JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. On the ground of delay and laches alone on the part of the plaintiffs we think the Court below rightly dismissed the plaintiffs suit. It is well established that the delay of either party to a contract in not prosecuting his right to the interference of the Court by the institution of a suit may constitute such laches as will disentitle him to the aid of the Court. For the purpose of specific performance, undue delay may amount to an abandonment of the contract by an aggrieved party. “A party cannot call upon a Court of Equity for specific performance, said Lord ALVANLEY, M.R. “unless he has shown himself ready, desirous, prompt and eager.” Milward v. Earl Thanet, [1801] 5 Ves., 720. The rule is specially applicable when the subject matter of the contract is of speculative or fluctuating value. It is said on behalf of the respondent, and it is not denied, that property in Cawnpore has of late years largely increased in value, and the suggestion has been thrown out that it is to the enhancement of the value of the property, which is the subject-matter of this appeal, rather than to any sentimental wish, such as is suggested on the part of the appellants, to regain possession of their ancestral property, that this litigation owes its origin. The plaintiffs, it is said, encouraged by aid from outside speculators, hope by the aid of the Court to carry out a bargain which for the reason stated above, would be highly beneficial to them. That there has been great delay, on the part of the plaintiffs, in seeking the aid of the Court, is established beyond any doubt, The agreement sought to be enforced is dated the 11th of May, 1898. Differences arose between the parties in regard to the terms of the contract, and so long back as the 14th of June, 1898, the plaintiffs were apprised by the defendant that the contract was at an end. The defendant, however, expressed his willingness to meet the plaintiffs fairly and to enter into negotiations for a new contract if such were agreeable to them, So, on the 14th of June, 1898, the plaintiffs had notice that the defendant refused to perform the contract. The defendant, however, expressed his willingness to meet the plaintiffs fairly and to enter into negotiations for a new contract if such were agreeable to them, So, on the 14th of June, 1898, the plaintiffs had notice that the defendant refused to perform the contract. Nothing was done until the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, was instituted on the 10th of June, 1901, that is, after a lapse of nearly three years. The last letter on the subject of the agreement was written on the 30th of August, 1899, by the defendant's pleader to the plaintiff's pleader. This terminated the correspondence. On the part of the plaintiffs,’ it has been contended that the delay in completing the contract was solely attributable to the fact that the defendant insisted that certain mortgagee rights which he possessed were not included in or affected by the contract. But if this were so, it was the duty of the plaintiff to insist on and, if necessary, promptly institute a suit for specific performance, Not having done so, it appears to us that their suit was rightly dismissed. 2. The defendant has sworn, and we think truly, that he has spent a considerable, sum of money in improving the property since October, 1899, and that the rents have gone up considerably since that date; and it appears to us that it would be inequitable to give the plaintiffs the benefit of this expenditure and of the enhancement in value of the property. 3. It further appears, that notice has been served under the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition of portion of the property, for the purposes of extension works in connection with the Railway, and that in respect of this land the defendant has filed in the Collector's Court a claim for compensation, amounting to upwards of 2 lakhs. We think it highly probable, that it was in view of these matters that the tardy claim of the plaintiffs for specific performance was advanced. 4. We think it highly probable, that it was in view of these matters that the tardy claim of the plaintiffs for specific performance was advanced. 4. The Court below has also held, that inasmuch as the contract contained an agreement empowering the defendant to sell the property, the subject-matter of the suit, in default of payment of certain instilments of the purchase-money, which was invalid in view of the provisions of section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, the contract ought not to be specifically enforced, This raises a question of some nicety. It is admitted that this provision of the contract is invalid, but it is said on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants that the mistake of the parties in inserting it was a mistake of law and not of fact, and that the Court ought not to relieve the defendant from his obligation to fulfil his contract by reason of such a mistake, and especially as plaintiffs are willing to take specific performance expunging the sale-clause, i.e., expunging that without which the defendant swore he would hot have entered into the contract. Now it is true that a Court of Equity will not in general relieve against a mistake in a contract which was a mistake of law, but there are cases in which the Court does not hold itself strictly bound by this rule, but relieves against a mistake of law if there be any equitable ground, which makes it under the particular facts of the case inequitable that a party benefited by the mistake should retain that benefit. “If the defendant,” said PLUMER, V.C. “can show any circumstances dehors, independent of the writing making it inequitable to interpose for the purpose of a specific performance, a Court of Equity having satisfactory information upon that subject will not interpose.” [Clowes v. Higginson, [1813] 1 V. and B. 527; s.c. 12 R.R., 285]. Referring to the general rule MELLISH, L.J. observed in Rogers v. Ingham, [1876] 3 Ch. Referring to the general rule MELLISH, L.J. observed in Rogers v. Ingham, [1876] 3 Ch. D., 351, 357 “I think there is no doubt that the rule at law is in itself an equitable and just rule which is not interfered with by Courts of Equity; but on the other hand I think that, no doubt, as was said by Lord Justice TURNER,’ this Court has power (as I feel no doubt that it has) to relieve against mistakes in law as well as against mistakes in fact [Stone v. Godfrey, [1854] 5 D.M. & G, 90]; that is to say, if there is any equitable ground which makes it under the particular facts of the case inequitable that the party who received the money should retain it.’ “The learned Subordinate Judge in the exercise of his discretion considered that it would be improper to enforce specific performance of a contract containing a provision contrary to law. We are not prepared to say that in this case he was wrong in refusing to do so. A Court of Equity may look to circumstances outside the contract and not accept the validity of the contract : of itself as conclusive in plaintiff's favour. In this case the evidence shows that the defendant would not have entered into the contract, if he had been aware that the provision for sale contained in it in default of payment of instalments of the purchase money was invalid. He assigns good reasons for the insertion of this provision in the contract. Both parties were at the time of the contract clearly in ignorance, or had lost sight of the provisions of section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that effect could not be given to the power to sell for which the defendant contracted. Seeing that this material term of the contract connot be enforced, would it be equitable to enforce the contract in dispute? The Court below in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be said to have been capriciously exercised, decided this question in the negative. We should not be disposed to disagree in the view it took if it were necessary to decide the question, but in view of the great delay on the part of the plaintiffs in seeking the aid of the Court with which we have already dealt, it is unnecessary to determine it. 5. We should not be disposed to disagree in the view it took if it were necessary to decide the question, but in view of the great delay on the part of the plaintiffs in seeking the aid of the Court with which we have already dealt, it is unnecessary to determine it. 5. Pandit Sunder Lal relied upon the provisions of section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, which preclude the enforcement of a contract assent to which was given under the influence of a mistake of fact, misapprehension or surprise. He argued from the fact that a mistake in law was not mentioned in this section, that the Court was not merely not precluded from enforcing but ought to enforce a contract induced by a mistake of law. We cannot accede to this argument. The fact that the enforcement of certain contracts is prohibited by the section, does not narrow the power of the Court in other cases or prevent it from refusing in the exercise of a proper discretion to enforce specific performance on equitable grounds, We think that the plaintiffs have by their delay and laches lost their right to the aid which the Court might have given if they had promptly appealed to it. 6. As regards the claim for damages no attempt whatever has been made to prove any damage. This is admitted by the learned advocate for the appellants. Consequently the last ground of appeal must fail. 7. We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale. 8. We have also to consider an objection filed under section 561 of the Civil Procedure Code on the subject of costs. The Court below for reasons assigned in the judgment directed that the, parties should bear their own costs. The respondent claims to be entitled to his costs in court below. Under the circumstances we see no reason for interference with the decision of the Court below upon this question, and we disallow the objection. We say nothing as to costs.