JUDGMENT 1. (Sic) bond, all of dates subsequent to the date of the original bond. It is not denied that there was a contract entered into at the rime of the execution of these bonds of later dates, that the original mortgage of 1839 was not to be redeemed without paying off the sums due under the subsequent bonds. The District Judge has decided that the Plaintiffs should carry out the agreements entered into by their predecessor. 2. The Plaintiffs appeal and on their behalf it has been contended that the Plaintiffs are entitled to redeem the first bond only without paying off the sums due under the later bonds, on the equitable principle that there can be no clog or fetter on the redemption of a mortgage. In support of this contention, the case of Sheo Sankar v. Parma Mahton ILR 260 All. 559 (1904) and Rajmal Motiram v. Shivaji Anandrav (2)(sic) have been cited. In the latter case, however, no question as to the right to clog the equity of redemption is decided The decision merely throws some doubt, on the rule laid down in the case, to be presently noticed, of Hari Mahadaji v. Balambhat ILR 9 Bom. 233 (1884) 3. On the other land, the pleader for the Respondant relies on a passage in the work of Dr. Rash Behari Ghose on the Law of Mortgage, in which it is said (p. 266): "The maxim ('once a mortgage always a mortgage') means it is true that no agreement of the parties can control the right of redemption; 4. sic (sic) then it has reference only to stipu sic (sic) entered into at the time of the sic (sic) again refers to this principle at p. 283 of his work. It, undoubtedly embodies a rule of the English Law of Mortgage, for which there is, also, authority in Indian case law. We, however, have referred to the cases of Hari Mahadaji v. Balambhat ILR 9 Bom. 233 (1884), Yashvant v. Vithoba ILR 12 Bom. 231 (1887), Krishnaji v. Maheshvar ILR 20 Bom. 346 (1895), Unni v. Nagammal ILR 18 Mad. 368 (1895). We, however, have referred to the cases of Hari Mahadaji v. Balambhat ILR 9 Bom. 233 (1884), Yashvant v. Vithoba ILR 12 Bom. 231 (1887), Krishnaji v. Maheshvar ILR 20 Bom. 346 (1895), Unni v. Nagammal ILR 18 Mad. 368 (1895). In these cases a distinction is made between an unsecured debt and a debt secured by some charge on the land already mortgaged, and there would seem to he also a tendency to permit of the fettering of the equity of redemption in favour of debts of even the former description. But, on the other land, in Sheo Sankar v. Parma Mahton ILR 26 All. 559 (1904), it is broadly stated that the redemption of a mortgage cannot be clogged or fettered by a subsequent agreement. In this case the learned Judges were dealing with an instrument which attempted to fetter or clog the mortgagor's rights, but which did not create any charge on the property, which was the subject of the mortgage bond, sought to be redeemed by the mortgagor or his representative. It is to be regretted, we think, that in this case the learned Judges did not make any allusion to, or apparently considered, the effect of the provisions of sec. 61 of the Transfer of Property Act, which impliedly permit of contracts precluding a mortgagor from redeeming "without paying any money due under any separate mortgage made by him, or by any person through whom he claims, on property other than that ILR 26 All. 559 (1904). comprised in the mortgage which he seeks to redeem." But in any ease the Allahabad decision is no authority for the contention that the Plaintiffs in this suit cannot be compelled to pay off the sums due on the bonds other than the simple bond, Ex. B, for these three bonds create charges on the disputed lands. The Allahabad case is, therefore, no authority for holding that the agreement entered into by the parties, that the debts due on these bonds should be paid off simultaneously with the earlier bond of 1839, is illegal and cannot be given effect to. On the contrary, agreements of even wider scope have been held to be valid and enforceable [see the remarks of Sargent, C.J., in Yashvant v. Vithoba ILR 12 Bom. 231 (1887), of Subramaniya Ayyar, J., in Unni v. Nagammal ILR 18 Mad. On the contrary, agreements of even wider scope have been held to be valid and enforceable [see the remarks of Sargent, C.J., in Yashvant v. Vithoba ILR 12 Bom. 231 (1887), of Subramaniya Ayyar, J., in Unni v. Nagammal ILR 18 Mad. 368 (1895)], and indeed it would seem inequirable that the Defendant should be deprived of property of which he is now in possession, until all the debts charged on such property are paid off. We feel some doubt as to the simple bond, Ex. B. This is no mortgage bond The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, apparently, do not contemplate the equity of redemption being clogged or fettered by a contract for the payment of such an unsecured bond debt. There would seem to be no authority for a contract to pay off such a debt being enforceable. 5. We may, therefore, we think, follow the Allahabad case referred to so far as the amount of the simple bond, Ex. B, is concerned We are fortified in this conclusion by another case, Rugad Singh v. Satnarain Singh ILR 27 All. 178 (1904). There the learned Judges, in speaking of a simple money bond, observe :--'It does not create any charge, and amounts to no more than a clog or fetter on the equity of redemption.' To this extent we modify the lower Appellate Court's decree and direct that, in making up the account, which it has ordered to be made up, the amount of the bond, Ex. B, viz., Rs. 150 shall not be taken into consideration. This order carries costs in proportion. In other respects we dismiss this appeal with coals in proportion.