villages, we fail to see that it can be regarded as fictitious. The Collector was prepared to act upon it as a genuine sale and in view of if, to give to the plaintiff a lease of the villages for a term of 15 years. The plaintiff, moreover, was prepared to pay the arrears of revenue upon the execution of the lease. The learned Subordinate Judge commenting on the evidence of the plaintiff observes that that evidence shows “that the transfer was made simply to make him ostensible share-holder in all the villages.” As to this comment ‘the obvious reply is that it was not to make him ostensible shareholder but a real share-holder that the transfer was made. The learned Subordinate Judge commenting on the evidence of the plaintiff observes that that evidence shows “that the transfer was made simply to make him ostensible share-holder in all the villages.” As to this comment ‘the obvious reply is that it was not to make him ostensible shareholder but a real share-holder that the transfer was made. This both the Tahsildar and the plaintiff deposed to. The Tahsildar says “there being no co-sharer in the property, who could take the property in farm, a sale-deed in respect of a kachwansi share in each of the villages was executed in favour of Kanhai Lal, the nephew of Gopal Ram, for Rs. 49, in order to make him a co-sharer.” We find also that under an agreement, dated the 19th of February, 1900, Baldeo Prasad, the father of Kanhai Lal, undertook to become surety for the payment of the Government revenue provided the Mustajiri (i.e., the farming lease) was sanctioned, Kanhai Lal says that the sale-deed in respect of the one kachwansi share in each of the villages executed to make him a co-sharer in order that he might take the property on lease. The evidence shows that the consideration was duly paid and except for the fact that mutation of names was not effected in respect of the shares comprised in this sale-deed, there is no evidence to support the contention that the sale was fictitious. It seems to us that though the sale was a sale of very small shares in the property it was a genuine sale entered into no doubt for the purpose of giving the plaintiff the status of co-sharer and so qualify him, under section 157 of the Revenue Act, to take the farming lease. This was, however, in no way an illegal object. 7. We now come to the question of the alleged refusal of the plaintiff to purchase. The learned Subordinate Judge come to the conclusion that the plaintiff did refuse to purchase the property, and he refers to his judgment in suit No. 1 of 1903, for the reasons which induced him to come to this decision. 7. We now come to the question of the alleged refusal of the plaintiff to purchase. The learned Subordinate Judge come to the conclusion that the plaintiff did refuse to purchase the property, and he refers to his judgment in suit No. 1 of 1903, for the reasons which induced him to come to this decision. In his judgment in that suit he says, “the evidence of the Tahsildar whom I have got no reason to disbelieve shows that the plaintiff refused to purchase the shares in dispute,” and later on “the plaintiff ought to have said that he was willing to purchase only the shares in dispute if he had really any mind to do so. It appears from the evidence of the Tahsildar that he had on no account any intention of purchasing the property of Gopal Ram. Turning to the evidence of the Tahsildar referred to, namely, Mirza Ahmad Jan, we find that no opportunity was given to the plaintiff to purchase the property when the sale to Kalka Prasad took place, namely, the 9th of January, 1902, or thereafter, The Tahsildar referred to a conversation which he had with the plaintiff and with Baldeo Prasad and Gopal Ram in the month of August, 1901, 4 or 5 months before the sale to Kalka Prasad was completed. His evidence is as follows: “I know the parties to the suit, namely, Baldeo Prasad and Kalka Prasad, Gopal Ram and Kanhai Lal. Once these four persons came to me and Kalka Prasad said that he was going to purchase the entire property of Gopal Ram, and that if Baldeo Prasad and Kanhai Lal wanted to take it, they could do so. Thereupon I asked Baldeo Prasad and Kanhai Lal and they said that neither they had money nor could they fight with Gopal Ram, and so they did not want to make the purchase. Kalka Prasad said that for that property he would pay Rs. 14,000 in cash and Rs. 5,000 on account of a debt due to a person. He mentioned the name of that person, but I do not recollect it,” This is the evidence upon which the Court below relied in holding that the plaintiff had refused to purchase and was therefore debarred from exercising his right of pre-emption. 14,000 in cash and Rs. 5,000 on account of a debt due to a person. He mentioned the name of that person, but I do not recollect it,” This is the evidence upon which the Court below relied in holding that the plaintiff had refused to purchase and was therefore debarred from exercising his right of pre-emption. This evidence only shows that the plaintiff expressed his unwillingness to purchase the property in August, 1901, that is, 4 or 5 months before the sale to Kalka Prasad, As we pointed out in our judgment in the case of Sohan Lal v. Shahabuddin Khan, Second Appeal No. 909 of 1901 (unreported) in order to debar a party entitled to pre-empt a sale from exercising his right, an opportunity to purchase must be given when a definite agreement to purchase at a fixed price has been entered into with a stranger. It is not enough to offer property to a person entitled to pre-empt before an agreement to purchase has been entered into with a third party as was the case here. We have not been referred to any other evidence in support of the finding of the Court below that the plaintiff did refuse to purchase on this occasion, and the decision on this issue therefore cannot be supported. This disposes of all the questions raised in the grounds of appeal. 