Parsasth Nath Tewari v. Dhanai Ojha and Dewkinundan Misser
1905-05-25
body1905
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. The suit out of which this appeal arises is of a rather peculiar nature. It is brought by one Hindu against another, for the purpose of enforcing an alleged right of pre-emption. The Plaintiff says that he is an 8 annas share-holder in the estate, and that, on the 9th August 1901, the remaining 8 annas share was sold to the Defendant No. 1, but that since he came to hear of the sale he ascertained his right of preemption as shaft khalit, and that he has brought this suit to have his title according to Mahomedan law, declared. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit. 2. The District Judge gave the Plaintiff a decree. 3. The Defendant No. 1, the purchaser of the property from the Defendant No. 2, appeals to this Court; and the learned pleader who appears on his behalf contends, first, that there is no right of pre-emption between non-Mahomedans, secondly, that the District Judge has found that the sale of 1901 was not a bond fide transaction and therefore there could be no right of pre-emption; and, thirdly, that the formalities necessary for enforcing the right of pre-emption had not been completed. 4. It is unnecessary for us to say anything with regard to the third of these grounds of appeals, as the learned District Judge has found, as matter of fact, that the Plaintiff immediately on becoming aware of the sale of 1901 made the formal demands; and we would not be justified in disturbing his finding on this point. 5. We, however, think that the first two grounds urged by the Appellant must prevail. 6. The parties are non-Mahomedans, apparently Hindus of the Brahmin case; and although there may be a custom of pre-emption among the Hindus of Behar, yet we find that the Plaintiff is not a resident of Behar, but of a village in the North-Western (now, the United) Provinces.
6. The parties are non-Mahomedans, apparently Hindus of the Brahmin case; and although there may be a custom of pre-emption among the Hindus of Behar, yet we find that the Plaintiff is not a resident of Behar, but of a village in the North-Western (now, the United) Provinces. Now, in Sir Roland Wilson's Digest of Anglo-Mahomedan Law, Art. 352, p. 397, we find it laid down that " where the custom is judicially noticed as prevailing in a certain local area, it does not govern persons who, though holding land therein for the time being, are neither natives of, or domiciled in, the district." It is clear to us that the Plaintiff is not a native of Chapra, where the property is situate: nor is he domiciled there because in para. 3 of his plaint he says that he resides in the District of Balia and that when, in Aughran 1309 F.S., he came to Mouzah Tarwa Tewari in Pergunnah Chonpur to collect, he became aware of the transfer. So that it was only on a visit to the place where the property is situate, that the Plaintiff came to know of the sale. That being so, it does not appear to us that the Plaintiff has a right of preemption. Moreover, on the finding of the District Judge, we think that no right of pre-emption accrued to the Plaintiff, even if he was entitled to preemption according to local custom, because the District Judge has distinctly found that the sale by the Defendant No. 2 in favour of the Defendant No. 1 was not a bond fide sale, but a sham transaction. He says that the transaction was arranged so as to cheat the Plaintiff, and that this is evidenced by the fact that no consideration was paid except, perhaps, the sum of Re. 1 and that the rest of the consideration was covered by a couple of bonds, which have not yet been satisfied. According to the finding of the District Judge, therefore, there has been no sale. Now in Baillie's Digest of Mahomedan Law (1st Ed.), p. 472, it is laid down that "there must also be an entire cessation of all rights on the part of the seller.
According to the finding of the District Judge, therefore, there has been no sale. Now in Baillie's Digest of Mahomedan Law (1st Ed.), p. 472, it is laid down that "there must also be an entire cessation of all rights on the part of the seller. There is therefore no right of pre-emption for an invalid sale, but if the purchaser under an invalid sale should sell by a valid sale, the pre-emptor has the option and may take the mansion in the first or second sale." 7. The learned pleader for the Plaintiff Respondent argues that it does not lie in the mouth of the Defendant No. 1, the purchaser, to come forward and say that he has not bought the property and therefore the Plaintiff has no right of pre-emption. It appears to us, however, that the Defendant No. 1 has a right to come forward and argue, as he has been doing here, that in the finding of the District Judge no right of pre-emption arises. 8. In these circumstances we decree this appeal and dismiss the Plaintiff's suit with costs. We understand that the preempted price has been deposited in the Court below and taken out of Court by the Defendant No. 2. The money now be returned.