8. An ingenious point, however, to which we have already alluded to, has been made by Mr. Porter which was not raised in the Court below. It is that the sale to Kalka Prasad was in reality a compulsory sale carried out to satisfy the debts of the creditors of Gopal Ram and that in the case of a compulsory sale, no pre-emptive right can be exercised. His contention is based upon the insolvency sections of the Code of Civil Procedure and particularly upon sections 351 and 352. Section 352 provides that a declaration of insolvency pronounced under section 351 “shall be deemed to be a decree in favour of” each of the creditors for their respective debts. His contention is based upon the insolvency sections of the Code of Civil Procedure and particularly upon sections 351 and 352. Section 352 provides that a declaration of insolvency pronounced under section 351 “shall be deemed to be a decree in favour of” each of the creditors for their respective debts. The argument is that a sale held by a receiver appointed under the insolvency sections, carries with it the same consequences as a sale by the Court in execution of a decree and that as in the case of such last mentioned sale no pre-emptive claim can be advanced, so likewise upon a sale by the receiver of an insolvent estate all rights of pre-emption are extinguished. We have not been referred to any authority which directly supports tin's proposition and are not prepared to accede to the contention. An order appointing a receiver operates to vest in the receiver all the insolvent's property with the exception specified in the first proviso to section 266, and it is the duty of the receiver, under the directions of the Court, to convert that property into money, that is, to do that which the insolvent proprietor might have done, before he was declared to be insolvent. In the present case the receiver has sold the property in dispute by private sale. There is nothing in the Code which suggests that any such sale can be effected in derogation of and to the prejudice of the rights of third parties. In the case of compulsory sale, such as those which take place by public auction in execution of decrees, the legislature has not been regardless of the right of pre-emption. Such compulsory sales take place after the issue of a public proclamation which, it is not unreasonable to assume, becomes known to all persons having pre-emptive rights. Section 310 of the Code, moreover, to some extent protects the rights of co-sharers in providing that when the property sold in execution of a decree is a share in undivided immoveable property and two or more persons of whom one is a co-sharer respectively advance the same sum at any bidding, such bidding shall be deemed to be the bidding of the co-sharer. 9. 9. As MAHMOOD, J., observed, “under the rules of procedure compulsory sales take place, after a public proclamation, which being an act of the Court of Revenue authority is taken to be sufficient notice to the pre-emptors along with the public at large to come forward and purchase the property; and it seems reasonable to suppose that those who do not appear to bid at the auction sale have no wish to purchase the property, These considerations seem sufficient to render the ordinary law of pre-emption inapplicable to sales by public auction in execution of decrees, and this view has received judicial sanction.” “Baij Nath v. Sital Singh, [1891] I.L.R., 13 All., 228. In the case before us the sale was privately arranged between the Collector and Kalka Prasad and was not by public auction, and as we have already pointed out no opportunity was given to the plaintiff, to purchase at the price agreed to be given by Kalka Prasad. We, therefore, are unable to hold that the plaintiff has lost his pre-emptive right. We are unable to see that the fact that the property was under attachment for arrears of revenue in any way affected the plaintiff's rights in the matter of pre-emption. The decree of the Court below dismissing the plaintiff's claim cannot, therefore, be upheld, We must allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below, and as the appellant, through his learned Advocate, has stated that he is willing to take a decree for pre-emption of the ten villages in dispute on payment of the full price of Rs. 14,114 excluding from the decree the lands No. 4 and No. 7 in the schedule to the plaint, we give a decree for pre-emption accordingly, with costs of this appeal including fees on the higher scale and also costs in the Court below, conditional on payment on or before the 1st of August next, of the sum of Rs. 14,114. In default of payment of the said sum the plaintiff's suit will be dismissed with costs in both Courts.